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AUTONOMOUS CARS AND TORT
LIABILITY
By Kyle Colonna*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine jumping into your car after a long day of work, entering
your address into the car's computer, and falling asleep while the car
navigated its way to your home. According to Nady Boules, General
Motor's Director of the Electrical and Control Integration Lab, this
technology is only ten years away from becoming a reality. 1
Unfortunately, there are currently legal barriers that would prevent
car manufacturers from introducing this technology. For example,
forty-nine states have driver's license and examination laws, which
make it illegal for a car to drive itself without a licensed operator. 2
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1.

Larry Webster, The Age of the Car That Drives Itself, POPULAR
MECHANICS
(Oct.
18,
2010,
12:00
PM),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/news/industry /the_age-of-thecar-that-drives-itself (discussing Google's "fleet of driverless Toyota
Priuses" that have driven autonomously for 140,000 miles).

2.

Matthew Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous Vehicles for Personal
Transport: A Technology Assessment, CAL. INST. OF TECH. 6 (June 2,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1865047 ("[W]e interviewed Ryan Calo, the director of the
Consumer Privacy Project at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet
and Society. Calo made it clear that the legal issues behind autonomous
driving are not fully sorted yet, but explained that the legal code
relating to this technology essentially boils down to the following: 'every
vehicle needs to have a licensed operator."'); see also Year of First State
Driver License Law and First Driver Examination, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP.
(Apr.
1997),
available
at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/dl230.pdf (showing a list of
all states with driver's license and examination laws). In Illinois, the
Secretary of State has set the minimum age to obtain a valid driver's
license at sixteen. See fllinois Graduated Driver Licensing System, ILL.
SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.cyberdriveillinois~com/departments/
drivers/teen_driver_safety / gdl.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). The
issue is that a machine neither qualifies to obtain a driver's license nor
can it pass the driver's examination under the current law. Most, if not
all states, have similar laws; therefore, in forty-nine of the fifty states,
autonomous cars are not legal on a mere technicality.
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On June 16, 2011, Nevada passed bill A.B. 51!3 and became the
first state to amend its current transportation statute to expressly
recognize autonomous cars as a legal form of transportation. 4
Although Nevada took the first step in legalizing autonomous cars,
the statute failed to provide any specific regulations tailored to cars
with autonomous technology. 5 Instead, A.B. 511 charges the Nevada
Department of Transportation with the task of subsequently creating
autonomous car regulations. 6
Approximately four months later, the Nevada Department of
Motor Vehicles proposed "minimum safety standards" for autonomous
vehicles, which define autonomous technologies, set testing and
certification requirements, establish minimum safety standards, and

et forth· driver's license and registration requirements. 7 On February
~5, 2012, Nevada's Legislative Commission adopted the first
autonomous car regulations in the United States. 8
While most of the provisions are not out of the ordinary, Sections
3 and 4.2 define the "operator" of the vehicle as the person who
"causes the autonomous vehicle to engage . . . . "9 The regulations,
moreover, deem the operator as the driver of the vehicle for
"purpose[s] of enforcing traffic laws and other laws applicable to
drivers and motor vehicles operated in [Nevada]." 10 Hence, if the
owner of an autonomous car "engages" 11 his autonomous vehicle and
it "runs" a red light while in autopilot mode, the owner would
technically incur liability for the infraction.
Nevada's new law accounts for violations arising out of an
operator's action or inaction.i 2 However, the law is less clear about
violations caused by manufacturer errors. 13 Products liability and
strict tort theories impute liability on the manufacturers of defective
hardware or software, and the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles
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Stan Hanel, Driverless cars tested in Nevada, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct.
~4, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/drive/driverless-cars-testedm-nevada-131846728.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2011, 11:22 AM) ("AB
511 passed through the Assembly Ways and Means Committee as well
as the Senate Finance Committee, where it was amended twice before
being.vo~ed for final passage by both state houses. Gov. Sandoval signed
the bill mto law on June 16, and Nevada became the first state in the
nation to allow driver less vehicles onto designated roadways.").
Clay Dillow, Nevada Is the First State to Pass Driverless Car
Legislation, Paving the Way for Autonomous Autos, POPSCI (Jun. 23,
2011, 4:~5 PM), http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2011-06/nevadapasses-dnverless-car-legislation-paving-way-autonomous-autos
(discussing Nevada passing Assembly Bill No. 511, which gives the
Nevada Department of Transportation authorization to "draft a set of
regulations and rules governing autonomous cars"); see also A.B. 511,
2011 .Legis., Comm. on Transp., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/ AB511_EN.pdf;
see
also
Bryant Walker Smith, Backseat Driving, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND
Soc'y
(Jan.
31,
2012,
9:12
PM),
http://cyberlaw.st~nford.edu/blog/2012 /02/backseat-driving (discussing
how the state legislatures for Nevada, Florida, Hawaii, Arizona and
Oklahoma are taking measures to "expressly regulate automated
driving").

See Evan Ackerman, Nevada Bill Would Provide Tentative Roadmap for
IEEESPECTRUM
(Apr.
29,
2011),
Autonomous
.Vehicles,
~ttp:( /spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificialmtelligence / nevada-bill-would-provide-tentative-roadmap-fora utonomous-vehicles (discussing how Nevada's "new bill" A.B. 511 is
" very vague. ") ; see al so A .B. 511, 2011 Legis., Comm. on' Transp., 76th
'
Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
system/files/ AB511_EN.pdf.
A.B. 511, 76 Legis., Comm. on Transp., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available
at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/AB511_EN.pdf ("The
Department shall adopt regulations authorizing the operation of
autonomous vehicles on highways within the State of Nevada.").
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7.

Proposed Reg. of the Dep't of Motor Vehicles, LCB File No. R084-11
(proposed Oct. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 483 NAC, 482 NAC, 487
NAC, 484 NAC), available at http://leg.state.nv.us/register/
2011Register/R084-11I.pdf. (proposing regulations for autonomous c~rs,
specifically: definitions for autonomous car technology, testmg
requirements, certification requirements, minimal safety requirements,
driver's license endorsement, and registration requirements).

8.

Nev. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Regulations Clear the Road for Selfdriving Cars, DMVNV.COM (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.dmvnv.com/
news/12001-regulations-for-self-driving-cars.htm ("In a s~ep that pu~s
Nevada first in the nation while paving the way for urnque economic
opportunity, the Legislative Commission today approved .regulations
allowing for the operation of self-driving vehicles on the state's
roadways.").

9.

Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, 482A NAC §4.2, 2 (2012),
available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/2011Register/R08411A.pdf ("For the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws and other laws
applicable to drivers and motor vehicles operated in this State, the
operator of an autonomous vehicle that is operated in autonomous mode
shall be deemed the driver of the autonomous vehicle regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the autonomous vehicle while
it is engaged.").

10.

Id.

11.

See Smith, supra note 4 ("This language raises at least three questions.
What 'causes' the engagement? Is the person causing it necessarily a
natural person? And can the DMV lawfully deem that person to be the
driver of a vehicle that by statute 'drive[s] itself?"').

12.

See Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 9, § 4.2.

13.

Id.

83

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET · VOL.

4 · N 0. 1 · 2012

Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability

On June 16, 2011, Nevada passed bill A.B. 511 3 and became the
first state to amend its current transportation statute to expressly
recognize autonomous cars as a legal form of transportation. 4
Although Nevada took the first step in legalizing autonomous cars,
the statute failed to provide any specific regulations tailored to cars
with autonomous technology. 5 Instead, A.B. 511 charges the Nevada
Department of Transportation with the task of subsequently creating
autonomous car regulations. 6
Approximately four months later, the Nevada Department of
Motor Vehicles proposed "minimum safety standards" for autonomous
vehicles, which define autonomous technologies, set testing and
certification requirements, establish minimum safety standards, and

3.

4.

5.

6.

Stan Hanel, Driverless cars tested in Nevada, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct.
~4, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/drive/driverless-cars-testedm-nevada-131846728.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2011, 11:22 AM) ("AB
511 passed through the Assembly Ways and Means Committee as well
as the Senate Finance Committee, where it was amended twice before
being_vo~ed for final passage by both state houses. Gov. Sandoval signed
the bill mto law on June 16, and Nevada became the first state in the
nation to allow driverless vehicles onto designated roadways.").
Clay Dillow, Nevada Is the First State to Pass Driverless Car
Legislation, Paving the Way for Autonomous Autos, POPSCI (Jun. 23,
2011, 4:~5 PM), http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2011-06/nevadapasses-dnverless-car-legislation-paving-way-autonomous-autos
(discussing Nevada passing Assembly Bill No. 511, which gives the
Nevada Department of Transportation authorization to "draft a set of
regulations and rules governing autonomous cars"); see also A.B. 511,
2011 .Legis., Comm. on Transp., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/ AB511_EN.pdf;
see
also
Bryant Walker Smith, Backseat Driving, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND
Soc'y
(Jan.
31,
2012,
9:12
PM),
http://cyberlaw.st~nford.edu/blog/2012/02/backseat-driving (discussing
how the state legislatures for Nevada, Florida, Hawaii, Arizona and
Oklahoma are taking measures to "expressly regulate automated
driving").

See Evan Ackerman, Nevada Bill Would Provide Tentative Roadmap for
Autonomous
_Vehicles,
IEEESPECTRUM
(Apr.
29,
2011),
~ttp: ( / spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/ artificialmtelhgence / nevada-bill-would-provide-tentative-roadmap-forau tonomous-vehicles (discussing how Nevada's "new bill" A.B. 511 is
" very vague. ") ; see al so A .B. 511, 2011 Legis., Comm. on' Transp., 76th
'
Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
system/files/AB511_EN.pdf.
A.B. 511, 76 Legis., Comm. on Transp., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available
at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/ AB511_EN.pdf ("The
Department shall adopt regulations authorizing the operation of
autonomous vehicles on highways within the State of Nevada.").

82

J 0 URNALOFLAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET

·VOL.

4 ·No. I· 2012

Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability

t forth· driver's license and registration requirements. 7 On February
~~ 2012, Nevada's Legislative Commission adopted the first
autonomous car regulations in the United States. 8
.
.
While most of the provisions are not out of the ordmary, Sections
3 and 4.2 define the "operator" of the vehicle as the person who
"causes the autonomous vehicle to engage . . . ."9 The regulations,
moreover, deem the operator as the driver of the ve~cle for
"purpose[s] of enforcing traffic laws and other laws applicable to
drivers and motor vehicles operated in [Nevada]." 10 Hence, if the
owner of an autonomous car "engages" 11 his autonomous vehicle and
it "runs" a red light while in autopilot mode, the owner would
technically incur liability for the infraction.
Nevada's new law accounts for violations arising out of an
operator's action or inaction. 12 However, ~~e law is less _cle~~ about
violations caused by manufacturer errors.
Products hab1hty and
strict tort theories impute liability on the manufacturers of defective
hardware or software, and the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles

7.

Proposed Reg. of the Dep't of Motor Vehicles, LCB File No. R084-11
(proposed Oct. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 483 NA~, 482 NAC, 487
NAC, 484 NAC), available at http://leg.state.nv.us/register/
2011Register/R084-11I.pdf. (proposing regulations for autonomous c~rs,
specifically: definitions for autonomous car technology, testmg
requirements, certification requirements, minimal safety requirements,
driver's license endorsement, and registration requirements).

8.

Nev. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Regulations Clear the Road for Selfdriving Cars, DMVNV.COM (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.dmvnv.com/
news/12001-regulations-for-self-driving-cars.htm ("In a s~ep that pu~s
Nevada first in the nation while paving the way for umque economic
opportunity, the Legislative Commission today approved regulations
allowing for the operation of self-driving vehicles on the state's
roadways.").

9.

Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, 482A NAC §4.2, 2 (2012),
available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/2011Register/R08411A.pdf ("For the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws and other laws
applicable to drivers and motor vehicles operated in this State, the
operator of an autonomous vehicle that is operated in ~utonomous mode
shall be deemed the driver of the autonomous vehicle regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the autonomous vehicle while
it is engaged.").

10.

Id.

11.

See Smith supra note 4 ("This language raises at least three questions.
What 'ca~ses' the engagement? Is the person causing it necessarily a
natural person? And can the DMV lawfully deem that person to be the
driver of a vehicle that by statute 'drive[s] itself?"').

12.

See Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 9, § 4.2.

13.

Id.
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has adopted a similar stance toward autonomous car manufacturers. 14
Nevertheless, imputing substantial liability upon the manufacturers of
autonomous technology and cars is improvident because it would
hinder autonomous cars from entering into the marketplace in a
timely fashion. 15
Thus, although autonomous car technology is
advancing rapidly and striving towards mass availability, the liability
issues will dictate how quickly autonomous cars enter into the
marketplace. 16
Attributing subst.antial liability to manufacturers of autonomous
cars and the manufacturers of autonomous car technology is
worrisome because of the substantial social utility of autonomous
cars.17 Presumably, autonomous cars will save millions of lives and

billions of dollars once they are introduced into the marketplace. 18
The issue is that "[t]he technology is ahead of the law in many areas,"
according to Bernard Lu, senior staff counsel for the California
Department of Motor Vehicles. 19
Consequently, while Nevada's
regulations are a springboard for regulating autonomous cars, 20 the
proposed regulations are insufficient because they do not directly
address the complex liability and economic issues that will inevitably
arise when the autonomous technology-as opposed to a human
action-causes damage or injury. 21
In the 1950s, the private nuclear power industry faced a similar
liability conundrum. 22 Although the government yearned for private
investment in nuclear energy, the private sector was uncertain about
its liability. 23 As a result, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act. 24
This created a successful, two-tiered insurance program, which
effectively overcame the economic and legal uncertainties of private

14.

INFO. STATEMENT OF ADOPTED REG. As REQUIRED BY ADMIN.
PROCEDURES ACT NRS 233B.066, LCB FILE No. R084-11, at 31 (Feb. 6,
available
at
2012),
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/2011Register/R084-11A.pdf ("This
is a product liability situation that is handled today through our justice
system.").

15.

See John Markoff, Collision in the Making Between Self-Driving Cars
and How the World Works, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at B6
(discussing how the "potential liabilities will be huge for the designers
and manufacturers of autonomous vehicles," and that without some
legal protections, no company will put money into developing them). If
the manufacturers of autonomous cars will not make a profit, they will _
not produce the cars. See Phil LeBeau, The Auto Industry's Six Profit
Drivers,
CNBC.COM
(Mar.
21,
2012,
9:07
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/46806437/ ("Strip away the marketing and
auto shows there is one ultimate goal for the automakers: make the
most money possible on each automobile.").

16.

17.

See Doug Gross, Look, no hands! The driverless future of driving is
here,
CNN.COM
(Feb.
22,
2012),
http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/the-sci-fi-future-of-drivingits-already-here/ (referring to a quote by Scott Belcher, CEO of the
Intelligent Transportation Society of America, who stated that "[i]t's
going to be the liability issues, the control issues that are going to
prevent [the success of autonomous cars]").
See discussion infra Section III.D; see also James Poulos, Driverless
Cars for All: An Idea More Dangerous Than Driving, FORBES.COM
(Mar.
13,
2012,
3:23
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamespoulos/2012/03/13/driverless-carsfor-all-an-idea- more-dangerous-than-driving/ ("Advances in information
processing mean driverless cars are coming, and fast. If you live in the
Bay Area, actually, they're already here. Let's say-and I don't know if
this is optimistic or pessimistic-that full adoption of driverless cars
could cut the number of [car] accidents in half..... In 2010, more than
32,000 Americans were killed in car accidents, more than 2 million were
injured, and the resulting medical costs and productivity losses were,
according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in the
$100 billion range. Car accidents are the leading cause of death for
Americans between the ages of one and 30. If we could halve all that, it
would be, in the first case, an enormous win for human welfare and in

84

the second case, a huge change in the composition of medical
expenditures, with far less trauma care .... ") (quoting Ezra Klein, Does
Your Model for Future Health-Care Spending Account for Driverless
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
10,
2012
11:23
AM),
Cars?,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/why-we-cantmake-good-predictions-about-future-health-carespending/ 2011/08/25 / gI QAD BpM3R_blog .html.
18.

See Alex Forrest & Mustafa Konca, Autonomous Cars and Society (May
1,
2007)
(unpublished
undergraduate
paper),
available
at
http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/ Available/E-project-043007205701/unrestricted/IQPOVP06Bl.pdf; see also Tyler Cowen, Can I see
Your License, Registration and C.P. U. ?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, at
BUS (discussing the possible societal benefits and costs of autonomous
cars).

19.

Debra Cassens Weiss, Who's Liable for a Driverless Car Accident?
Google Test Raises the Issue, ABA J. (Oct. 12, 2010, 8:35 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/whos_liable_for_a_driverless
_car_accident_google_test_raises_the_issue.

20.

See Ackerman, supra note 5.

21.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4 ("Who drives an automated vehicle? The
answer might be no one-a truly driverless car in the legal and technical
senses. It might be a natural person-the individual owner (if there is
one), the occupant (ditto),. or the individual who initiates the automated
operation (ditto again). It might be a company-the corporate owner,
the service provider, or the manufacturer. Depending on the context, it
might even be some combination of these possibilities.").

22.

See Harold P. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, And Indemnity, 71
MICH. L. REV. 479, 481-482 (1972) (identifying the nuclear industry's
nascence and potential for harm).

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 483.
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the second case, a huge change in the composition of medical
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investment in nuclear energy. 25 Establishing a similar insurance
program for manufacturers of autonomous cars and technology would
arguably produce similar results.
Section II will explore the technology and inner-workings of
autonomous cars and examine other autonomous transportation
technologies, including elevators, airplanes, sea vessels, and trains. It
will also explore how courts evaluate harm caused by autonomous
transportation technologies. Section III will apply tort law, products
liability, and strict liability to autonomous cars. It will also analogize
the biotechnology industry to autonomous cars and investigate the
potential social utility of autonomous cars. Moreover, Section III will
explain the logic behind the rise in products and strict liability claims
against manufacturers of autonomous technology and cars. Lastly,
Section IV will propose a new insurance framework that works in
conjunction with current tort law in order to govern the liability of
autonomous car manufacturers.

hardware usually includes some amalgamation of radar, lasers, lidar, 27
ultrasonic sensors, cameras, global positioning systems ("GPS"), and
computers. 28 Sensing hardware creates data based on the surrounding
environment of the car and sends that data to the computer. 29 The
computer has software that applies logic-based, decision-making
algorithms to the data provided by the sensing hardware. 30 Based on
the environmental data and algorithms, this software provides data
outputs to the car, which instructs it to make automated movements
including acceleration. 31
Currently, most autonomous car technologies available for use on
public roads require human intervention. 32 For example, Lexus's
advanced parking guidance system requires a human driver to align
the vehicle with the desired spot, manually activate the autonomous
parking technology, and engage the brakes to deactivate the
autonomous parking technology once the maneuver is complete.33

II.
A.

Together, these sensors allow [the car] to pinpoint its location to within
30 centimeters.").

BACKGROUND

How Do Autonomous Cars Work?

27.

See Using Lasers to Study our Atmospheres, NASA (Aug. 1996),
http://www.nasa.gov/ centers /langley /news /fact sheets /LaserSensing_pr
t.htm ("A lidar is similar to radar, which is commonly used to track
everything from airplanes in flight to thunderstorms. Instead of
bouncing radio waves off its target, however, a lidar uses short pulses of
laser light to detect particles or gases in the atmosphere. Traveling as a
tight, unbroken beam, the laser light disperses very little as it moves
away from its origin-such as from space down to the Earth's surface.
Some of the laser's light reflects off of tiny particles-even molecules-in
the atmosphere. The reflected light comes back to a telescope and is
collected and measured. By precisely timing the collected light, and by
measuring how much reflected light is received by the telescope,
scientists can accurately determine the location, distribution and nature
of the particles [which creates a 3D image].").

28.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 4-6 (providing a chart labeled Figure
1 detailing the process by which autonomous cars work); see also A Car
Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

29.

A Car Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

30.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 5; see also A Car Driven By
Computers, supra note 26 ("The car can steer, brake and accelerate, as
well as turn all its components on or off, solely through its computer.").

The technology utilized in autonomous cars is a combination of
computers, software, and sensing hardware that communicate with
each other, the car, and in some cases, the human operator. 26 Sensing

25.

See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS.
AND
DISASTER
RELIEF
FUNDS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.pdf
(hereinafter FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS.).

26.

Computer Scientists And Engineers Design A Car Driven By
Computers,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Dec.
1,
2007),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/videos/2007 /1205-driverless_car.htm
(discussing how autonomous car technology works) [hereinafter A Car
Driven By Computers]; see also R. LOPES, PROJECT PAPER ON
AUTONOMOUS
CAR
CONTROLLER
2-6
(2002),
available
at
http:/ /web.njit.edu/-rlopes/Project-example-1.pdf
(describing
the
complete system of an autonomous car based on vision); see also Kate
Greene, Stanford's New Driverless Car, TECHNOLOGYREVIEW (June 15,
2007),
http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=18908
("The new car has a total of eight LIDAR systems that emit beams of
light and detect reflections to determine the distance of other objects.
One system is mounted on the front of [the car's] roof and has a range
of about 100 meters ... [ a]nother LIDAR system points at the ground
and constantly keeps track of the road and reflective lane markers. A
third system constantly takes a 360-degree image of its surroundings. All
this data is process by two Intel quad-core machines running at 2.3
gigahertz, and the pertinent information is relayed to the driving
systems, which guide the car. [The car] is also equipped with a precise
location system that include GPS and other sensors that measure the
revolution of the wheels and the direction the car is moving in.
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31.

A Car Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

32.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 15.

33.

Advanced
Parking
Guidance
System,
LEXUS
(2012),
http://www.lexus.com/models/LS/features/exterior/advanced_parking
_guidance_system.html; see also Demos Advanced Parking Guidance
System, LEXUS, (2012), http://www.lexus.com/models/
LS /features/ exterior/ advanced_parking_guidance_system.html?demo=
ls_parking&s_ocid=30019 (describing further how drivers engage the
Advanced Parking Guidance System); Charles J. Murray, Lexus LS 460
Parking System Grabs the Wheel, DESIGNNEWS (Feb. 7, 2007),
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investment in nuclear energy. 25 Establishing a similar insurance
program for manufacturers of autonomous cars and technology would
arguably produce similar results.
Section II will explore the technology and inner-workings of
autonomous cars and examine other autonomous transportation
technologies, including elevators, airplanes, sea vessels, and trains. It
will also explore how courts evaluate harm caused by autonomous
transportation technologies. Section III will apply tort law, products
liability, and strict liability to autonomous cars. It will also analogize
the biotechnology industry to autonomous cars and investigate the
potential social utility of autonomous cars. Moreover, Section III will
explain the logic behind the rise in products and strict liability claims
against manufacturers of autonomous technology and cars. Lastly,
Section IV will propose a new insurance framework that works in
conjunction with current tort law in order to govern the liability of
autonomous car manufacturers.

hardware usually includes some amalgamation of radar, lasers, lidar, 27
ultrasonic sensors, cameras, global positioning systems ("GPS"), and
computers. 28 Sensing hardware creates data based on the surrounding
environment of the car and sends that data to the computer. 29 The
computer has software that applies logic-based, decision-making
algorithms to the data provided by the sensing hardware. 30 Based on
the environmental data and algorithms, this software provides data
outputs to the car, which instructs it to make automated movements
including acceleration. 31
Currently, most autonomous car technologies available for use on
public roads require human intervention. 32 For example, Lexus's
advanced parking guidance system requires a human driver to align
the vehicle with the desired spot, manually activate the autonomous
parking technology, and engage the brakes to deactivate the
autonomous parking technology once the maneuver is complete. 33
Together, these sensors allow [the car] to pinpoint its location to within
30 centimeters.").

II. BACKGROUND
A.

How Do Autonomous Cars Work?

27.

See Using Lasers to Study our Atmospheres, NASA (Aug. 1996),
http://www.nasa.gov/ centers /langley /news /factsheets /LaserSensing_pr
t.htm ("A lidar is similar to radar, which is commonly used to track
everything from airplanes in flight to thunderstorms. Instead of
bouncing radio waves off its target, however, a lidar uses short pulses of
laser light to detect particles or gases in the atmosphere. Traveling as a
tight, unbroken beam, the laser light disperses very little as it moves
away from its origin-such as from space down to the Earth's surface.
Some of the laser's light reflects off of tiny particles-even molecules-in
the atmosphere. The reflected light comes back to a telescope and is
collected and measured. By precisely timing the collected light, and by
measuring how much reflected light is received by the telescope,
scientists can accurately determine the location, distribution and nature
of the particles [which creates a 3D image].").

28.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 4-6 (providing a chart labeled Figure
1 detailing the process by which autonomous cars work); see also A Car
Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

29.

A Car Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

30.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 5; see also A Car Driven By
Computers, supra note 26 ("The car can steer, brake and accelerate, as
well as turn all its components on or off, solely through its computer.").

The technology utilized in autonomous cars is a combination of
computers, software, and sensing hardware that communicate with
each other, the car, and in some cases, the human operator. 26 Sensing

25.

See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS.
AND
DISASTER
RELIEF
FUNDS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.pdf
[hereinafter FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS.].

26.

Computer Scientists And Engineers Design A Car Driven By
Computers,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Dec.
1,
2007),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/videos/2007 /1205-driverless_car.htm
(discussing how autonomous car technology works) [hereinafter A Car
Driven By Computers]; see also R. LOPES, PROJECT PAPER ON
AUTONOMOUS
CAR
CONTROLLER
2-6
(2002),
available
at
http:/ /web.njit.edu/-rlopes/Project-example-1. pdf
(describing
the
complete system of an autonomous car based on vision); see also Kate
Greene, Stanford's New Driverless Car, TECHNOLOGYREVIEW (June 15,
2007),
http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=18908
("The new car has a total of eight LIDAR systems that emit beams of
light and detect reflections to determine the distance of other objects.
One system is mounted on the front of [the car's] roof and has a range
of about 100 meters . . . [ a]nother LIDAR system points at the ground
and constantly keeps track of the road and reflective lane markers. A
third system constantly takes a 360-degree image of its surroundings. All
this data is process by two Intel quad-core machines running at 2.3
gigahertz, and the pertinent information is relayed to the driving
systems, which guide the car. [The car] is also equipped with a precise
location system that include GPS and other sensors that measure the
revolution of the wheels and the direction the car is moving in.
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31.

A Car Driven By Computers, supra note 26.

32.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 15.

33.

Advanced
Parking
Guidance
System,
LEXUS
(2012),
http://www.lexus.com/models/LS/features/exterior/advanced_parking
_guidance_system.html; see also Demos Advanced Parking Guidance
System, LEXUS, (2012), http://www.lexus.com/models/
LS/features/exterior/advanced_parking_guidance_system.html?demo=
ls_parking&s_ocid=30019 (describing further how drivers engage the
Advanced Parking Guidance System); Charles J. Murray, Lexus LS 460
Parking System Grabs the Wheel, DESIGNNEWS (Feb. 7, 2007),
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This technology utilizes six sonar sensors, advanced ParkMate
software, and computer processors. 34
Another example of an
autonomous technology is adaptive cruise control, which controls a
car's position relative to the location of the objects around it.35
Adaptive cruise control uses either lasers or radar to determine both
the location and speed of the vehicle in front of it, and the cruise
control employs computer software to calculate the rate of
acceleration required by the engine to maintain the specified distance
between the vehicles. 36 An additional type of autonomous technology
is the lane-keeping assist system. 37 The lane-keeping assist system
helps the driver stay within the lanes by providing miniscule amounts
of "actuation" 38 to the steering. 39 Radar, lidar, ultrasonic range
finders, video cameras, and computer processors all work in
conjunction to detect the lane's location. 40 Once the lane's location is
determined relative to the car's current location, the computer relays
the calculations to the steering system to maintain the car's location
within the lane. 41 Although these autonomous car technologies are
relatively new, car manufacturers are already in the developmental
and testing stages, creating cars that are smarter and more
independent of humans than ever before. 42

34.

ht~p://www.designnews.com/document.asp?doc_id=224411
("When
drivers want to parallel park the new vehicle, they are required to pull
the LS past, and three feet away from, parked vehicles on the side
finally reaching a point where they can see the front license plate of th~
vehicle they plan to park behind. They then shift the transmission to
reverse and press a "reverse icon" on a dashboard display.").
Murray, supra note 33.

35.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 21.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 18.

38.

See generally, Andreas Eidehall, An Automotive Lane Guidance System
4, (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Linkopings Universitet), available at
http://www.control.isy.liu.se/research/reports/LicentiateThesis/Licll22
.pdf (explaining actuation).

39.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 18; See, e.g., LANE KEEPING ASSIST,
LEXUS
.
(2011),
http://web.arch1ve.org/web/20110102093821/http://www.lexus.eu/rang
e(Ls/key-features/safety /safety-lane-keeping-assist.aspx (providing a
video and a description regarding the lane keeping assist feature).

40.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 18.

41.

Id.

42.

Daniel H. Wilson,
NBCNEWS.coM

Cars
(Nov.

are

approaching
6,
2009,

'auto' pilot
9:13

mode,
AM),

~ttp://v:vrw.msnbc.msn.com/id/33591971/ns/technology_and_science
mnovatwn/t /cars-are-approaching-auto-pilot-mode/#. TrsOsmCFLJ4
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For instance, Volkswagen is currently developing Temporary Auto
Pilot ("TAP") technology. 43 TAP can "semi-autonomously" drive a
car on a clearly marked road up to speeds of approximately eighty
miles per hour. 44 TAP does require a human to monitor the car in the
same manner as if he was driving it, which is a limitation that some
critics have noted in calling into question the usefulness of TAP .45
However, Volkswagen's chief focus behind the development of TAP is
improving safety because computers have substantially faster reaction
times than humans. 46 While TAP seems complicated, it is merely a
combination of autonomous technologies already available, such as
adaptive cruise control and side monitoring. 47 Like many other
autonomous technologies, TAP uses radar, cameras, ultrasonic
sensors, a laser scanner, and an electronic horizon. 48
Similarly, Google has developed its own fleet of semi-autonomous
Toyota Prius automobiles that have logged more than 190,000 miles

(discussing how "semi-autonomous safety features" are allowing "the
drivers to do less and less").
43.

Mark Hachman, Volkswagen Develops Self-Driving Car, Almost,
PCMAG.COM
(June
23,
2011,
10:16
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/ article2 /0,2817 ,2387524,00.asp#fbid=yqNgBD7
Lfln. (discussing Volkswagen's new semi-autonomous driving system,
called "Temporary Auto Pilot (TAP)").

44.

Id.

45.

Id.; see also Evan Ackerman, Volkswagen's Temporary Auto Pilot
Makes Your Car Almost But Not Quite a Robot, IEEESPECTRUM (June
28,
2011),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificialintelligence / volkswagen-temporary-auto-pilot-makes-your-car-almostbut-not-quite-a-robot. (discussing how the driver still has to pay
attention to the car driving, which takes away the benefit from using
the TAP system - the driver cannot divert his or her attention to other
tasks).

46.

Id.

47.

Rebecca Boyle, Volkswagen Debuts Self-Driving 'Temporary Autopilot'
For
New
Cars,
POPSCI
(June
24,
2011,
2:50
PM),
http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2011-06/volkswagen-debuts-selfdriving-temporary-autopilot-new-cars;
See,
e.g.,
SIDE
ASSIST,
VOLKSWAGEN
(2011),
http://www.volkswagen.co.uk/technology/proximity-sensing/side-assist
(providing a video that explains side monitoring).

48.

Hachman, supra note 43; See also NA VTEQ(R) Electronic Horizon
Technology Supports Dynamic Pass Predictor, PRNEWSWIRE (Aug. 14,
2006),
http://www.prnewswire.com/ news-releases/ navteqr-electronichorizon-technology-supports-dynamic-pass-predictor-56122182.html
("NAVTEQ's patented electronic horizon technology. enables ~he
attributes in the NAVTEQ digital map to be used to assist the vehicle
in understanding the road ahead.").
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This technology utilizes six sonar sensors, advanced ParkMate
software, and computer processors. 34
Another example of an
autonomous technology is adaptive cruise control, which controls a
car's position relative to the location of the objects around it.35
Adaptive cruise control uses either lasers or radar to determine both
the location and speed of the vehicle in front of it, and the cruise
control employs computer software to calculate the rate of
acceleration required by the engine to maintain the specified distance
?etween the vehicles. 36 An additional type of autonomous technology
is the lane-keeping assist system. 37 The lane-keeping assist system
helps the driver stay within the lanes by providing miniscule amounts
of "actuation" 38 to the steering. 39 Radar, lidar, ultrasonic range
finders, video cameras, and computer processors all work in
conjunction to detect the lane's location. 40 Once the lane's location is
determined relative to the car's current location, the computer relays
the calculations to the steering system to maintain the car's location
within the lane. 41 Although these autonomous car technologies are
relatively new, car manufacturers are already in the developmental
and testing stages, creating cars that are smarter and more
independent of humans than ever before. 42

34.

ht~p: / /www.designnews.com/ document.asp ?doc_id=224411
("When
drivers want to parallel park the new vehicle, they are required to pull
the LS past, and three feet away from, parked vehicles on the side
finally reaching a point where they can see the front license plate of th~
vehicle they plan to park behind. They then shift the transmission to
reverse and press a "reverse icon" on a dashboard display.").
Murray, supra note 33.

35.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 21.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 18.

38.

See generally, Andreas Eidehall, An Automotive Lane Guidance System
4, (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Linkopings Universitet), available at
http://www.control.isy.liu.se/research/reports/LicentiateThesis/Licll22
.pdf (explaining actuation).

39.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 18; See, e.g., LANE KEEPING ASSIST,
LEXUS
.
(2011),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110102093821/http://www.lexus.eu/rang
e(Ls/key-features/safety/safety-lane-keeping-assist.aspx (providing a
video and a description regarding the lane keeping assist feature).

40.

Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 18.

41.

Id.

42.

'auto' pilot mode,
9:13
AM),
~ttp://v:ww.msnbc.msn.com/id/33591971/ns/technology_and_science
mnovatmn/t /cars-are-approaching-auto-pilot-mode/#. TrsOsmCFLJ4
Daniel H. Wilson,
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For instance, Volkswagen is currently developing Temporary Auto
Pilot ("TAP") technology. 43 TAP can "semi-autonomously" drive a
car on a clearly marked road up to speeds of approximately eighty
miles per hour. 44 TAP does require a human to monitor the car in the
same manner as if he was driving it, which is a limitation that some
critics have noted in calling into question the usefulness of TAP. 45
However, Volkswagen's chief focus behind the development of TAP is
improving safety because computers have substantially faster reaction
times than humans. 46 While TAP seems complicated, it is merely a
combination of autonomous technologies already available, such as
adaptive cruise control and side monitoring. 47 Like many other
autonomous technologies, TAP uses radar, cameras, ultrasonic
sensors, a laser scanner, and an electronic horizon. 48
Similarly, Google has developed its own fleet of semi-autonomous
Toyota Prius automobiles that have logged more than I90,000 miles

(discussing how "semi-autonomous safety features" are allowing "the
drivers to do less and less").
43.

Mark Hachman, Volkswagen Develops Self-Driving Car, Almost,
PCMAG.COM
(June
23,
2011,
10:16
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387524,00.asp#fbid=yqNgBD7
Lfln. (discussing Volkswagen's new semi-autonomous driving system,
called "Temporary Auto Pilot (TAP)").

44.

Id.

45.

Id.; see also Evan Ackerman, Volkswagen's Temporary Auto Pilot
Makes Your Car Almost But Not Quite a Robot, IEEESPECTRUM (June
28,
2011),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificialintelligence / volkswagen-temporary-auto-pilot-makes-your-car-almostbut-not-quite-a-robot. (discussing how the driver still has to pay
attention to the car driving, which takes away the benefit from using
the TAP system - the driver cannot divert his or her attention to other
tasks).

46.

Id.

47.

Rebecca Boyle, Volkswagen Debuts Self-Driving 'Temporary Autopilot'
For
New
Cars,
POPSCI
(June
24,
2011,
2:50
PM),
http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2011-06/volkswagen-debuts-selfdriving-temporary-autopilot-new-cars;
See,
e.g.,
SIDE
ASSIST,
VOLKSWAGEN
(2011),
http://www.volkswagen.co. uk/ technology/ proximity-sensing/ side-assist
(providing a video that explains side monitoring).

48.

Hachman, supra note 43; See also NA VTEQ(R} Electronic Horizon
Technology Supports Dynamic Pass Predictor, PRNEWSWIRE (Aug. 14,
2006),
http://www.prnewswire.com/ news-releases/ navteqr-electronichorizon-technology-supports-dynamic-pass-predictor-56122182.html
("NAVTEQ's patented electronic horizon technology. enables ~he
attributes in the NAVTEQ digital map to be used to assist the vehicle
in understanding the road ahead.").
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with limited human intervention in a diverse array of environments. 49
Like the Volkswagen TAP technology, the Google Prius cars use four
radars, a camera, and a laser. 50 The laser works by generating a
three-dimensional map of the car's surrounding environment and
subsequently applies that map to existing maps to produce data. 51
The Google Prius also employs GPS and inertial measurement units52
to determine its location and record its movements. 53 The Google
Prius automobiles, furthermore, analyze past-recorded data from
other vehicles that drove in the same location, and then incorporate
such data into its decision-making processes. 54 Google's technology is
arguably nearing the threshold of artificial intelligence ("AI"), which
Although
makes future decisions based on past experiences. 55
Google's software is advanced by today's standards, the software
required for a fully autonomous vehicle is beyond what is readily
available in the high-technology market. 56 The technology needs to

49.

Erico Guizzo, How Google's Self-Driving Car Works, IEEESPECTRUM
~Oct .. 18, 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificialmtelhgence/how-google-self-driving-car-works; See also John Markoff,
Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at
Al. (discussing how one of Google's autonomous Prius's drove down
"Lombard Street in San Francisco," which is "one of the steepest and
curviest streets in the nation").

improve its reactions to the unpredictability of extremely dynamic
environments, particularly in urban locations. 57
It is imperative to understand how the autonomous technologies
work at the piecemeal level in order to appreciate how liability is
imposed on the manufacturers of autonomous technologies or cars via
tort law. The next section will examine other modes of autonomous
transportation, such as elevators, airplanes, sea vessels, and trains,
and explore the legal frameworks that courts apply to these types of
autonomous vehicles. These modes of transportation have utilized
autonomous technologies for many years and may provide guidance
on how to evaluate autonomous cars.
B.

The History and Liability Frameworks of Other Autonomous
Vehicles

1.

Elevators

First commissioned by King Louis XV in the eighteenth century,
elevators have evolved to the point where engineers are seriously
considering an elevator beginning on the earth's surface and reaching
into outer space. 58 Similar to airplanes and sea vessels, elevators are
vehicles. 59 In the United States and Canada alone, 245 million people
use elevators every day. 60 Despite elevators' current widespread usage
and safety, elevators were traditionally unsafe, required a human

50 .. Guizzo, supra note 49.

51.

Id.

52.

See,
e.g.,
TheCrista
IMUThe,
CLOUD
CAP
TECHNOLOGY
http://www.cloudcaptech.com/crista_imu.shtm. (last visited Nov. 2'.
2011) (discussing what constitutes an inertial measurement unit).
Guizzo, supra note 49.

53.
54.

Id. ("The second thing is that, before sending the self-driving car on a
road test, Google engineers drive along the route one or more times to
gather data about the environment. When it's the autonomous vehicle's
turn to drive itself, it compares the data it is acquiring to the previously
recorded data, an approach that is useful to differentiate pedestrians
from stationary objects like poles and mailboxes.").

55.

Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Q&A: What Is Artificial Intelligence'?,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jul.
14,
2010,
3:14
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/07 /14/qa-what-is-artificialintelligence/ ("The theory is that computers can be programmed to
learn from their decisiops and move quickly in response to that
learning.").

56.

Forr~st & Kone~, supra note 18, at 5; see also Markoff, supra note 15, at
B6 ( And despite Google's early success, technological barriers remain.
Some trivial tasks for human drivers-like recognizing an officer or
safety worker motioning a driver to proceed in an alternate directionawait a breakthrough in artificial intelligence that may not come
soon.").
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57.

Forrest.& Konca, supra note 18, at 5 ("Although the [autonomous car]
prototypes seem to be very successful, a fully autonomous car tha_t ~s
reliable enough to be on the streets has not been constructed yet. This is
mostly because of the difficulties involved in controlling a vehicle in the
unpredictable traffic conditions of urban areas. While better hardware is
being developed there are important limitations on the artificial
intelligence side of the research. It would be fair to say that the future
of the autonomous cars mostly depends on the development of better
artificial intelligence software.").

58.

K. Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-IfIcations, Assessing Liability for Robotics-Based Car Accidents, 5 No. 4
A.B.A. SEC. SCIENCE &TECH, LAWYER Spring 2009, at14 (2009); see
generally, D.V. Smitherman, Jr., Space Elevators, An Advanced EarthSpace Infrastructure for the New Millennium, NASA (Aug. 2000),
available at http://www.nss.org/resources/library /spaceelevator/2000SpaceElevator-NASA-CP210429.pdf (explaining all aspects of a space
elevator); see also Bradley C. Edwards, Manuscript, The Space
NASA
(2000),
available
at
Elevator,
http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spaceelevator/2000SpaceElevator-NIAC-phasel.pdf (a study on the concept of a space
elevator).

59.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3.

60.

Id.
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with limited human intervention in a diverse array of environments. 49
Like the Volkswagen TAP technology, the Google Prius cars use four
radars, a camera, and a laser. 50 The laser works by generating a
three-dimensional map of the car's surrounding environment and
subsequently applies that map to existing maps to produce data. 51
The Google Prius also employs GPS and inertial measurement units52
to determine its location and record its movements. 53 The Google
Prius automobiles, furthermore, analyze past-recorded data from
other vehicles that drove in the same location, and then incorporate
such data into its decision-making processes. 54 Google's technology is
arguably nearing the threshold of artificial intelligence ("AI"), which
Although
makes future decisions based on past experiences. 55
Google's software is advanced by today's standards, the software
required for a fully autonomous vehicle is beyond what is readily
available in the high-technology market. 56 The technology needs to

49.
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Al. (discussing how one of Google's autonomous Prius's drove down
"Lombard Street in San Francisco," which is "one of the steepest and
curviest streets in the nation").
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improve its reactions to the unpredictability of extremely dynamic
environments, particularly in urban locations. 57
It is imperative to understand how the autonomous technologies
work at the piecemeal level in order to appreciate how liability is
imposed on the manufacturers of autonomous technologies or cars via
tort law. The next section will examine other modes of autonomous
transportation, such as elevators, airplanes, sea vessels, and trains,
and explore the legal frameworks that courts apply to these types of
autonomous vehicles. These modes of transportation have utilized
autonomous technologies for many years and may provide guidance
on how to evaluate autonomous cars.
B.

The History and Liability Frameworks of Other Autonomous
Vehicles

1.

Elevators

First commissioned by King Louis XV in the eighteenth century,
elevators have evolved to the point where engineers are seriously
considering an elevator beginning on the earth's surface and reaching
into outer space. 58 Similar to airplanes and sea vessels, elevators are
vehicles. 59 In the United States and Canada alone, 245 million people
use elevators every day. 60 Despite elevators' current widespread usage
and safety, elevators were traditionally unsafe, required a human

50. · Guizzo, supra note 49.
51.

Id.

52.

See,
e.g.,
TheCrista
IMUThe,
CLOUD
CAP
TECHNOLOGY,
http://www.cloudcaptech.com/crista_imu.shtm. (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) (discussing what constitutes an inertial measurement unit).

53.

Guizzo, supra note 49.

54.

Id. ("The second thing is that, before sending the self-driving car on a
road test, Google engineers drive along the route one or more times to
gather data about the environment. When it's the autonomous vehicle's
tum to drive itself, it compares the data it is acquiring to the previously
recorded data, an approach that is useful to differentiate pedestrians
from stationary objects like poles and mailboxes.").

55.

Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, QCJA: What Is Artificial Intelligence?,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jul.
14,
2010,
3:14
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/07/14/qa-what-is-artificialintelligence/ ("The theory is that computers can be programmed to
learn from their decisio;ns and move quickly in response to that
learning.").

56.

Forr~st & Kone~, supra note 18, at 5; see also Markoff, supra note 15, at
B6 ( And despite Google's early success, technological barriers remain.
Some trivial tasks for human drivers-like recognizing an officer or
safety worker motioning a driver to proceed in an alternate directionawait a breakthrough in artificial intelligence that may not come
soon.").

90

57.

Forrest.& Konca, supra note 18, at 5 ("Although the [autonomous car]
prototypes seem to be very successful, a fully autonomous car tha_t ~s
reliable enough to be on the streets has not been constructed yet. This is
mostly because of the difficulties involved in controlling a vehicle in the
unpredictable traffic conditions of urban areas. While better hardware is
being developed there are important limitations on the artificial
intelligence side of the research. It would be fair to say that the future
of the autonomous cars mostly depends on the development of better
artificial intelligence software.").

58.

K. Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-IfIcations, Assessing Liability for Robotics-Based Car Accidents, 5 No. 4
A.B.A. SEC. SCIENCE &TECH, LAWYER Spring 2009, at14 (2009); see
generally, D.V. Smitherman, Jr., Space Elevators, An Advanced EarthSpace Infrastructure for the New Millennium, NASA (Aug. 2000),
available at http://www.nss.org/resources/library /spaceelevator/2000SpaceElevator-NASA-CP210429.pdf (explaining all aspects of a space
elevator); see also Bradley C. Edwards, Manuscript, The Space
NASA
(2000),
available
at
Elevator,
http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spaceelevator/2000SpaceElevator-NIAC-phasel.pdf (a study on the concept of a space
elevator).

59.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3.

60.

Id.
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operator, and were powered by a steam pump. 61 The ropes often
broke, making elevators unsuitable for people to ride in except for
industrial use. 62 In 1854, however, Elisha Graves Otis introduced the
first passenger-safe elevator. 63 Otis's elevator connected to guide rails
instead of rope. 64 And since technology continued to progress quite
Today, most elevators are fully
rapidly, so did elevators. 65
autonomous and extremely efficient. 66
Currently, state statutes and local ordinances govern elevator
safety. ·The basis for most states' elevator codes and standards is
found in both the American Society of Civil Engineers Code 21 67 and
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Saf~ty Code Al 7. 68 In
Ohio, all owners of elevators are required to register every elevator
with the division of labor. 69 All passenger elevators require inspection
twice a year by a competent inspector in order to remain in service. 70
Additionally, the Board of Building Standards establishes the
parameters that govern the inspections of elevators. 71 But while

statutes exist for safety, they do not address liability when someone
incurs injury or damage.
The cause of action for injuries resulting from a malfunctioning
elevator is usually negligence. 72 The injured person can typically sue
the landlord who owns the property where the elevator is located, the
elevator manufacturer, or the elevator installer. 73 If a defect in an
elevator's hardware is discovered, the injured plaintiff can sue the
manufacturer based on products or strict liability. 74 For example, in
Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, the door of the elevator prematurely closed on
the plaintiff, causing her injury. 75 Service records indicated that there
were issues with the door detectors in four specific instances. 76 The
court of appeals held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and
that the jury could reasonably find a defect in the elevator. 77
Elevators and autonomous cars are similar because technology
dictates both vehicles' movement.
However, elevators are
distinguishable because they operate on closed tracks. Although there
are mechanics in the elevator shaft that engage in action, the
elevator's environment is not nearly as dynamic as an autonomous
car's, particularly when the car is engaged in an ever-changing urban
environment. Nevertheless, since technology controls an elevator's
movements, elevators are similar enough to autonomous cars to
illustrate that products liability or strict liability is probably
applicable to autonomous cars when the autonomous technology
causes harm.

61.

Id.;
see
also
Elevator,
ENCYCLOPlEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/184491/elevator
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2012, 7:43 PM).

62.

Elevator, supra note 61.

63.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3.

64.

Id. at 3 ("[I]n front of a large crowd, [Otis] cut the elevator's rope
causing his newly designed safety spring to lock the elevator in place.");
see also Elevator, supra note 63.

65.

Elevator, supra note 61.

66.

Id.; see also John Tierney, Smart Elevators, Dumb People, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
20,
.
2007,
12:48
PM),
http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/smart-elevators-dumbpeople/?apage=3 (introducing the idea of smart elevators).

67.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3 (setting forth the code "for
people movers operated by cables").

68.

Id. at 3-4 (referencing "the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators").

69.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4105.09 (West 2012) (requiring each registration
to "giv[e]the type, capacity, and description, name of manufacturer, and
purpose for which each is used").

70.

Id. at §§ 4105.02, 4105.10 (both discussing requirements of elevator
inspections and inspector competency).

71.

Id. at § 4105.011 ("Such rules shall prescribe uniform minimum
standards necessary for the protection of the public health and safety
and shall follow generally accepted engineering standards, formulae, and
practices established and pertaining to such elevator design,
construction, repair, alteration, and maintenance. The board may adopt
existing published standards as well as amendments thereto
subsequently published by the same authority.").

92

2.

Airplane Autopilot

Airplanes have utilized autopilots since about 1914, when
Lawrence Sperry presented his gyroscopic stabilizer apparatus (the
72.

Theresa L. Kilgore, Cause of Action Injury or Death in Elevator or
Escalator Accident, 3 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 461, § 1 (1993) (illustrating
that the doctrine of res ipsa· loquitur is applied often in elevator cases).
See, e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding the application of res ipsa loquitur valid as to what caused the
elevator door to prematurely close); see also Ferguson v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 408 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1981) (finding that res ipsa
loquitur applied regarding the sudden dropping of an elevator).

73.

See Kilgore, supra note 72, at § 2 ("[Although a] strict tort liability
claim against the owner or occupier of the premises on which the
elevator or escalator is located is unlikely to be successful.").

74.

Id. (explaining that the injured plaintiff could also sue if it were found
that a malfunction in the software caused the incident). See infra note
75.

75.

703 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Ct. App. 1985).

76.

Id. at 1249 ("The elevator doors were equipped with a detector device
which was supposed to stop the doors from closing on anyone .... ").

77.

Id. at 1251.
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operator, and were powered by a steam pump. 61 The ropes often
broke, making elevators unsuitable for people to ride in except for
industrial use. 62 In 1854, however, Elisha Graves Otis introduced the
first passenger-safe elevator. 63 Otis's elevator connected to guide rails
instead of rope. 64 And since technology continued to progress quite
rapidly, so did elevators. 65
Today, most elevators are fully
autonomous and extremely efficient. 66
Currently, state statutes and local ordinances govern elevator
safety. ·The basis for most states' elevator codes and standards is
found in both the American Society of Civil Engineers Code 21 67 and
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Saf~ty Code Al 7. 68 In
Ohio, all owners of elevators are required to register every elevator
with the division of labor. 69 All passenger elevators require inspection
twice a year by a competent inspector in order to remain in service. 70
Additionally, the Board of Building Standards establishes the
parameters that govern the inspections of elevators. 71 But while

statutes exist for safety, they do not address liability when someone
incurs injury or damage.
The cause of action for injuries resulting from a malfunctioning
elevator is usually negligence. 72 The injured person can typically sue
the landlord who owns the property where the elevator is located, the
elevator manufacturer, or the elevator installer. 73 If a defect in an
elevator's hardware is discovered, the injured plaintiff can sue the
manufacturer based on products or strict liability. 74 For example, in
Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, the door of the elevator prematurely closed on
the plaintiff, causing her injury. 75 Service records indicated that there
were issues with the door detectors in four specific instances. 76 The
court of appeals held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and
that the jury could reasonably find a defect in the elevator. 77
Elevators and autonomous cars are similar because technology
However, elevators are
dictates both vehicles' movement.
distinguishable because they operate on closed tracks. Although there
are mechanics in the elevator shaft that engage in action, the
elevator's environment is not nearly as dynamic as an autonomous
car's, particularly when the car is engaged in an ever-changing urban
environment. Nevertheless, since technology controls an elevator's
movements, elevators are similar enough to autonomous cars to
illustrate that products liability or strict liability is probably
applicable to autonomous cars when the autonomous technology
causes harm.

61.

Id.;
see
also
Elevator,
ENCYCLOPlEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/184491/elevator
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2012, 7:43 PM).

62.

Elevator, supra note 61.

63.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3.

64.

Id. at 3 ("[I]n front of a large crowd, [Otis] cut the elevator's rope
causing his newly designed safety spring to lock the elevator in place.");
see also Elevator, supra note 63.

65.

Elevator, supra note 61.

66.

Id.; see also John Tierney, Smart Elevators, Dumb People, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
20,
.
2007,
12:48
PM),
http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/smart-elevators-dumbpeople/?apage=3 (introducing the idea of smart elevators).

67.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3 (setting forth the code "for
people movers operated by cables").

68.

Id. at 3-4 (referencing "the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators").

69.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4105.09 (West 2012) (requiring each registration
to "giv[e]the type, capacity, and description, name of manufacturer, and
purpose for which each is used").

70.

Id. at §§ 4105.02, 4105.10 (both discussing requirements of elevator
inspections and inspector competency).

71.

Id. at § 4105.011 ("Such rules shall prescribe uniform minimum
standards necessary for the protection of the public health and safety
and shall follow generally accepted engineering standards, formulae, and
practices established and pertaining to such elevator design,
construction, repair, alteration, and maintenance. The board may adopt
existing published standards as well as amendments thereto
subsequently published by the same authority.").

92

2.

Airplane Autopilot

Airplanes have utilized autopilots since about 1914, when
Lawrence Sperry presented his gyroscopic stabilizer apparatus (the
72.

Theresa L. Kilgore, Cause of Action Injury or Death in Elevator or
Escalator Accident, 3 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 461, § 1 (1993) (illustrating
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied often in elevator cases).
See, e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding the application of res ipsa loquitur valid as to what caused the
elevator door to prematurely close); see also Ferguson v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 408 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1981) (finding that res ipsa
loquitur applied regarding the sudden dropping of an elevator).

73.

See Kilgore, supra note 72, at § 2 ("[Although a] strict tort liability
claim against the owner or occupier of the premises on which the
elevator or escalator is located is unlikely to be successful.").

74.

Id. (explaining that the injured plaintiff could also sue if it were found
that a malfunction in the software caused the incident). See infra note
75.

75.

703 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Ct. App. 1985).

76.

Id. at 1249 ("The elevator doors were equipped with a detector device
which was supposed to stop the doors from closing on anyone .... ").

77.

Id. at 1251.
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"Device") at the Concours de la Securite en Aeroplane. 7s Sperry
designed and created the Device to improve both stability and control
of airplanes. 79 The Device worked by "linking the control surfaces
with three gyroscopes, allowing flight corrections to be introduced
based on the angle of deviation between the flight direction and the
original gyroscopic settings."so
These early autopilots merely
controlled the aircraft's pitch, yaw, and roll, which maintain the
aircraft's "straight and level flight. "s1 Today, autopilots execute
complex maneuvers or flight plans, bring aircraft into approach and
landing paths, or make possible the control of inherently unstable
aircraft (such as some supersonic aircraft) and of those capable of
vertical takeoff and landing. s2
Modern autopilot systems are normally a combination of
computers, sensing hardware, servomotors, and a guidance program.s3
The sensing hardware, "such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, altimeters,
and airspeed indicators"s4 generate information based on the aircraft's
surrounding environment.s 5 The computers subsequently analyze the
aircraft's location and motion with respect to the specified final
destination, and command the servomotors to "actuate the craft's
engines and control surfaces to alter its flight when corrections or
changes are required. "s6 Most autopilots work by making slight
changes in the heading of the plane and do not require significant

adaptations.s 7 As a result, although there are many aircraft accidents
on record, most are the result of human operating error and not
autopilot manufacturing defects when the autopilot was in controi.ss
For instance, in Richardson v. Bombardier, Inc.,s 9 a military
airplane en route to Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia went into a
dive, broke apart, and crashed, killing all people on board. 90 The
plaintiffs attributed the accident to a defect in the installation of the
APS-65 autopilot system and a manufacturing defect in the APS-65. 91
The plaintiffs alleged that when the human pilot attempted to
intervene, a "jam prevented the capstan from turning and, in turn,
prevented the pilot from manually deflecting the elevator to resume
level flight." 92 Nevertheless, the jury concluded that the APS-65 did
not cause the crash. 93 On appeal, the court upheld the jury's
conclusion and found that the plane itself was defective-not the
autopilot. 94
Similarly, in Moe v. Avians Marcel Dasault-Breguet Aviation, an
airplane crashed resulting in the death of the pilots and several
passengers, except one, who suffered "extensive, permanent injuries. "95
The plaintiffs contended that the crash resulted from, among other
things, a defective autopilot system:

78.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 1 ("[T]he autopilot was
originally called a 'gyroscopic stabilizer apparatus,' and incorporated
Sperry's insight that an autopilot needed to control three flight axes of
an aircraft: yaw, pitch, and roll. The gyroscopes essentially offset
movement in the aircraft through the air, opening or closing valves to
change wing or rudder angles."); see also Lawrence Sperry: Autopilot
Inventor and Aviation Innovator, HISTORYNET (June 12, 2006),
http://www.historynet.com/lawrence-sperry-autopilot-inventor-andaviation-innovator.htm [hereinafter Autopilot Inventor] (translating the
"Concours de la Securite en Aeroplane" as the" Airplane Safety
Competition").

79.

Autopilot Inventor, supra note 78.

80.

Id.

81.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 2007 ULTIMATE REFERENCE SUITE,
AUTOMATIC PILOT ("The earliest automatic pilots could do no more
than maintain an aircraft in straight and level flight by controlling
pitch, yaw, and roll movements; and they are still used most often to
relieve the pilot during routine cruising.").

82.

Id.

[t]he evidence reflects that if a pilot engages the autopilot and
then attempts to fly the aircraft manually with the autopilot
87.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 1.

88.

Id. at 2.

89.

No. 8:03CV544T31MSS, 2005 WL 3087864 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2005)
aff'd sub nom. Ferguson v. Bombardier Serv. Corp., 244 F. App'x 944
(11th Cir. 2007).

90.

Id. at *1; Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2 ("[A]n Army
National Guard pilot engaged the autopilot on the C-23B that he was
flying to go to the lavatory in the rear of the plane. While he was away,
the plane hit a wind shear 'that caused [the plane] to pitch upward and
gain altitude' by driving the nose of the plane upward. The autopilot
attempted to adjust by lowering the elevator. But the autopilot's
actions essentially overcorrected, and the plane went into a dive. As the
court found, 'shortly thereafter, the increasing airspeed exceeded the
structural limitations of the airplane, which broke apart and crashed."').

91.

Richardson, 2005 WL 3087864, at *1; Waterman & Henshon, supra note
58, at n.17 ("The Richardson court also rejected claims that the
autopilot system was negligently designed, including a warning to notify
a pilot when the autopilot has 'limit[ed] the amount of torque which can
be applied to the controls."').

83.

Id.

92.

Richardson, 2005 WL 3087864, at *3.

84.

Id.

93.

Id. at *6.

85.

Id.

94.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.

86.

Id.

95.

727 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1984).
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"Device") at the Concours de la Securite en Aeroplane. 78 Sperry
designed and created the Device to improve both stability and control
of airplanes. 79 The Device worked by "linking the control surfaces
with three gyroscopes, allowing flight corrections to be introduced
based on the angle of deviation between the flight direction and the
original gyroscopic settings." 80
These early autopilots merely
controlled the aircraft's pitch, yaw, and roll, which maintain the
aircraft's "straight and level flight." 81 Today, autopilots execute
complex maneuvers or flight plans, bring aircraft into approach and
landing paths, or make possible the control of inherently unstable
aircraft (such as some supersonic aircraft) and of those capable of
vertical takeoff and landing. 82
Modern autopilot systems are normally a combination of
computers, sensing hardware, servomotors, and a guidance program. 83
The sensing hardware, "such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, altimeters,
and airspeed indicators" 84 generate information based on the aircraft's
surrounding environment. 85 The computers subsequently analyze the
aircraft's location and motion with respect to the specified final
destination, and command the servomotors to "actuate the craft's
engines and control surfaces to alter its flight when corrections or
changes are required. "86 Most autopilots work by making slight
changes in the heading of the plane and do not require significant

adaptations. 87 As a result, although there are many aircraft accidents
on record, most are the result of human operating error and not
autopilot manufacturing defects when the autopilot was in control. 88
For instance, in Richardson v. Bombardier, Inc., 89 a military
airplane en route to Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia went into a
dive, broke apart, and crashed, killing all people on board. 90 The
plaintiffs attributed the accident to a defect in the installation of the
APS-65 autopilot system and a manufacturing defect in the APS-65. 91
The plaintiffs alleged that when the human pilot attempted to
intervene, a "jam prevented the capstan from turning and, in turn,
prevented the pilot from manually deflecting the elevator to resume
level flight. "92 Nevertheless, the jury concluded that the APS-65 did
not cause the crash. 93 On appeal, the court upheld the jury's
conclusion and found that the plane itself was defective-not the
autopilot. 94
Similarly, in Moe v. Avians Marcel Dasault-Breguet Aviation, an
airplane crashed resulting in the death of the pilots and several
passengers, except one, who suffered "extensive, permanent injuries. "95
The plaintiffs contended that the crash resulted from, among other
things, a defective autopilot system:

78.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 1 ("[T]he autopilot was
originally called a 'gyroscopic stabilizer apparatus,' and incorporated
Sperry's insight that an autopilot needed to control three flight axes of
an aircraft: yaw, pitch, and roll. The gyroscopes essentially offset
movement in the aircraft through the air, opening or closing valves to
change wing or rudder angles."); see also Lawrence Sperry: Autopilot
Inventor and Aviation Innovator, HISTORYNET (June 12, 2006),
http://www.historynet.com/lawrence-sperry-autopilot-inventor-andaviation-innovator .htm [hereinafter Autopilot Inventor] (translating the
"Concours de la Securite en Aeroplane" as the" Airplane Safety
Competition").

79.

Autopilot Inventor, supra note 78.

80.

Id.

81.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRJTANNICA 2007 ULTIMATE REFERENCE SUITE,
AUTOMATIC PILOT ("The earliest automatic pilots could do no more
than maintain an aircraft in straight and level flight by controlling
pitch, yaw, and roll movements; and they are still used most often to
relieve the pilot during routine cruising.").

82.

Id.

[t]he evidence reflects that if a pilot engages the autopilot and
then attempts to fly the aircraft manually with the autopilot
87.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 1.

88.

Id. at 2.

89.

No. 8:03CV544T31MSS, 2005 WL 3087864 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2005)
aff'd sub nom. Ferguson v. Bombardier Serv. Corp., 244 F. App'x 944
(11th Cir. 2007).

90.

Id. at *1; Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2 ("[A]n Army
National Guard pilot engaged the autopilot on the C-23B that he was
flying to go to the lavatory in the rear of the plane. While he was away,
the plane hit a wind shear 'that caused [the plane] to pitch upward and
gain altitude' by driving the nose of the plane upward. The autopilot
attempted to adjust by lowering the elevator. But the autopilot's
actions essentially overcorrected, and the plane went into a dive. As the
court found, 'shortly thereafter, the increasing airspeed exceeded the
structural limitations of the airplane, which broke apart and crashed."').

91.

Richardson, 2005 WL 3087864, at *1; Waterman & Henshon, supra note
58, at n.17 ("The Richardson court also rejected claims that the
autopilot system was negligently designed, including a warning to notify
a pilot when the autopilot has 'limit[ed] the amount of torque which can
be applied to the controls."').

83.

Id.

92.

Richardson, 2005 WL 3087864, at *3.

84.

Id.

93.

Id. at *6.

85.

Id.

94.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.

86.

Id.

95.

727 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1984).
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engaged, the autopilot causes the plane to respond opposite to
the pilot's control inputs. There is no clear warning that the
autopilot is still engaged after the pilot attempts to disengage it
by use of the yoke disconnect switch. Plaintiffs' evidence was
that the stiffness of Arthur Q runaway, or hydraulic clogging,
masked and camouflaged the fact that the autopilot had not
disengaged. 96

human error causes far more accidents than autopilot technology. 102
Since autopilot technology is rarely at fault for airplane crashes,
products and strict liability suits do not undermine the advancement
of autopilot technology in the marketplace. Therefore, there is no
need to afford manufacturers of airplane autopilots special treatment.
Although
airplane
autopilots
and
autonomous
cars
are
distinguishable, they are similar enough to show that products and
strict liability will probably be applied to autonomous cars in the
future when the autonomous technology is alleged to have caused
damage.

The experts for both the plaintiffs and ~defendants presented
mixed opinions on whether the autopilot caused the crash. 97
Nonetheless, the appeals court upheld the unanimous jury verdict in
favor of the defendant regarding the autopilot products liability
claims. 98
In cases where the autopilot on airplanes allegedly caused harm,
the plaintiffs have sued under a products liability claim.
Furthermore, most airplane crashes are not the result of autopilot
malfunctions. 99 The Code of Federal Regulations bars the use of
autopilot systems below an altitude of five hundred feet. 100 Because
human pilots are in control of the airplane during takeoff and landing,
the likelihood of operator error increases substantially since humans
have slower reaction times than computers. 101
Even when the
autopilot is activated and in control of the airplane during flight, the
human pilots are supposed to monitor the autopilot and determine if
a manual override is necessary, further supporting the contention that

96.

Id. at 921.

97.

Id. at 921-22.

98.

Id. at 922-23, 936.

99.

Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 3 ("[M]ost airplane accidents
involve departures or landings, which are generally not when autopilots
are in use.").

3.

Sea Vessel Autopilot

Sea vessel autopilots consist of five basic parts that control the
vessel's speed, rudder, and generally compensate for the vessel's
Generally, the control panel, computer, heading
environment. 103
sensor, rudder drive, and rudder position sensor all work in
conjunction to navigate the vessel to the specified location. 104 As with
airplane accidents, human operator error seems to play a major role in
sea vessel accidents where autopilots were active. 105 For instance, in
2009 a twenty-one foot vessel crashed into a breakwall on Lake Erie. 106
According to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the owner of
the vessel entered wrong coordinates into the autopilot, which caused
the crash. 107

102. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2 ("[C]onstant human
oversight is both implied and expected, to determine whether thencurrent use of the autopilot is appropriate.").

100. FAA Operating Requirements Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.579 (2007)
("Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section, no
person may use an autopilot en route, including climb and descent, at
an altitude above the terrain that is less than twice the maximum
altitude loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for a malfunction of
the autopilot under cruise conditions, or less than: 500 feet, whichever is
higher."); see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932
F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding the crew and not the autopilot at
fault when the airplane flew into restricted USSR airspace and was shot
down); see also New Jersey Federal Jury Returns Defense Verdict In
Suit Alleging Defective Autopilot, 228 PRODUCTS LIABILITY ADVISORY
ART. 5-6 (Feb. 2008) (finding the manufacturer of the autopilot not
liable because sufficient facts existed to show that the autopilot did not
malfunction and that the pilot was impaired during the fatal flight).
101. See Ackerman, supra note 45 ("fAl car is still about a thousand times
quicker than [a person] when it comes to reaction times.").
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103. Chuck Husick, Autopilots by the Dozen, YACHTING MAGAZINE (Oct. 3,
2007), http://www.yachtingmagazine.com/article/Best-New-Autopilots
(describing the five basic parts as "the operator control panel, the
computer (which may be built into the control panel), the heading
sensor, rudder drive and, in virtually all installations, a rudder-position
sensor").
104. See id. ("A properly chosen, installed and operated autopilot will
eliminate the tedium of steering, making your time underway more
enjoyable. By precisely controlling your yacht's rudder, the autopilot
will allow you to maintain the high degree of situational awareness
needed to assure safe navigation.").
105. See Ron Rutti, Error using GPS system blamed for Conneaut boating
accident,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Aug.
10,
2009,
10:36
AM),
http:/ /blog.cleveland.com/ metro /2009 / 08 / a_boating_accident_that_le
ft.html; see also Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.
106. Rutti, supra note 105; a "breakwall" is generally defined as a manmade
wall in the lake constructed with the purpose of protecting the land
from waves.
107. Id.
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engaged, the autopilot causes the plane to respond opposite to
the pilot's control inputs. There is no clear warning that the
autopilot is still engaged after the pilot attempts to disengage it
by use of the yoke disconnect switch. Plaintiffs' evidence was
that the stiffness of Arthur Q runaway, or hydraulic clogging,
masked and camouflaged the fact that the autopilot had not
disengaged. 96

human error causes far more accidents than autopilot technology. 102
Since autopilot technology is rarely at fault for airplane crashes,
products and strict liability suits do not undermine the advancement
of autopilot technology in the marketplace. Therefore, there is no
need to afford manufacturers of airplane autopilots special treatment.
Although
airplane
autopilots
and
autonomous
cars
are
distinguishable, they are similar enough to show that products and
strict liability will probably be applied to autonomous cars in the
future when the autonomous technology is alleged to have caused
damage.

The experts for both the plaintiffs and defendants presented
mixed opinions on whether the autopilot caused the crash. 97
Nonetheless, the appeals court upheld the unanimous jury verdict in
favor of the defendant regarding the autopilot products liability
claims. 98
In cases where the autopilot on airplanes allegedly caused harm,
the plaintiffs have sued under a products liability claim.
Furthermore, most airplane crashes are not the result of autopilot
malfunctions. 99 The Code of Federal Regulations bars the use of
autopilot systems below an altitude of five hundred feet. 100 Because
human pilots are in control of the airplane during takeoff and landing,
the likelihood of operator error increases substantially since humans
have slower reaction times than computers. 101
Even when the
autopilot is activated and in control of the airplane during flight, the
human pilots are supposed to monitor the autopilot and determine if
a manual override is necessary,. further supporting the contention that

96.

Id. at 921.

97.

Id. at 921-22.

98.

Id. at 922-23, 936.

99.
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Generally, the control panel, computer, heading
environment. 103
sensor, rudder drive, and rudder position sensor all work in
conjunction to navigate the vessel to the specified location. 104 As with
airplane accidents, human operator error seems to play a major role in
sea vessel accidents where autopilots were active. 105 For instance, in
2009 a twenty-one foot vessel crashed into a breakwall on Lake Erie. 106
According to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the owner of
the vessel entered wrong coordinates into the autopilot, which caused
the crash. 107
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oversight is both implied and expected, to determine whether thencurrent use of the autopilot is appropriate.").
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computer (which may be built into the control panel), the heading
sensor, rudder drive and, in virtually all installations, a rudder-position
sensor").
104. See id. ("A properly chosen, installed and operated autopilot will
eliminate the tedium of steering, making your time underway more
enjoyable. By precisely controlling your yacht's rudder, the autopilot
will allow you to maintain the high degree of situational awareness
needed to assure safe navigation.").
105. See Ron Rutti, Error using GPS system blamed for Conneaut boating
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CLEVELAND.COM
(Aug.
10,
2009,
10:36
AM),
http:/ /blog.cleveland.com/ metro /2009 / 08 / a_boating_accident_that_le
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Similarly, in 2006, the captain of the Crown Princess cruise ship
engaged the autopilot too early after leaving port. 108 As a result, the
autopilot attempted to turn the cruise ship at a dangerously high
speed in shallow water .109 The second officer attempted to intervene;
however, he overcompensated and the cruise ship breeched, resulting
in over three hundred passengers sustaining injuries. 110 The National
Transportation Safety Board released a report stating that the second
officer's "incorrect wheel commands" caused the accident. 111 However,
the report also recommended that Sperry Marine, the company that
manufactured the autopilot, "develop a system that provides [the
crew of a vessel] with critical information regarding errors or potential
problems in the use of integrated navigation systems. "112
Likewise, the 2012 Costa Concordia cruise ship accident was also
the result of human error, according to the media and Costa Cruise,
the cruise line that owns the ship.11 3 Pier Luigi Froshi, the Chief
Executive Officer of Costa Cruise, said '"[o]f course our ships have
autopilot, which immediately sends a warning signal when the ship
goes off course . . . . ' But the Costa Concordia was being steered
manually when it crashed. 'And they didn't see the obstacle, a row of
rocks extending from the land into the sea. "' 114
However, there are also instances where defective autopilots
allegedly caused injuries. In Boucvalt v. Sea-Trac Offshore Services,
Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the autopilot on his yacht
malfunctioned and caused an impact. 115 The plaintiff pled, among
other things, a plethora of products liability allegations pertaining to
the manufacturing ·of the autopilot. 116 The plaintiff argued that the

autopilot manufacturer knew about the issues with the fluxgate
compass, yet failed to test it for defects. 117 The appellate court found
nothing beyond negligence and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. 118
As demonstrated in Boucvalt, plaintiffs in sea vessel autopilot
cases will most likely bring products or strict liability claims, just like
plaintiffs in aircraft autopilot cases. And although navigating a sea
vessel is more analogous to driving on land in the sense that land and
water are more concentrated with potential obstacles than flying an
airplane-navigating on water is not as dynamic as driving on landespecially in an urban setting. In addition, sea vessel autopilots are
only active when the vessel is out to sea and not in shallow waters,
just as airplane autopilots are only active while in flight.11 9 Moreover,
sea vessels, like airplanes, the Google Prius automobiles, and
Volkswagen TAP, also require someone to monitor the autopilot
system at all times. 120 Nevertheless, since autopilot technology is
sometimes in control of both airplanes and sea vessels, these analogies
still provide guidance on how courts will view autonomous cars.

108. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess
Atlantic Ocean Off Port Canaveral, Florida July 18, 2006, NAT'L
TRANSP. SAFETY BD. ACCIDENT REPORTS (Jan. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/ doclib /reports/2008 /MAR0801. pdf.
112. Id.
113. Cruise Ship Hit Rocks Above Water's Surface, Not Below, Ship Official
Says,
INT'L
HERALD
TRIB.
(Jan.
21,
2012,
9:43
AM),
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/cruise-ship-hit-rocksthat-were-above-not-below-surface-ship-official-says /.
114. Id.
115. 943 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (La. Ct. App. 2006) ("This lawsuit arises out of
an collision in the Gulf of Mexico between the 40-foot yacht Slick Liquor
and a well jacket owned by Chevron, USA.").
116. Id. at 1208 ("The allegations against Raymarine can be summarized as
failure to adequately test the product before it went to market, failure
to warn, failure to conduct sufficient testing on the product's

98

components, breach of express and implied warranties, and failure to
adequately communicate installation guidelines to its dealers, etc.").
117. Id. at 1208-09 ("[P]laintiffs point out the deposition testimony of three
witnesses, Dr. John Kreifeldt, Carl Busuttil-Reynaud, and Christopher
Martin. Plaintiffs argue that these witnesses' testimonies establish that
Raymarine knew about erratic behavior of the fluxgate compass when a
vessel using the autopilot passed large metal objects; Raymarine
declined to perform hazards testing on the flux gate compass component
of the auto pilot, and knew about problems with the flux gate compass,
but did not investigate further until this litigation. This Court notes
that in the deposition testimony of Reynaud, the statement plaintiffs
rely on was taken out of context. This witness testified that the entire
auto pilot system was tested, of which the flux gate compass was a
component, though no testing was performed on the flux gate compass
individually and separate from its function within the autopilot system,
because the flux gate compass was a known technology at the time.
Plaintiffs do not allege that no testing was performed.").
118. Id. at 1205-09 ("The trial court found that the allegations in plaintiffs'
petition did not rise past ordinary negligence, and accordingly dismissed
that cause of action. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court . . . . [t]he trial court was correct in its ruling that plaintiffs'
allegations of Raymarine's negligence did not rise to reckless or callous
disregard for the rights of others, or gross negligence."). The plaintiff
wanted punitive damages, so he argued for a higher standard, i.e., gross
negligence or reckless disregard, but both the trial and appellate courts
found only negligence. There is no subsequent history and the opinion
provided no analysis on how negligence was found. Moreover, the trial
court dismissed both parties with prejudice.
119. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.
120. Id.
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Similarly, in 2006, the captain of the Crown Princess cruise ship
engaged the autopilot too early after leaving port. 108 As a result, the
autopilot attempted to turn the cruise ship at a dangerously high
speed in shallow water .109 The second officer attempted to intervene;
however, he overcompensated and the cruise ship breeched, resulting
in over three hundred passengers sustaining injuriesY 0 The National
Transportation Safety Board released a report stating that the second
officer's "incorrect wheel commands" caused the accident. m However,
the report also recommended that Sperry Marine, the company that
manufactured the autopilot, "develop a system that provides [the
crew of a vessel] with critical information regarding errors or potential
problems in the use of integrated navigation systems. "112
Likewise, the 2012 Costa Concordia cruise ship accident was also
the result of human error, according to the media and Costa Cruise,
the cruise line that owns the ship. 113 Pier Luigi Froshi, the Chief
Executive Officer of Costa Cruise, said '" [o]f course our ships have
autopilot, which immediately sends a warning signal when the ship
goes off course . . . . ' But the Costa Concordia was being steered
manually when it crashed. 'And they didn't see the obstacle, a row of
rocks extending from the land into the sea. "' 114
However, there are also instances where defective autopilots
allegedly caused injuries. In Boucvalt v. Sea-Trac Offshore Services,
Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the autopilot on his yacht
malfunctioned and caused an impact. 115 The plaintiff pled, among
other things, a plethora of products liability allegations pertaining to
the manufacturing of the autopilot. 116 The plaintiff argued that the

autopilot manufacturer knew about the issues with the fluxgate
compass, yet failed to test it for defects. 117 The appellate court found
nothing beyond negligence and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. 118
As demonstrated in Boucvalt, plaintiffs in sea vessel autopilot
cases will most likely bring products or strict liability claims, just like
plaintiffs in aircraft autopilot cases. And although navigating a sea
vessel is more analogous to driving on land in the sense that land and
water are more concentrated with potential obstacles than flying an
airplane-navigating on water is not as dynamic as driving on landespecially in an urban setting. In addition, sea vessel autopilots are
only active when the vessel is out to sea and not in shallow waters,
just as airplane autopilots are only active while in flight. 119 Moreover,
sea vessels, like airplanes, the Google Prius automobiles, and
Volkswagen TAP, also require someone to monitor the autopilot
system at all times. 120 Nevertheless, since autopilot technology is
sometimes in control of both airplanes and sea vessels, these analogies
still provide guidance on how courts will view autonomous cars.

108. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess
Atlantic Ocean Off Port Canaveral, Florida July 18, 2006, NAT'L
TRANSP. SAFETY BD. ACCIDENT REPORTS (Jan. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/ doclib /reports /2008/MAR0801. pdf.
112. Id.
113. Cruise Ship Hit Rocks Above Water's Surface, Not Below, Ship Official
Says,
INT'L HERALD
TRIB.
(Jan.
21,
2012,
9:43
AM),
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/cruise-ship-hit-rocksthat-were-above-not-below-surface-ship-official-says /.
114. Id.
115. 943 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (La. Ct. App. 2006) ("This lawsuit arises out of
an collision in the Gulf of Mexico between the 40-foot yacht Slick Liquor
and a well jacket owned by Chevron, USA.").
116. Id. at 1208 ("The allegations against Raymarine can be summarized as
failure to adequately test the product before it went to market failure
to warn, failure to conduct sufficient testing on the p~oduct's

98

components, breach of express and implied warranties, and failure to
adequately communicate installation guidelines to its dealers, etc.").
117. Id. at 1208-09 ("[P]laintiffs point out the deposition testimony of three
witnesses, Dr. John Kreifeldt, Carl Busuttil-Reynaud, and Christopher
Martin. Plaintiffs argue that these witnesses' testimonies establish that
Raymarine knew about erratic behavior of the fluxgate compass when a
vessel using the autopilot passed large metal objects; Raymarine
declined to perform hazards testing on the flux gate compass component
of the auto pilot, and knew about problems with the flux gate compass,
but did not investigate further until this litigation. This Court notes
that in the deposition testimony of Reynaud, the statement plaintiffs
rely on was taken out of context. This witness testified that the entire
auto pilot system was tested, of which the flux gate compass was a
component, though no testing was performed on the flux gate compass
individually and separate from its function within the autopilot system,
because the flux gate compass was a known technology at the time.
Plaintiffs do not allege that no testing was performed.").
118. Id. at 1205-09 ("The trial court found that the allegations in plaintiffs'
petition did not rise past ordinary negligence, and accordingly dismissed
that cause of action. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court . . . . [t]he trial court was correct in its ruling that plaintiffs'
allegations of Raymarine's negligence did not rise to reckless or callous
disregard for the rights of others, or gross negligence."). The plaintiff
wanted punitive damages, so he argued for a higher standard, i.e., gross
negligence or reckless disregard, but both the trial and appellate courts
found only negligence. There is no subsequent history and the opinion
provided no analysis on how negligence was found. Moreover, the trial
court dismissed both parties with prejudice.
119. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 58, at 2.
120. Id.
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Autonomous Trains

On November 4, 2011, Paris commissioned its first fleet of
autonomous trains. 121 However, fully autonomous trains are not
new; 122 in fact, Chicago's O'Hare airport has operated autonomous
trains since 1993. 123 Additionally, in 2008, Miami International
Airport comrnissioned Mitsubishi to build a "driverless people mover
system. "124 Yet just months after the driverless people mover system
was fully installed, it was involved in an accident. 125 According to a
report by the National Transportation Safety Board, a three-car train
failed to stop at a specified platform and crashed into a wall at the
end of the guideway, injuring seven people. 126 The train was in fully
automatic mode-without a human operator-when the accident
occurred. 127 The National Safety Transportation Safety Board's
report concluded that the train's software malfunctioned and that
human error did not cause the accident. 128 Although there are
insufficient facts to determine if products liability or strict liability
121. Bryan Pirolli, Paris metro makes conversion to driverless trains
SMARTPLANET.COM
(Nov.
4,
2011,
1:35
AM):
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/global-observer/paris-metro-makesconversion-to-driverless-trains/ 432.
122. Germany's First Driverless Mass-Transit Train Goes to Work
THAINDIAN.COM
(May
4,
2008,
11:19
AM):
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/germanys-first~riverle~s-mass-transit-train-goes-to-work_10045075.html
("Germany's
first dnverless mass-transit train went into operation Sunday without
fanfare in the southern city of Nuremberg, with a computer in charge for
the whole day. Driverless trains are already in use in other nations,
including the Singapore's North East Metro Line (NEL) operating since
2003 .... ").
123. Gary Washburn, O'Hare Set To Really Move You, CHI. TRIB. (May 6,
http:// articles. chicagotribune. com/ 1993-051993),
06 /news /9305060221_1_people-mover-westinghouse-electric-corpairport-transit-system.
124. Mitsubishi Heavy to Build Miami Airport Transit-Report, REUTERS
(Oct. 2, 2008, 4:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/02/
mitsubishi-miamiairport-idUSN0229579720081002.
125. Nat'l. Transp. Safety Bd., Railroad Accident Report: Board Meeting Miami, FL/Miami-Dade Airport Transit Shuttle Crash, NAT'L/ TRANSP.
SAFETY BD. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/
2011/miami_fl/index.html.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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applies, there is no doubt that if there was a malfunction in the
hardware or software, a manufacturing defect may have been present.
Even so, autonomous trains also crash as a result of human operating
For example, human operating error caused a 2006
error .129
autonomous train accident in Germany, killing twenty-three people. 130
Autonomous train case law also seems to dictate a products and
strict liability theory of recovery in the case that autonomous train
technology causes injury. For instance, in In re Fort Totten Metrorail
Cases Arising Out of the Events of June 22, two trains collided
resulting in several deaths. 131 The plaintiffs alleged that since train
number 112's automatic train control system failed to detect train
number 214, the trains crashed. 132 Particularly,
[a]round 2004, the WMATA [Washington Metro Area Transit
Authority] began replacing GRS components with those
provided by United Switch & Signal . . . The use of both GRS
and U.S. & S components allegedly diminished the sensitivity of
the train detection system, resulting in the track circuit not deenergizing as it should have to detect the presence of a train on
the track. 133
The plaintiffs pled, among other things, products liability. 134 The
plaintiffs alleged a failure "to properly design, manufacture, install,
inspect, test, and maintain the automated warning system that should
have prevented the two trains from colliding. "135 The court, however,
found that the defendants were protected by the District of
Columbia's repose statute. 136 As a result, the plaintiffs' products

129. See Deadly Crash on German Monorail, BBC (Sept. 22, 2006, 11:28
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5370564.stm.
130. Id.
131. 793 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.C.C. 2011).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 138.
134. Id. ("Both the Master Complaint and the McMillan Estate Complaint
raise claims of negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty
against defendant.").
135. Id. ("The claims primarily allege that malfunctions in the electronic
train control system caused the crash. Alstom, as one of the providers of
the components used in the electronic train control system, is alleged to
have failed to properly design, manufacture, install, inspect, test, and
maintain the automated warning system that should have prevented the
two trains from colliding.").

128. Id. ~"The ... train failed to make a normal deceleration and stop at its
station platform berthing point because of the failure . . . within the
program stop system module.").

136. Id. at 137 ("They allege that because Alstom is a manufacturer,
excluded from protection under the statute of repose, its activities as
both a designer and manufacturer must be excluded from protection."):
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Autonomous Trains

On November 4, 2011, Paris commissioned its first fleet of
autonomous trains. 121 However, fully autonomous trains are not
new; 122 in fact, Chicago's O'Hare airport has operated autonomous
trains since 1993. 123 Additionally, in 2008, Miami International
Airport cortunissioned Mitsubishi to build a "driverless people mover
system. "124 Yet just months after the driver less people mover system
was fully installed, it was involved in an accident. 125 According to a
report by the National Transportation Safety Board, a three-car train
failed to stop at a specified platform and crashed into a wall at the
end of the guideway, injuring seven people. 126 The train was in fully
automatic mode-without a human operator-when the accident
occurred. 127 The National Safety Transportation Safety Board's
report concluded that the train's software malfunctioned and that
human error did not cause the accident. 128 Although there are
insufficient facts to determine if products liability or strict liability
121. Bryan Pirolli, Paris metro makes conversion to driverless trains
SMARTPLANET.COM
(Nov.
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2011,
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first dnverless mass-transit train went into operation Sunday without
fanfare in the southern city of Nuremberg, with a computer in charge for
the whole day. Driverless trains are already in use in other nations,
including the Singapore's North East Metro Line (NEL) operating since
2003 .... ").
123. Gary Washburn, O'Hare Set To Really Move You, CHI. TRlB. (May 6,
1993),
http:// articles. chicagotribune. com/ 1993-0506 /news/ 930506022 l_l_people-mover-westinghouse-electric-corpairport-transit-system.
124. Mitsubishi Heavy to Build Miami Airport Transit-Report, REUTERS
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applies, there is no doubt that if there was a malfunction in the
hardware or software, a manufacturing defect may have been present.
Even so, autonomous trains also crash as a result of human operating
For example, human operating error caused a 2006
error. 129
autonomous train accident in Germany, killing twenty-three people. 130
Autonomous train case law also seems to dictate a products and
strict liability theory of recovery in the case that autonomous train
technology causes injury. For instance, in In re Fort Totten Metrorail
Cases Arising Out of the Events of June 22, two trains collided
resulting in several deaths. 131 The plaintiffs alleged that since train
number 112's automatic train control system failed to detect train
number 214, the trains crashed. 132 Particularly,
[a]round 2004, the WMATA [Washington Metro Area Transit
Authority] began replacing GRS components with those
provided by United Switch & Signal ... The use of both GRS
and U.S. & S components allegedly diminished the sensitivity of
the train detection system, resulting in the track circuit not deenergizing as it should have to detect the presence of a train on
the track. 133
The plaintiffs pled, among other things, products liability. 134 The
plaintiffs alleged a failure "to properly design, manufacture, install,
inspect, test, and maintain the automated warning system that should
have prevented the two trains from colliding." 135 The court, however,
found that the defendants were protected by the District of
Columbia's repose statute. 136 As a result, the plaintiffs' products

129. See Deadly Crash on German Monorail, BBC (Sept. 22, 2006, 11:28
PM), http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5370564.stm.
130. Id.
131. 793 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.C.C. 2011).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 138.
134. Id. ("Both the Master Complaint and the McMillan Estate Complaint
raise claims of negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty
against defendant.").

127. Id.

135. Id. ("The claims primarily allege that malfunctions in the electronic
train control system caused the crash. Alstom, as one of the providers of
the components used in the electronic train control system, is alleged to
have failed to properly design, manufacture, install, inspect, test, and
maintain the automated warning system that should have prevented the
two trains from colliding.").

128. Id. ("The ... train failed to make a normal deceleration and stop at its
station platform berthing point because of the failure . . . within the
program stop system module.").

136. Id. at 137 ("They allege that because Alstom is a manufacturer,
excluded from protection under the statute of repose, its activities as
both a designer and manufacturer must be excluded from protection.")~
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liability claims were dismissed. 137 It is not a surprise that the
plaintiffs alleged products liability in this context. Autonomous trains
are analogous to elevators, except that autonomous trains operate on
a horizontal axis instead of a vertical axis.
As evidenced by the illustrations and case law, whenever
autonomous technology is controlling a means of transportation and
ca~ses har~ or damage, the plaintiffs bring products or strict liability
claims agamst the manufacturer. This finding is essential in making a
reasonable prediction on how courts will analyze autonomous car
liability. Since courts consistently apply products or strict liability to
these autonomous vehicles, courts will most likely treat autonomous
cars similarly.
Policy considerations, moreover, mandate that
manufacturers of autonomous cars do not deserve different treatment
in the application of products or strict liability when the autonomous
cars are the sole cause of the harm. 138 This result, however is
Since human error is non-existent in cases where
problematic.
autonomous cars are the cause of the harm, courts. will apply products
and strict liability.
This application effectively increases
manufacturer liability, thereby hampering the entrance of autonomous
cars into the marketplace due to the manufacturer's lack of monetary
incentives. 139
The following section will provide an in-depth background and
analysis of negligence, products liability, and strict liability. It will
then analogize the biotechnology industry to autonomous cars,
explore the potential social utility of autonomous cars and provide
reasoning why manufacturers of autonomous cars and t~chnology will
see an uptick in products liability claims.

Ill.

THE CURRENT LIABILITY FRAMEWORK AND ITS INHERENT
DEFECTS

A.

General Tort Law

~ort law governs the liability of vehicles controlled by humans.
Particularly, when an unintentional tort occurs, negligence governs

137. Id.
138. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965) ("[P]ublic policy
~emands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
mtended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and
be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can
be obtained.").
139. See LeBeau, supra note 15 ("Strip away the marketing and auto shows
ther~ is one ultimate goal for the automakers: make the most money
possible on each automobile.").
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the person's liability. 140
Generally, to find someone liable for
negligence, the plaintiff must first establish. th~t the defendant owed
him a duty or obligation. 141 Second, the plamtiff must prove t~a~ t~e
defendant breached that duty or obligation. 142 Third, the plamtiff is
required to present evidence sh,?wing that .th~ .de~en~ ~nt's conduct
was the proximate and "but for cause of his mJuries. 4 Lastly, the
plaintiff must establish that he incurred an actual loss or damage as a
result of the defendant's unreasonable conduct. 144
In a situation where a human causes a car accident, the court will
apply the four~element negligence test and decide whether the human
is liable. However, issues arise when hardware or software causes all
of the injury or damage. For example, imagine an autonomous car
driving down a street. Suddenly, the car's autonomous software
miscalculates the location of cars parallel-parked along the street,
thereby causing it to crash into several of the parked vehicles, and
substantial damage ensues. It is obvious that applying the current
negligence test to hardware or software is not practica~-no one would
argue for imposing tort liability on a computer, its software, or
autonomous car hardware-because one cannot literally impute
liability on a machine. 145
140. See generally, ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND K~ETON ON
TORTS 161-64 (5th Ed. 1984) (providing a section on the history and
generalities of negligence).

141. Id. at 164 ("A duty, or obligation, recognized by law, requirin~ the
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk.").
142. Id. ("A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required:
a breach of duty.").

143. Id. at 165 ("A reasonably close causal connection betw~en the condu:t
and the resulting injury . . . which includes the not10n of cause m
fact.").
144. Id. ("Since the action for negligence developed chiefly ~ut of the old
form of action on the case, it retained the rule of that act10n, that proof
of damage was an essential part of the plaintiff's case.").
145. First the software program by itself cannot compensate the car owners
for the damage it caused, effectively undermining tort law's primary
function-to compensate those who incur injury or damage as a result of
other's unreasonable actions. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 5.
Second one of the integral pieces of the negligence analysis is deciding
whether' a "'reasonable [person] of ordinary prud ence '" un d er lik.e
circumstances would have acted similarly.
Id. at 174. Yet, this
standard is not applicable to either hardware or software. Neither
hardware nor software falls within the lay definition of a human being.
JUDY PEARSALL ET AL., THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 691 (10th
Ed. 2002) (defining human being as "a man, women, or child of the
species Homo sapiens."). And while the combination of software and
hardware is somewhat analogous to a human's skeletal and central
nervous systems, there is no standard by which one can determine how
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liability claims were dismissed. 137 It is not a surprise that the
plaintiffs alleged products liability in this context. Autonomous trains
are analogous to elevators, except that autonomous trains operate on
a horizontal axis instead of a vertical axis.
As evidenced by the illustrations and case law, whenever
autonomous technology is controlling a means of transportation and
ca~ses har~ or damage, the plaintiffs bring products or strict liability
claims agamst the manufacturer. This finding is essential in making a
reasonable prediction on how courts will analyze autonomous car
liability. Since courts consistently apply products or strict liability to
these autonomous vehicles, courts will most likely treat autonomous
cars similarly.
Policy considerations, moreover, mandate that
manufacturers of autonomous cars do not deserve different treatment
in the application of products or strict liability when the autonomous
cars are the sole cause of the harm. 138 This result however is
Since human error is non-existent in' cases where
problematic.
autonomous cars are the cause of the harm, courts. will apply products
and strict liability.
This application effectively increases
manufacturer liability, thereby hampering the entrance of autonomous
cars into the marketplace due to the manufacturer's lack of monetary
incentives. 139
The following section will provide an in-depth background and
analysis of negligence, products liability, and strict liability. It will
then analogize the biotechnology industry to autonomous cars,
explor~ the potential social utility of autonomous cars, and provide
reasomng why manufacturers of autonomous cars and technology will
see an uptick in products liability claims.

Ill. THE CURRENT LIABILITY FRAMEWORK AND ITS INHERENT
DEFECTS

A.

General Tort Law

Tort law governs the liability of vehicles controlled by humans.
Particularly, when an unintentional tort occurs, negligence governs

137. Id.
138. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965) ("[P]ublic policy
~emands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
mtended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and
be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can
be obtained.").
139. See LeBeau, supra note 15 ("Strip away the marketing and auto shows
ther~ is one ultimate goal for the automakers: make the most money
possible on each automobile.").
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the person's liability. 140
Generally, to find someone liable for
negligence, the plaintiff must first establish. th~t the defendant owed
him a duty or obligation. 141 Second, the plamtiff must prove t~a~ t~e
defendant breached that duty or obligation. 142 Third, the plamtiff is
required to present evidence sh ~wing that .th~ .de~en~ ~nt's conduct
was the proximate and "but for 1 cause of hrn mJuries. 4 Lastly, the
plaintiff must establish that he incurred an actual loss or damage as a
result of the defendant's unreasonable conduct. 144
In a situation where a human causes a car accident, the court will
apply the four~element negligence test and decide whether the human
is liable. However, issues arise when hardware or software causes all
of the injury or damage. For example, imagine an autonomous car
driving down a street. Suddenly, the car's autonomous software
miscalculates the location of cars parallel-parked along the street,
thereby causing it to crash into several of the parked vehicles, and
substantial damage ensues. It is obvious that applying the current
negligence test to hardware or software is not practical-no one would
argue for imposing tort liability on a computer, its software, or
autonomous car hardware-because one cannot literally impute
liability on a machine. 145
140. See generally, ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND K~ETON ON
TORTS 161-64 (5th Ed. 1984) (providing a section on the history and
generalities of negligence).
141. Id. at 164 ("A duty, or obligation, recognized by law, requirin? the
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk.").
142. Id. ("A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required:
a breach of duty.").
143. Id. at 165 ("A reasonably close causal connection betw~en the condu~t
and the resulting injury . . . which includes the not10n of cause m
fact.").
144. Id. ("Since the action for negligence developed chiefly ~ut of the old
form of action on the case, it retained the rule of that action, that proof
of damage was an essential part of the plaintiff's case.").
145. First, the software program by itself cannot compensate the car o~ners
for the damage it caused, effectively undermining tort law's pnmary
function-to compensate those who incur injury or damage as a result of
other's unreasonable actions. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 5.
Second one of the integral pieces of the negligence analysis is deciding
whether' a "'reasonable [person] of ordinary prud ence "' un d er l"k
i .e
circumstances would have acted similarly.
Id. at 174. Yet, this
standard is not applicable to either hardware or software. Neither
hardware nor software falls within the lay definition of a human being.
JUDY PEARSALL ET AL., THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 691 (10th
Ed. 2002) (defining human being as "a man, women, or child of the
species Homo sapiens."). And while the combination of software and
hardware is somewhat analogous to a human's skeletal and central
nervous systems, there is no standard by which one can determine how
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Attributing liability to the owner of the vehicle nevertheless is
not socially desirable, 146 unless owners of autonomous' cars agree u;on
the purchase of the autonomous car to assume the risk of all harm
regardless of what, or who, caused it. 147 Yet, requiring consumers t~
assume. one-hundred percent of the risk would deter many from
purchasmg autonomous cars-at least until the technology is
extremely reliable. Since consumers have no power over the quality of
autonomou~ c~r manufa~turing, design, or spending, public policy
conc~rns will likely outweigh an assumption of the risk approach that
reqmres
the consumer to accept total responsibility regardless of
148
fault.
While general tort law does not provide a c~urse of action
products and strict liability does.
'
either so~ware or hardware must act or make decisions. Even if the
software is so advanced that it . can "think" like a human, neither
hard:vare n~r software possesses a human being's mental capacity,
physical attributes, knowledge, or age, which are all required bricks in
the wall of the reasonable person analysis. KEETON ET AL., supra note
140, at 165, 175-179. Moreover, the reasonable person doctrine dates as
far back as 1837. Vaughan v. Menlove, 1837, 3 Bing.N.C. 468, 132
Eng:Rep. 490 ("Instead therefore, of saying that the liability for
ne~hgence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual,
which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual
we ought rat~er to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases ~
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.").
As a result, the framers of the reasonable person doctrine did not
postulate the existence of software or hardware.
146. Un~er ~urrent negligence law, imputing liability upon the owner of the
vehicle is not possible. The owner must act, or fail to act, giving rise to
the harm. Here, the owner is merely a passive passenger. The car itself
caused. the harm via a malfunction.
Under the current Nevada
re~ulat10ns, the operator, whether or not in the car, is considered the
driver. As a result, the human owner could in theory be liable for the
damage that the car's malfunctions caused.
147. KEETO_N ET AL., supra note 140, at 480 ("assumption of the risk has been
rec~gmzed from three different perspectives, as follows ... [i]n its most
b~s1c s~nse assump~ion of the risk means the plaintiff, in advance, has
given his express [s1?] consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation
o.f con~~ct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known
risk ar~smg from what the defendant is to do or leave undone .... The
result is the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the plaintiff; and being
~nder_ no. duty, he cannot. be charged with negligence . . . . A second
s1tuat1on is where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with
the. defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him
agamst one or more future risks that may arise from the relation. He
may_ then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly [sic] consenting to the
neg~1gen?e and agre~in? t? take his own chances . . . . In the third type
of s1tuat10n, the plamt1ff is aware of a risk that has already been created
by the neg!igence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to proceed to
encounter it.").
148. Id. a~ _482 ("where one party is at such obvious disadvantage in
bargammg power that the effect of the contract is to put [the consumer]
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Products and Strict Liability

Products liability law, which can be traced back as far as the
sixth century A.D. in Roman law, 149 is a specialized area of law that
imposes liability upon manufacturers or suppliers of goods. 150
Products liability law is reactive in nature-its purpose is to
compensate those injured due to a manufacturer's negligence in the
production of a product-hence, it operates. ex post. 151
Generally,
anyone who sells or manufactures a product is liable for negligence if
the product "may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting
substantial harm if it is defective. "152 The rationale for holding
product manufacturers liable is based on the economic benefit that
the manufacturers derive from sales of the products they sell. 153
Products liability law has carved out several instances by which a
manufacturer or creator of a product is subject to liability. 154
A manufacturer, and sometimes others involved in the stream of
commerce, may incur liability if it fails to discover a flaw in the
product it is manufacturing or selling. 155 The plaintiff must show, by
preponderance of the evidence, that the defect in question
proximately caused his injuries. 156 Moreover, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant's conduct, when compared to a prudent
manufacturer under like circumstances, is unreasonable. 157 Thus, if an
at the mercy of the other's negligence. Thus it is generally held that a
contract exempting an employer from all liability for negligence toward
his employees [, for example,] is void against public policy.").
149. DAVID G. OWEN, ET. AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 11 (2005).
150. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 677.
151. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 3.
152. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 682-83 ("Cardozo's opinion struck
through the fog of the 'general rule' and its various exceptions, and held
the maker liable for negligence.
This decision found immediate
acceptance and at the end of some forty years is universal law in the
United States.").
153. Id. at 683.
154. Id. at 685.
155. Id. ("A flaw in a product is a condition of the product that is different
from what it was intended to be . . . . Normally, a retail dealer would
not be negligent, as a matter of law, in selling a flawed or defectively
designed product of a reputable manufacturer.").
156. Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that a specific product unit
was defective as a result of 'some mishap in the manufacturing process
itself, improper workmanship, or because defective materials were used
in construction,' and that the defect was the cause of plaintiff's injury.")
(citation omitted).
157. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 440.
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Attributing liability to the owner of the vehicle, nevertheless, is
not socially desirable, 146 unless owners of autonomous cars agree upon
the purchase of the autonomous car to assume the risk of all harm,
regardless of what, or who, caused it. 147 Yet, requiring consumers to
assume one-hundred percent of the risk would deter many from
purchasing autonomous cars-at least until the technology is
extremely reliable. Since consumers have no power over the quality of
autonomous car manufacturing, design, or spending, public policy
concerns will likely outweigh an assumption of the risk approach that
requires the consumer to accept total responsibility, regardless of
148
fault.
While general tort law does not provide a course of action,
products and strict liability does.
either software or hardware must act or make decisions. Even if the
software is so advanced that it . can "think" like a human, neither
hardware nor software possesses a human being's mental capacity,
physical attributes, knowledge, or age, which are all required bricks in
the wall of the reasonable person analysis. KEETON ET AL., supra note
140, at 165, 175-179. Moreover, the reasonable person doctrine dates as
far back as 1837. Vaughan v. Menlove, 1837, 3 Bing.N.C. 468, 132
Eng.Rep. 490 ("Instead therefore, of saying that the liability for
negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual,
which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual,
we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.").
As a result, the framers of the reasonable person doctrine did not
postulate the existence of software or hardware.
146. Under current negligence law, imputing liability upon the owner of the
vehicle is not possible. The owner must act, or fail to act, giving rise to
the harm. Here, the owner is merely a passive passenger. The car itself
caused the harm via a malfunction.
Under the current Nevada
regulations, the operator, whether or not in the car, is considered the
driver. As a result, the human owner could in theory be liable for the
damage that the car's malfunctions caused.
147. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 480 ("assumption of the risk has been
recognized from three different perspectives, as follows . . . [i]n its most
basic sense assumption of the risk means the plaintiff, in advance, has
given his express [sic] consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation
of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known
risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone .... The
result is the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the plaintiff; and being
under no duty, he cannot be charged with negligence . . . . A second
situation is where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with
the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him
against one or more future risks that may arise from the relation. He
may then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly [sic] consenting to the
· negligence and agreeing to take his own chances . . . . In the third type
of situation, the plaintiff is aware of a risk that has already been created
by the negligence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to proceed to
encounter it.").
148. Id. at 482 ("where one party is at such obvious disadvantage in
bargaining power that the effect of the contract is to put [the consumer]
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Products and Strict Liability

Products liability law, which can be traced back as far as the
sixth century A.D. in Roman law, 149 is a specialized area of law that
imposes liability upon manufacturers or suppliers of go~ds. 150
Products liability law is reactive in nature-its purpose is to
compensate those injured due to a manufacturer's negligence in the
production of a product-hence, it operates ex post. 151
G~nerall~,
anyone who sells or manufactures a product is liable for negligence if
the product "may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflict~ng
substantial harm if it is defective. "152 The rationale for holdmg
product manufacturers liable is based on the economic benefit that
the manufacturers derive from sales of the products they sell. 153
Products liability law has carved out several instances by which a
manufacturer or creator of a product is subject to liability. 154
A manufacturer, and sometimes others involved in the stream of
commerce, may incur liability if it fails to discover a flaw in the
product it is manufacturing or selling. 155 The plaintiff m~st show, _by
preponderance of the evidence, that the defect i~ _quest10n
proximately caused his injuries. 156 Moreover, the plamtiff must
establish that the defendant's conduct, when compared to a prudent
manufacturer under like circumstances, is unreasonable. 157 Thus, if an
at the mercy of the other's negligence. Thus it is generally held that a
contract exempting an employer from all liability for negligence toward
his employees [,for example,] is void against public policy.").
149. DAVID G. OWEN, ET. AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 11 (2005).
150. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 677.
151. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 3.
152. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 682-83 ("Cardozo's opinion struck
through the fog of the 'general rule' and its various exceptions_, and ~eld
the maker liable for negligence.
This decision found immediate
acceptance and at the end of some forty years is universal law in the
United States.").
153. Id. at 683.
154. Id. at 685.
155. Id. ("A flaw in a product is a condition of the product t~at is different
from what it was intended to be . . . . Normally, a retail dealer would
not be negligent, as a matter of law, in selling a flawed or defectively
designed product of a reputable manufacturer.").
156. Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that a specific p~oduct unit
was defective as a result of 'some mishap in the manufacturing process
itself, improper workmanship, or because defective mat~ria_ls, w~r~ us~~
in construction,' and that the defect was the cause of plamt1ff s mJury. )
(citation omitted).
157. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 440.
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autonomous car's software fails due to an error in production-'causing it to rear-end the car directly in front of it-the manufacturer
or producer of the software is theoretically subject to_ liability as ~or1:g
as it acted unreasonably. In the area of manufacturmg defects, it is
typically not difficult for a plaintiff to prove that a product is
defective, and therefore caused the harm, because that burden can be
met through the use of expert testimony. 158 Consequently, m?st
defendants settle in order to avoid the high costs and negative
. t"10n. 159
publicity that resu1t fr om lit iga
Manufacturers may also be liable for a failure to warn consumers
about a danger or hazard160 when a manufacturer knows or _sho~d
have known about an inherent danger or hazard regardmg its
product.161 This duty to warn is specifically rooted in Roman sa~es
law. 162 If a merchant living in the Roman Empire sold a product with
a hidden danger and did not provide notice of the hidden danger to
the consumer the merchant risked being found guilty of dolus, i.e.,
fraud.163 In' the modern context, the manufacturer is held to a
standard of reasonable inquiry. 164 Manufacturers are under a duty to
adequately warn consumers of hidden dangers in their prod~cts;
however, there is no duty to warn consumers about obv10us
dangers.165 As such, if someone is harmed, yet the manufacturer
sufficiently warned consumers of the danger that caused ~he harm, _the
manufacturer is not liable. 166 Moreover, a manufacturer is not subject
to liability if the consumer used the product in an unforeseeable way,

because it is not possible for the manufacturer to know of the danger
and reasonably warn the consumer.167
Lastl!, a 1:1-anufacturer is subject to liability if the design of a
product itself lS defective in nature. 168 However what constitutes a
def~ctive design is not clear .169 Furthermore, ma~y economists stand
behi~1d the theory th~t it is t~e market's role to decide which designs
are mherently defective-not Judges and juries. 110 In addition
·t·
.
h f
' many
en ics cite t e act that even if a manufacturer went to the most
~eason~bl~ _length~ in designing a product, the manufacturer may still
mcur habihty,_ which should be against public policy. m Nevertheless,
the_ la:W reqrures manufacturers to satisfy the duty of care when
·
designmg consumer goods. 172
!he risk-utility test, which gained popularity in the 1970s, is the
leadmg legal test for whether a design is defective.173 The test states
that a product design is defective if "the costs of avoiding [a]
parti~ul~~ haza~~ a~e foreseeably less than the resulting safety
benefits. 74 In htigat10n, the plaintiffs and defendants generally argue
o~er a "narrow 'micro-balance' of pros and cons of a manufacturer's
failure to adopt some particular design feature that would have

158. Id. at 434, 39.
159. Id.
160. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 677.
161. Id.
162. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 562.
163. Id.
164. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 685 ("[I]t is the state of the
scientific knowledge and technical information regarding danger t~at
was available to the seller at the time such seller surrendered possess10n
that is relevant and admissible as regards [to] what he should have
known. The information which a manufacturer should have known
would include information that would be obtainable from a reasonable
inquiry of experts and a reasonable research of scientific literature.")·
165. See id. at 686; OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 561 (_"Manufa~turers
and other sellers have a duty to provide consumers with warnmgs of
hidden product dangers and instructions on how th~i: pro~ucts m3:y be
safety used.
Products that fail to carry sufficient mformat10nal
'software' of this type are deemed 'defective."').
166. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 561.
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167. See K~ETON _ET AL., supra note 140, at 687 ("Thus in one case, a 5-yearold child sprmkled himself with highly flammable fingernail polish which
ha~ no warning. ~he ch_ild was burned to death when the polish ignited
while he was playmg with the polish. It was held that there was no
duty to warn against this kind of misuse. But the real reason would
appear to be that a warning of this kind of rare use would probabl
have served no purpose in most instances since those who read or coul~
read would already know of the existence of the likely flammability of
the product."); The same would probably apply to the misuse of
autonomous cars-if you can read (implying you are educated) then
you probably know what the reasonable uses of an autonomous ca; are.
168. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 480.
169. See i~. at 490 ("The quest for understanding design defectiveness
perenm~lly vexes courts and accomplished products liability lawyers
atte~ptmg to unravel design defe~t problems; delights law clerks, young
asso~i~tes, and law _students furmshed an occasion for displaying their
erudition; and provides fertile grist for law professors aspiring for the
renown ~h~ught to _follow discovery of the key riddle wrapped in a
mystery mside an emgma. ").

170. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 688.
171. Id. ("[O]ne can be either negligent or without negligence in designing a
bad product .... ").
172. Id.
173. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 493.
174. Id. at 495 ("In other words, if the safety benefits from preventing the
danger . that harmed the plaintiff were foreseeably greater than its
precaut10n costs, the product's design is defective under the cost-benefit
(or "risk-utility") standard of liability.").
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autonomous car's software fails due to an error in production-'causing it to rear-end the car directly in front o_f it-th~ rr:~nufacturer
or producer of the software is theoretically subject to hab1hty as long
as it acted unreasonably. In the area of manufacturing defects, it ~s
typically not difficult for a plaintiff to prove that a product is
defective, and therefore caused the harm, because that burden can be
met through the use of expert testimony. 158 Consequently, m?st
defendants settle in order to avoid the high costs and negative
159
publicity that result from litigation.
Manufacturers may also be liable for a failure to warn consumers
about a danger or hazard160 when a manufacturer knows or _sho~d
have known about an inherent danger or hazard regardmg its
product.151 This duty to warn is specifically rooted in Roman sa~es
law.162 If a merchant living in the Roman Empire sold a product with
a hidden danger and did not provide notice of the hidden danger_ to
the consumer the merchant risked being found guilty of dolus, i.e.,
fraud.163 In' the modern context, the manufacturer is held to a
standard of reasonable inquiry .164 Manufacturers are under a duty to
adequately warn consumers of hidden dangers in their prod~cts;
however, there is no duty to warn consumers about obv10us
dangers.165 As such, if someone is harmed, yet the manufacturer
sufficiently warned consumers of the danger that caused ~he harm, ~he
manufacturer is not liable. 166 · Moreover, a manufacturer is not subject
to liability if the consumer used the product in an unforeseeable way,

158. Id. at 434, 39.
159. Id.
160. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 677.
161. Id.
162. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 562.
163. Id.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 685 ("[I]t is the state of the
164.
scientific knowledge and technical information regarding danger t~at
was available to the seller at the time such seller surrendered possession
that is relevant and admissible as regards [to] what he should have
known. The information which a manufacturer should have known
would include information that would be obtainable from a reasonable
inquiry of experts and a reasonable research of scientific literature.")·
165. See id. at 686; OWEN ET AL.,- supra note 149, at 561 (_"Manufa~turers
and other sellers have a duty to provide consumers with warmngs of
hidden product dangers and instructions on how th~i~ pro~ucts m8:Y be
safety used.
Products that fail to carry sufficient mformational
'software' of this type are deemed 'defective."').
166. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 561.
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because it is not possible for the manufacturer to know of the danger
and reasonably warn the consumer. 167
Lastly, a manufacturer is subject to liability if the design of a
produ~t itself is defective in nature. 168 However, what constitutes a
def~ctive design is not clear .169 Furthermore, many economists stand
beh1:1d the theory th~t it is t~e market's role to decide which designs
are mherently defective-not judges and juries. 170 In addition ma
ny
en·t·ics c1"t e t h e f act that even if a manufacturer went to the' most
~eason~bl~ _lengths_ in designing a product, the manufacturer may still
mcur hab1hty, which should be against public policy. 171 Nevertheless
the law requires manufacturers to satisfy the duty of care whe~
designing consumer goods. 172
·
!he risk-utility test, which gained popularity in the 1970s, is the
leadmg legal test for whether a design is defective. 173 The test states
that a product design is defective if "the costs of avoiding [a]
parti~ul~~ haza~~ a~e foreseeably less than the resulting safety
benefits. 174 In ht1gat10n, the plaintiffs and defendants generally argue
over a "narrow 'micro-balance' of pros and cons of a manufacturer's
failure to adopt some particular design feature that would have
167. See K~ETON _ET AL., ~upra n~te 140, at 687 ("Thus in one case, a 5-yearold child sprmkled himself with highly flammable fingernail polish which
ha~ no warning. ~he c~ild was burned to death when the polish ignited
while he was playmg with the polish. It was held that there was no
duty to warn against this kind of misuse. But the real reason would
appear to be that a w8:rning of_ this kind of rare use would probably
have served no purpose m most mstances since those who read or could
read would already know of the existence of the likely flammability of
the product."); The same would probably apply to the misuse of
autonomous cars-if you can read (implying you are educated), then
you probably know what the reasonable uses of an autonomous car are.
168. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 480.
169. See id: at 490 ("The quest for understanding design defectiveness
perenmally vexes courts and accomplished products liability lawyers
atte~pting to unravel design defect problems; delights law clerks, young
asso~i~tes, and law _student~ furn!shed an occasion for displaying their
erudition; and provides fertile gnst for law professors aspiring for the
renown thought to follow discovery of the key riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma.").
170. KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 688.
171. Id. ("[O]ne can be either negligent or without negligence in designing a
bad product .... ").
172. Id.
173. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 493.
174. Id. at 495 ("In other words, if the safety benefits from preventing the
danger . that harmed the plaintiff were foreseeably greater than its
precaution costs, the product's design is defective under the cost-benefit
(or "risk-utility") standard of liability.").
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prevented the plaintiff's harm. "175 Hence, in most defective design
cases, the plaintiff tries to provide a superior alternative to the design
the defendant used. 176 In many jurisdictions, the law often requires
the plaintiff to present a superior alternative design in the
pleadings. 177 And while design defectiveness is the leading claim set
. forth by plaintiffs today, 178 the leading theory that most plaintiffs
assert in products liability litigation is strict liability. 179
Starting in the 1960s, strict liability became the "predominant
theory of recovery [in the United States] for product related
injuries. "180 Originally, strict liability's basis was solely founded in
contract law, via an implied or express warranty. 181 Subsequently, the
torts theory of strict liability emerged, which is conditioned upon the
inherent dangerousness of the product. 182 Regardless of the confusion
surrounding strict liability in the context of products liability, state
courts agree that "in order for strict liability to apply under Section

402A [of the Second Restatement of Torts], [the] productO [in
controversy] must be 'in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer. "' 183
Automotive products liability is nearly identical to other types of
products liability cases. 184 In some respects, nonetheless, automotive
products liability is nuanced. 185 These cases normally involve either
defects that cause accidents, or vehicles that are not "sufficiently
'crashworthy' to protect the occupants" in the car. 186 Plaintiffs
normally plead that a design defect, failure to warn, or manufacturing
defect caused the injury or harm to the plaintiff. 187
It seems like products or strict liability is the best way for drivers
to recover against manufacturers of autonomous cars when the cars'
technology causes harm; however, policy and economic issues
complicate the matter because the social utility of autonomous cars
will be substantial once they enter the marketplace. 188
C.

175. Id. at 498 ("[T]hat is, whether the costs of changing the design in some
particular ('micro') manner would have been worth the resulting safety
benefits.").
176. Id. at 505 ("[D]esign defectiveness is usually best resolved by the riskutility analysis, the purpose of which is to determine 'whether the risk of
injury might have been reduced or avoided if the manufacturer had used
a feasible a alternative design.' In the words of a leading tort scholar,
'one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect until
and unless one has identified some design alternative (including any
design omission) that can serve as a basis for a risk-benefit analysis."').

Biotechnology: A Case Study

Applying products and strict liability, although legally sound,
would have a hampering effect on the introduction of autonomous car
technology into the marketplace. 189 For example, in the United
183. See Stovsky, supra note 180, at 367 ("In determining whether liability
attaches to a defective product, state courts apply one of two distinct
tests: (1) a risk-utility test, or (2) a consumer expectations test."); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 702 (further discussing the
consumer-contemplation tests and the risk-utility test).

177. Id. at 506.

184. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 1073.

178. Id. at 482.

185. Id. at 1073.

179. Id.

186. Id. at 1072-73.

180. Michael D. Stovsky, Comment, Product Liability Barriers to the
Commercialization of Biotechnology: Improving the Competitiveness of
the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 6 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 366
(1992).

188. See infra, Section III.D.

181. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 690 ("Two problems in particular
gave considerable trouble." First, a "buyer [is prevented] from
recovering on a warranty unless he gives notice to the seller within a
reasonable time after he knows or should know of the breach." Second,
a manufacturers was "free to insert in his contract of sale an effective
agreement that he warrants only against certain consequences or defects,
or that his liability shall be limited to particular remedies, such as
replacement, repair, or return of the purchase price.").
182. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 693-94 ("The first case to apply a
tort theory of strict liability generally was Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., in California in 1963. That decision and the final
acceptance of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts by the
American Law Institute in 1964 were immediately relied upon for the
ad~ption of strict liability in tort throughout the country."); see also id.
at 677-724 (further discussing strict liability).
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187. Id. at 1073.

189. Tyler C. Folsom, Social Ramifications of Autonomous Urban Land
Vehicles 4, IEEE INT'L SYMPOSIUM ON TECH. AND Soc'Y (May 2011),
available at http://faculty.washington.edu/jbs/itrans/tyler-article.pdf;
see Markoff, supra note 15, at B6 ("'Why would you even put money
into developing it?' [Gary E. Marchant, director of the Center for Law,
Science and Innovation at the Arizona State University Law School]
asked. 'I see this as a huge barrier to this technology unless there are
some policy ways around it'-though he noted that there were
precedents for Congress adopting such policies."). The argument that
the current torts regime only prevents dangerous or defective
technologies from entering the marketplace is valid; however, a
product's utility may substantially outweigh the product's risk, yet the
profits do not overcome the liabilities. And since profits arguably drive
the marketplace, a highly beneficial product would never enter the
marketplace merely because of profit concerns. Passing the costs onto
the consumer might cause consumers not to purchase the product and
once again, profit concerns arise so the manufacturer decides not to
produce.
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prevented the plaintiff's harm." 175 Hence, in most defective design
cases, the plaintiff tries to provide a superior alternative to the design
the defendant used. 176 In many jurisdictions, the law often requires
the plaintiff to present a superior alternative design in the
pleadings. 177 And while design defectiveness is the leading claim set
. forth by plaintiffs today, 178 the leading theory that most plaintiffs
assert in products liability litigation is strict liability. 179
Starting in the 1960s, strict liability became the "predominant
theory of recovery [in the United States] for product related
injuries. "180 Originally, strict liability's basis was solely founded in
contract law, via an implied or express warranty. 181 Subsequently, the
torts theory of strict liability emerged, which is conditioned upon the
inherent dangerousness of the product. 182 Regardless of the confusion
surrounding strict liability in the context of products liability, state
courts agree that "in order for strict liability to apply under Section

402A [of the Second Restatement of Torts], [the] productO [in
controversy] must be 'in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer. "' 183
Automotive products liability is nearly identical to other types of
products liability cases. 184 In some respects, nonetheless, automotive
products liability is nuanced. 185 These cases normally involve either
defects that cause accidents, or vehicles that are not "sufficiently
'crashworthy' to protect the occupants" in the car. 186 Plaintiffs
normally plead that a design defect, failure to warn, or manufacturing
defect caused the injury or harm to the plaintiff. 187
It seems like products or strict liability is the best way for drivers
to recover against manufacturers of autonomous cars when the cars'
technology causes harm; however, policy and economic issues
complicate the matter because the social utility of autonomous cars
will be substantial once they enter the marketplace. 188
C.

175. Id. at 498 (" [T]hat is, whether the costs of changing the design in some
particular ('micro') manner would have been worth the resulting safety
benefits.").
176. Id. at 505 (" [D]esign defectiveness is usually best resolved by the riskutility analysis, the purpose of which is to determine 'whether the risk of
injury might have been reduced or avoided if the manufacturer had used
a feasible a alternative design.' In the words of a leading tort scholar,
'one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect until
and unless one has identified some design alternative (including any
design omission) that can serve as a basis for a risk-benefit analysis."').

Biotechnology: A Case Study

Applying products and strict liability, although legally sound,
would have a hampering effect on the introduction of autonomous car
technology into the marketplace. 189 For example, in the United
183. See Stovsky, supra note 180, at 367 ("In determining whether liability
attaches to a defective product, state courts apply one of two distinct
tests: (1) a risk-utility test, or (2) a consumer expectations test."); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 702 (further discussing the
consumer-contemplation tests and the risk-utility test).

177. Id. at 506.

184. OWEN ET AL., supra note 149, at 1073.

178. Id. at 482.

185. Id. at 1073.

179. Id.

186. Id. at 1072-73.

180. Michael D. Stovsky, Comment, Product Liability Barriers to the
Commercialization of Biotechnology: Improving the Competitiveness of
the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 6 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 366
(1992).

188. See infra, Section III.D.

181. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 690 ("Two problems in particular
gave considerable trouble." First, a "buyer [is prevented] from
recovering on a warranty unless he gives notice to the seller within a
reasonable time after he knows or should know of the breach." Second,
a manufacturers was "free to insert in his contract of sale an effective
agreement that he warrants only against certain consequences or defects,
or that his liability shall be limited to particular remedies, such as
replacement, repair, or return of the purchase price.").
182. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 693-94 ("The first case to apply a
tort theory of strict liability generally was Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., in California in 1963. That decision and the final
acceptance of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts by the
American Law Institute in 1964 were immediately relied upon for the
adoption of strict liability in tort throughout the country."); see also id.
at 677-724 (further discussing strict liability).
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187. Id. at 1073.

189. Tyler C. Folsom, Social Ramifications of Autonomous Urban Land
Vehicles 4, IEEE INT'L SYMPOSIUM ON TECH. AND Soc'y (May 2011),
available at http://faculty.washington.edu/jbs/itrans/tyler-article.pdf;
see Markoff, supra note 15, at B6 ("'Why would you even put money
into developing it?' [Gary E. Marchant, director of the Center for Law,
Science and Innovation at the Arizona State University Law School]
asked. 'I see this as a huge barrier to this technology unless there are
some policy ways around it'-though he noted that there were
precedents for Congress adopting such policies."). The argument that
the current torts regime only prevents dangerous or defective
technologies from entering the marketplace is valid; however, a
product's utility may substantially outweigh the product's risk, yet the
profits do not overcome the liabilities. And since profits arguably drive
the marketplace, a highly beneficial product would never enter the
marketplace merely because of profit concerns. Passing the costs onto
the consumer might cause consumers not to purchase the product and
once again, profit concerns arise so the manufacturer decides not to
produce.
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States, the biotechnology industry experienced a similar problem.19°
According to the International Trade Administration, products
liability law is a "severe" barrier for innovation in the biotechnology
191
industry.
Many of the United States' major drug corporations are
ceasing to produce newer and safer vaccines because of excessive
liability costs associated with drug production, with insurance being
the major cost plaguing the biotechnology companies. 192 Between 1980
and 1988, lawsuits for biotechnology products liability i~creased by
193
8133.
"In 1984 alone, $9.8 million of manufacturer's litigation costs
were not reimbursed by insurance, and by that time, plaintiffs had
requested over $3.5 billion in damages. "194 Damages drastically
increased too-from 1975 to 1986, "the average jury verdict in
product[s] liability cases had increased from $400,000 to over $1.8
195
million. "
Consequently, between the years 2007 and 2010, the
number of publically traded biotechnology companies located in the
United States decreased by one-hundred, which reduced the market
196
by 253.
Even worse, projections indicate that more companies will
continue to leave the marketplace. 197
Vaccines and other important products produced by
biotechnology companies have a high social utility because they
prevent disease, lower healthcare costs, and generally advance
In contrast, biotechnology companies are concerned
humanity. 198
190. See Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 1984), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/
06/26/science/vaccine-liability-threatens-supplies.html?pagewanted=all.
191. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 365.
192. Id. at 373 ("One of the foremost obstacles faced by firms attempting to
market biotechnological products is the cost of insuring their products
against product liability claims.").
193. Id.
194. Evan L. Rosenfeld, The Strict Products Liability Crisis and Beyond: Is
There Hope for an AIDS Vaccine?, 313 JURIMETRICS J. 187, 196 (1991).
195. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 373.
196. Rob Waters, Shrinking U.S. Biotechnology Sector Lost 25% of
Companies in Past 3 Years, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:22 P.M.),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-05/shrinking-u-sbiotechnology-sector-lost-25-of-companies-in-past-3-years .html.
The
current economic instability is .another major factor to consider.
197. See Stovsky, supra note 180, at 374
198. See generally Understanding Vaccines What They Are How They Work,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/vaccines/documents/undvacc.pdf;
Stovsky, supra note 180, at 376 ("The threat of enormous and
unpredictable liability continues to weigh heavily in our decisions
relating to the development of new products and to improvements to
existing ones. This is particularly significant in pharmaceuticals and
other high-technology health-care products. In cases involving these
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with mitigating the unpredictability that strict and products liability
presents, resulting in stifled innovation and thereby providing society
with less benefits than otherwise would have resulted. 199
D.

Social Utility of Autonomous Cars

Likewise, autonomous cars can significantly reduce the number of
car accidents, injuries, deaths, and costs related to cars accidents
because 953 of car accidents in the United States are the result of
human error. 200 To illustrate, over 40,000 people die each year as a
result of car accidents in the United States. 201 Recent studies in
Europe show:
that applying brakes half a second earlier in a car traveling at
50 km/h can reduce the crash energy by 50 percent. But an
analysis of German accidents showed that 39 percent of drivers
didn't activate their brakes before the collision, and 40 percent
didn't apply brakes effectively. 202
On the other hand, autonomous cars have faster reaction times
than humans. 203 Studies suggest that "81 percent of 'non-impaired'
products jurors are left free to second-guess the weight of impartial
scientific opinion and the Food and Drug Administration, to find
manufacturers at fault, and to award multi-million-dollar verdicts. As a
result, valuable products whose potential profitability is outweighed by
the risk of enormous liability never see the light of day.").
199. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 376 ("The uncertain threat of strict liability
strongly deters development of biotechnology products.").
200. Hannah Elliott, Most Dangerous Times To Drive, FORBES (Jan. 21,
2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/21/car-accident-timesforbeslife-cx_he_0121driving.html ('"I think that people in some
instances have a false sense of their own abilities and a false sense of
their abilities to multitask,' [Rae Tyson, spokesman for the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration] says. "'Since most of those
crashes are a result of human error, somebody's got to be making a lot
of mistakes."').
201. Id; see also David H. Freedman, Impatient Futurist Are We Finally
Ready for Self-Driving Car~ DISCOVER MAGAZINE (Apr. 2011),
available
at
http://discovermagazine.com/2011/apr/10-future-techfinally-ready-self-driving-cars ("The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimates that car crashes killed nearly 40,000 people and
cost more than $70 billion in the United States last year.").
202. Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 30-31.
203. Markoff, supra note 49 ("Robot drivers react faster than humans, have
360-degree perception and do not get distracted, sleepy or intoxicated,
the engineers argue."); see also Folsom, supra note 189 ("Manual
driving requires space between vehicles for driver reaction time and
brake application time in emergencies. In an autonomous system, there
is no driver and thus cognition time is a few milliseconds."); Evan
Ackerman, CMU Develops Autonomous Cars Software That's Probably

111

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

4 ·No. l · 2012

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

4 ·No. l · 2012

Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability

Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability

States, the biotechnology industry experienced a similar problem.mo
According to the International Trade Administration, products
liability law is a "severe" barrier for innovation in the biotechnology
industry. 191 Many of the United States' major drug corporations are
ceasing to produce newer and safer vaccines because of excessive
liability costs associated with drug production, with insurance being
the major cost plaguing the biotechnology companies. 192 Between 1980
and 1988, lawsuits for biotechnology products liability i~creased by
8133.m3 "In 1984 alone, $9.8 million of manufacturer's litigation costs
were not reimbursed by insurance, and by that time, plaintiffs had
requested over $3.5 billion in damages. "194 Damages drastically
increased too-from 1975 to 1986, "the average jury verdict in
product[s] liability cases had increased from $400,000 to over $1.8
million. "195 Consequently, between the years 2007 and 2010, the
number of publically traded biotechnology companies located in the
United States decreased by one-hundred, which reduced the market
by 253. 196 Even worse, projections indicate that more companies will
continue to leave the marketplace. 197
Vaccines and other important products produced by
biotechnology companies have a high social utility because they
prevent disease, lower healthcare costs, and generally advance
humanity. ms
In contrast, biotechnology companies are concerned

with mitigating the unpredictability that strict and products liability
presents, resulting in stifled innovation and thereby providing society
with less benefits than otherwise would have resulted. 199

190. See Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 1984), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/
06/26/science/vaccine-liability-threatens-supplies.html?pagewanted=all.
191. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 365.
192. Id. at 373 ("One of the foremost obstacles faced by firms attempting to
market biotechnological products is the cost of insuring their products
against product liability claims.").
193. Id.
194. Evan L. Rosenfeld, The Strict Products Liability Crisis and Beyond: Is
There Hope for an AIDS Vaccine?, 313 JURlMETRICS J. 187, 196 (1991).
195. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 373.
196. Rob Waters, Shrinking U.S. Biotechnology Sector Lost 25% of
Companies in Past 3 Years, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:22 P.M.),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-05/shrinking-u-sbiotechnology-sector-lost-25-of-companies-in-past-3-years .html.
The
current economic instability is another major factor to consider.
197. See Stovsky, supra note 180, at 374

D.

Social Utility of Autonomous Cars

Likewise, autonomous cars can significantly reduce the number of
car accidents, injuries, deaths, and costs related to cars accidents
because 953 of car accidents in the United States are the result of
human error. 200 To illustrate, over 40,000 people die each year as a
result of car accidents in the United States. 201 Recent studies in
Europe show:
that applying brakes half a second earlier in a car traveling at
50 km/h can reduce the crash energy by 50 percent. But an
analysis of German accidents showed that 39 percent of drivers
didn't activate their brakes before the collision, and 40 percent
didn't apply brakes effectively. 202
On the other hand, autonomous cars have faster reaction times
than humans. 203 Studies suggest that "81 percent of 'non-impaired'
products jurors are left free to second-guess the weight of impartial
scientific opinion and the Food and Drug Administration, to find
manufacturers at fault, and to award multi-million-dollar verdicts. As a
result, valuable products whose potential profitability is outweighed by
the risk of enormous liability never see the light of day.").
199. Stovsky, supra note 180, at 376 ("The uncertain threat of strict liability
strongly deters development of biotechnology products.").
200. Hannah Elliott, Most Dangerous Times To Drive, FORBES (Jan. 21,
2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/21/car-accident-timesforbeslife-cx_he_0121driving.html ("'I think that people in some
instances have a false sense of their own abilities and a false sense of
their abilities to multitask,' [Rae Tyson, spokesman for the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration] says. "'Since most of those
crashes are a result of human error, somebody's got to be making a lot
of mistakes."').
201. Id; see also David H. Freedman, Impatient Futurist Are We Finally
Ready for Self-Driving Cars.'4 DISCOVER MAGAZINE (Apr. 2011),
available
at
http://discovermagazine.com/2011/apr/10-future-techfinally-ready-self-driving-cars ("The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimates that car crashes killed nearly 40,000 people and
cost more than $70 billion in the United States last year,").
202. Forrest & Konca, supra note 18, at 30-31.

198. See generally Understanding Vaccines What They Are How They Work
\ at'
S DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (Jan. 2008), available
U ..
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/vaccines/documents/undvacc.pdf;
Stovsky, supra note 180, at 376 ("The threat of enormous and
unpredictable liability continues to weigh heavily in our decisions
relating to the development of new products and to improvements to
existing ones. This is particularly significant in pharmaceuticals and
other high-technology health-care products. In cases involving these

203. Markoff, supra note 49 ("Robot drivers react faster than humans, have
360-degree perception and do not get distracted, sleepy or intoxicated,
the engineers argue."); see also Folsom, supra note 189 ("Manual
driving requires space between vehicles for driver reaction time and
brake application time in emergencies. In an autonomous system, there
is no driver and thus cognition time is a few milliseconds."); Evan
Ackerman, CMU Develops Autonomous Cars Software That's Probably
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crashes could be avoided" due to autonomous cars' ability to
communicate with each other over a special radio spectrum.204
Moreover, in 2009, twenty percent of car accidents involved distracted
205
drivers,
and 11,000 people died as a result of alcohol-impaired
206
drivers.
However, unlike humans, it is not possible for autonomous
cars to become intoxicated or distracted. 207 Therefore, alcohol-related
deaths and distracted driver accidents would substantially decrease.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the increases in safety that
autonomous cars would provide, commuting time and efficiency could
be significantly improved. In 2005, the average person in the United
States spent one hundred hours commuting to work in a car.2os
Engineers predict that autonomous cars would improve traffic
congestion and road use by allowing cars to drive closer together and
Safe,
IEE1:
SPECTRUM
(July
1,
2011),
http://spectrunueee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/cmudevelops-autonomous-car-software-that-is-provably-safe ("It's one thing
to ramble on (like we do) about how autonomous cars are way safer
than hurn_an driven cars, but it's another thing to prove it. Like,
mathematically. A research group at Carnegie Mellon has created a
dis~r~buted c~~trol system for autonomous highway driving and then
verified that it s safe. In other words, the software itself provably [sic]
cannot cause an accident.").
204. Gross, supra note 16 ("'That's going to be our next major safety
advance - on par with airbags or safety belts,' Belcher said. Belcher
said studies suggest that as many as 81 percent of 'non-impaired'
crashes could be avoided through vehicle-to-vehicle communication
which uses a dedicated part of the radio spectrum that's been set asid~
by the federal government.").
205. Statistics and Facts About Distracted Driving, DISTRACTION.GOV,
http://www.distraction.gov/stats-and-facts/ (last visited Nov. 13 2011
8:51 PM).
'
'
206. MOT//
VEHICLE
SAFETY,
CDC,
http: www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011,
8:54 PM).
207. Howe:~r, take note t~at another issue is hackers, which may have the
capability to upload viruses that "intoxicate" or "distract" the software
o~ hardware in an ~utonomous car. See Markoff, supra note 15 ("There
will also be unpredictable technological risks, several participants' said.
For. ~x~mple, fu~ure autonomous vehicles will rely heavily on global
posit10nmg satellite data and other systems which are vulnerable to
jamming by malicious computer hackers."). '
208. See Americans Spend More Than 100 Hours Commuting to Work Each

~ear, C:ensus Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 30, 2005)

( Ame~icans spend _more than 100 hours commuting to work each year,
accordmg to Amencan Community Survey (ACS) data released today
by the U.S. Census Bureau. This exceeds the two weeks of vacation time
(80 h01.1:rs) frequently taken by workers over the course of a year. For
the nat10n as a whole, the average daily commute to work lasted about
24.3 minutes in 2003. ").
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209 As a result, not only would humans'
communicate with each other.
.
. .
erall time spent in cars decrease, but the time spent commutmg m
ov s could be used for other tasks. 210 Even travel times will become
.
carore accurate because the cars could calculate t h e trave1 times
wi"th
~ecision by communicating with other cars-making less people late
211
.
p work-and fu rt h er improvmg
.
. eff"iciency.
for
.
Additionally, engineers also predict that autonomous cars will
increase fuel economy and thereby save the United States billions of
dollars. 212 Particularly, with current fuel prices projected to reach a
record high of five dollars per gallon in the near future, fuel efficiency
is of paramount importance. 213 According to the U'.S. Department of
Transportation, aggressive drivers' gas mileage is thirty-three percent
higher than that of an average driver. 214 Autonomous cars_, however,
will effectively eliminate aggressive drivers, thereby decreasmg carbon
emissions and saving governments, corporations, and people billions of
dollars.

209. Markoff, supra note 49; see also Keith Barry, Semi-Autonomous Road
Train Trial Is a Success, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/01/semi-autonomous-road-traintrial-is-a-success/ ("That allows the semi-autonomous vehicles in the
train to follow together very closely, reducing congestion and decreasing
energy use by up to 20 percent. Indeed, in the trail shown above, cars
were a mere 20 feet from each other and travelled at speeds up to 56
mph, all while the folks in the driver's seats checked out their iPads. ");
see also Gross, supra note 16 (explaining how autonomous cars will
communicate with each other).
210. The 100 hours only includes time commuting to work and does not

include the total time spent in cars. Cf. Americans spend more energy
watching TV than on exercise, UNlV. OF CAL. (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/6189 ("The average
daily duration for driving a car was 101 minutes . . . . "~· Hence, t~e
time currently wasted driving could produce substantial economic
benefits.
211. Forrest & Konca , supra note 18, at 37 ("With the time waited on roads
reduced, the ability to improve the overall efficiency is realized."); driver
stress would also decrease substantially.
212. Markoff, supra note 49; see also FORREST & KONCA , supra note 18, at
38 (" [I]n 2004 people in the USA spent 424 billion dollars for fueling
their vehicles.").
213. See Clifford Krauss, Tensions Raise Spector of Gas at $5 a Gallon, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at Al. ("With no clear end to tensions w~th Iran
and Syria and rising demand from countries like China, g_as pnces a:e
already at record .highs for the winter months-averagmg $4:32 m
California and $3.73 a gallon nationally on Wednesday, accordmg to
AAA's Daily Fuel Gauge Report. As summer approaches, demand for
gasoline rises, typically pushing prices up around 20 cents a gallon.").
214. Forrest & Konca , supra note 18, at 38.
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crashes could be avoided" due to autonomous cars' ability to
communicate with each other over a special radio spectrum. 204
Moreover, in 2009, twenty percent of car accidents involved distracted
205
drivers,
and 11,000 people died as a result of alcohol-impaired
206
However, unlike humans, it is not possible for autonomous
drivers.
cars to become intoxicated or distracted. 207 Therefore, alcohol-related
deaths and distracted driver accidents would substantially decrease.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the increases in safety that
autonomous cars would provide, commuting time and efficiency could
be significantly improved. In 2005, the average person in the United
States spent one hundred hours commuting to work in a car.2os
Engineers predict that autonomous cars would improve traffic
congestion and road use by allowing cars to drive closer together and
Safe,
IEE~
SPECTRUM
(July
1,
2011),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/cmudevelops-autonomous-car-software-that-is-provably-safe ("It's one thing
to ramble on (like we do) about how autonomous cars are way safer
than hum.an driven cars, but it's another thing to prove it. Like,
mathematically. A research group at Carnegie Mellon has created a
dis~r~buted c~~trol system for autonomous highway driving and then
verified that it s safe. In other words, the software itself provably [sic]
cannot cause an accident.").
204. Gross, supra note 16 ("'That's going to be our next major safety
advance - on par with airbags or safety belts,' Belcher said. Belcher
said studies suggest that as many as 81 percent of 'non-impaired'
crashes could be avoided through vehicle-to-vehicle communication
which uses a dedicated part of the radio spectrum that's been set asid~
by the federal government.").
205. Statistics and Facts About Distracted Driving, DISTRACTION.GOV,
http://www.distraction.gov/stats-and-facts/ (last visited Nov. 13 2011
8:51 PM).
'
'
206. MOT//
VEHICLE
SAFETY,
CDC,
http: www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011,
8:54 PM).
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Additionally, engineers also predict that autonomous cars will
increase fuel economy and thereby save the United States billions of
dollars. 212 Particularly, with current fuel prices projected to reach a
record high of five dollars per gallon in the near future, fuel efficiency
is of paramount importance. 213 According to the U'.S. Department of
Transportation, aggressive drivers' gas mileage is thirty-three percent
higher than that of an average driver. 214 Autonomous cars, however,
will effectively eliminate aggressive drivers, thereby decreasing carbon
emissions and saving governments, corporations, and people billions of
dollars.

209. Markoff, supra note 49; see also Keith Barry, Semi-Autonomous Road
Train Trial Is a Success, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/01/semi-autonomous-road-traintrial-is-a-success/ ("That allows the semi-autonomous vehicles in the
train to follow together very closely, reducing congestion and decreasing
energy use by up to 20 percent. Indeed, in the trail shown above, cars
were a mere 20 feet from each other and travelled at speeds up to 56
mph, all while the folks in the driver's seats checked out their iPads. ");
see also Gross, supra note 16 (explaining how autonomous cars will
communicate with each other).
210. The 100 hours only includes time commuting to work and does not
include the total time spent in cars. Cf. Americans spend more energy
watching TV than on exercise, UNIV. OF CAL. (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/6189 ("The average
daily duration for driving a car was 101 minutes . . . . "~. Hence, t~e
time currently wasted driving could produce substantial economic
benefits.

207. However, take note that another issue is hackers, which may have the
capability to upload viruses that "intoxicate" or "distract" the software
o~ hardware in an autonomous car. See Markoff, supra note 15 ("There
will also be unpredictable technological risks, several participants' said.
For. ~x8:mple, fu~ure autonomous vehicles will rely heavily on global
pos1tionmg satellite data and other systems which are vulnerable to
jamming by malicious computer hackers."). '

211. Forrest & Konca , supra note 18, at 37 ("With the time waited on roads
reduced, the ability to improve the overall efficiency is realized."); driver
stress would also decrease substantially.

208. See Americans Spend More Than 100 Hours Commuting to Work Each
~ear, C:ensus Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 30, 2005)
( Ame~1cans spend _more than 100 hours commuting to work each year,
accordmg to American Community Survey (ACS) data released today
by the U.S. Census Bureau. This exceeds the two weeks of vacation time
(80 ho~s) frequently taken by workers over the course of a year. For
the nat10n as a whole, the average daily commute to work lasted about
24.3 minutes in 2003.").

213. See Clifford Krauss, Tensions Raise Spector of Gas at $5 a Gallon, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at Al. ("With no clear end to tensions w~th Iran
and Syria and rising demand from countries like China, g_as prices a~e
already at record .highs for the winter months-averagmg $4:32 m
California and $3.73 a gallon nationally on Wednesday, accordmg to
AAA's Daily Fuel Gauge Report. As summer approaches, demand for
gasoline rises, typically pushing prices up around 20 cents a gallon.").
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Therefore, if autonomous cars enter the market, it is apparent
that millions of lives and billions of dollars will be saved. 215 The social
utility of autonomous cars is undoubtedly significant. 216 Yet, if the
current liability framework is applied to autonomous cars, the
computer programmers and manufacturers of autonomous cars and
technology may make similar decisions that members of the
biotechnology industry made due to the threat of uncertain liability.
While products and strict liability will not act as an impregnable
barrier to entry, it will probably hinder the introduction of
autonomous cars into the marketplace. 217 And while autonomous cars
will eliminate many tort claims against drivers due to their increased
safety and efficiency, 218 the number of products and strict liability
claims against the manufacturers of autonomous cars likely will
increase upon introducing autonomous cars into the marketplace. 219

215. Id. at 30-40; see also Cowen, supra note 18.
216. Cowen, supra note 18.
217. See NIDHI KALRA, ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGIES
34
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dot.ca.gov/ research/researchreports /reports /2009 /prr200928_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_2009. pdf
("However, manufacturers' well-founded liability concerns may slow the
introduction of even socially beneficial technologies."); see also Cowen,
supra note 18 ("About 40,000 Americans die each year in car accidents.
Would driverless cars reduce this toll? We'll need further tests and
development to know for sure. But the way things stand now, we may
never get the chance to find out. Consider this thought experiment.
Assume that driverless cars could certainly reduce deaths by avoiding
accidents caused by people who drive while intoxicated or who simply
make stupid driving decisions, like driving on the wrong side of the
road. Add in the likelihood that even after they are perfected and well
inspected, driverless cars would lead to special problems, perhaps if the
computers don't respond properly to some unusual situations. To
continue this experiment, imagine that the cars would save many lives
over all, but lead to some bad accidents when a car malfunctions. The
evening news might show a 'Terminator' car spinning out of control and
killing a child. There could be demands to shut down the cars until just
about every problem is solved. The lives saved by the cars would not
be as visible as the lives lost, and therefore the law might thwart or
delay what could be a very beneficial innovation.").
218. See KALRA ET AL., supra note 217, at 34 ("[T]he decrease in the number
of crashes and the associated lower insurance costs that these
technologies are expected to bring about will encourage the adoption of
this technology by drivers and automobile-insurance companies.").
219. See id. ("[M]anufacturer liability is expected to increase, and this may
lead to inefficient delays in the adoption of these technologies.
Manufacturers may be held responsible under several theories of liability

.... ").

E.

Why Will Autonomous Car and Technology Manufacturers' Liability
Increase at the Outset?

When a new technology emerges, there is usually an increase in
general negligence claims and liability. 22° For instance, a class action
was already filed against Honda in 2008 claiming it:
misrepresented the characteristics of the Collision Mitigation
Braking System of the Acura RL vehicle. Plaintiffs argue[ed]
that Honda knew, but omitted the following information from
its pre-purchase marketing materials about the RL with the
Collision Mitigating Breaking System ("CMBS"): (1) the three
stages of the CMBS System overlap; (2) the CMBS will not
warn drivers in time to avoid an accident; and (3) the CMBS
shuts off in bad weather. 221
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the plaintiff's renewed
motion for class certification and remanded · it for further
proceedings. 222 The Honda case, nevertheless, is merely a glimpse of
the increase in claims that automobile manufacturers will see in the
future if autonomous cars are introduced into the marketplace. 223 The
220. Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
Precautions, and Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293
(1988) ("Negligence law is fundamentally a creature of technology;
really, it is the common law's response to technology. Advances in
technology can easily cause corresponding increases in the number of
negligence claims. Revolutions in an industry's technology will often
impose tremendous new loads on the negligence system.").
221. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 615 (C.D. Cal. 2008),
vacated sub nom. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Collision Mitigation Braking System,
A CURA.COM
(last
visited
Mar.
7,
2012,
9:26
pm),
http://owners.acura.com/Model/Features.aspx?feat=Collision_Mitigati
on_Vehicle&modelid=YB1H6CKNW ("The ZDX Collision Mitigation
Braking System™ ( CMBS™) helps reduce the likelihood of rear-ending
the vehicle ahead by alerting the driver before a collision occurs.
Powered by a radar transmitter mounted behind the grille, a signal is
constantly transmitted and the return signal is evaluated, determining
the distance. and closing speed of vehicles that lie directly ahead. When
a collision is considered unavoidable, the CMBS system takes steps to
minimize the severity of the collision. CMBS works automatically
without any driver input, but can be shut off if the driver prefers.").
222. Mazza, 666 F.3d. at 597. Although Honda was not required to
compensate anyone at this point in the litigation, Honda has probably
already paid substantial legal fees defending the case to this point. It
does not matter whether or not the car manufacturers win or lose cases.
The fact that cases are being filed is sufficient evidence to establish that
these manufacturers are paying substantial amounts of money to defend
these cases.
223. See generally Grady, supra note 222, at 293.
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Therefore, if autonomous cars enter the market, it is apparent
that millions of lives and billions of dollars will be saved. 215 The social
utility of autonomous cars is undoubtedly significant. 216 Yet, if the
current liability framework is applied to autonomous cars, the
computer programmers and manufacturers of autonomous cars and
technology may make similar decisions that members of the
biotechnology industry made due to the threat of uncertain liability.
While products and strict liability will not act as an impregnable
barrier to entry, it will probably hinder the introduction of
autonomous cars into the marketplace. 217 And while autonomous cars
will eliminate many tort claims against drivers due to their increased
safety and efficiency, 218 the number of products and strict liability
claims against the manufacturers of autonomous cars likely will
increase upon introducing autonomous cars into the marketplace. 219

215. Id. at 30-40; see also Cowen, supra note 18.
216. Cowen, supra note 18.
217. See NIDHI KALRA, ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGIES
34
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dot.ca.gov/research/researchreports/reports/2009/prr200928_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_2009. pdf
("However, manufacturers' well-founded liability concerns may slow t.he
introduction of even socially beneficial technologies."); see also Cowen,
supra note 18 ("About 40,000 Americans die each year in car accidents.
Would driverless cars reduce this toll? We'll need further tests and
development to know for sure. But the way things stand now, we may
never get the chance to find out. Consider this thought experiment.
Assume that driverless cars could certainly reduce deaths by avoiding
accidents caused by people who drive while intoxicated or who simply
make stupid driving decisions, like driving on the wrong side of the
road. Add in the likelihood that even after they are perfected and well
inspected, driverless cars would lead to special problems, perhaps if the
computers don't respond properly to some unusual situations. To
continue this experiment, imagine that the cars would save many lives
over all, but lead to some bad accidents when a car malfunctions. The
evening news might show a 'Terminator' car spinning out of control and
killing a child. There could be demands to shut down the cars until just
about every problem is solved. The lives saved by the cars would not
be as visible as the lives lost, and therefore the law might thwart or
delay what could be a very beneficial innovation.").
218. See KALRA ET AL., supra note 217, at 34 (" [T]he decrease in the number
of crashes and the associated lower insurance costs that these
technologies are expected to bring about will encourage the adoption of
this technology by drivers and automobile-insurance companies.").
219. See id. ("[M]anufacturer liability is expected to increase, and this may
lead to inefficient delays in the adoption of these technologies.
Manufacturers may be held responsible under several theories of liability

.... ").

E.

Why Will Autonomous Car and Technology Manufacturers' Liability
Increase at the Outset?

When a new technology emerges, there is usually an increase in
general negligence claims and liability. 22° For instance, a class action
was already filed against Honda in 2008 claiming it:
misrepresented the characteristics of the Collision Mitigation
Braking System of the Acura RL vehicle. Plaintiffs argue[ed]
that Honda knew, but omitted the following information from
its pre-purchase marketing materials about the RL with the
Collision Mitigating Breaking System ("CMBS"): (1) the three
stages of the CMBS System overlap; (2) the CMBS will not
warn drivers in time to avoid an accident; and (3) the CMBS
shuts off in bad weather. 221
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the plaintiff's renewed
motion for class certification and remanded· it for further
proceedings. 222 The Honda case, nevertheless, is merely a glimpse of
the increase in claims that automobile manufacturers will see in the
future if autonomous cars are introduced into the marketplace. 223 The
220. Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
Precautions, and Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293
(1988) ("Negligence law is fundamentally a creature of technology;
really, it is the common law's response to technology. Advances in
technology can easily cause corresponding increases in the number of
negligence claims. Revolutions in an industry's technology will often
impose tremendous new loads on the negligence system.").
221. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 615 (C.D. Cal. 2008),
vacated sub nom. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Collision Mitigation Braking System,
ACURA.COM
(last
visited
Mar.
7,
2012,
9:26
pm),
http://owners.acura.com/Model/Features.aspx?feat=Collision_Mitigati
on_Vehicle&modelid=YB1H6CKNW ("The ZDX Collision Mitigation
Braking System™ (CMBST'M) helps reduce the likelihood of rear-ending
the vehicle ahead by alerting the driver before a collision occurs.
Powered by a radar transmitter mounted behind the grille, a signal is
constantly transmitted and the return signal is evaluated, determining
the distance and closing speed of vehicles that lie directly ahead. When
a collision is considered unavoidable, the CMBS system takes steps to
minimize the severity of the collision. CMBS works automatically
without any driver input, but can be shut off if the driver prefers.").
222. Mazza, 666 F.3d. at 597. Although Honda was not required to
compensate anyone at this point in the litigation, Honda has probably
already paid substantial legal fees defending the case to this point. It
does not matter whether or not the car manufacturers win or lose cases.
The fact that cases are being filed is sufficient evidence to establish that
these manufacturers are paying substantial amounts of money to defend
these cases.
223. See generally Grady, supra note 222, at 293.
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autonomous car owners will inevitably blame their cars for crashes. 224
With new autonomous technologies, there will generally be a shift in
liability from the human owner to the manufacturer of the defective
product. 225 Particularly, with autonomous cars, many torts caused by
human error-such as negligence claims between drivers or drunk
driving accidents-will dramatically decrease. 226 Yet, with the new
autonomous technology, many new claims will arise. 227 For instance,
faulty technology or errors jn the computer software may cause many
accidents. In this case, the manufacturer or developer of the defective
technology would be held liable based on the policy rationale of
products and strict liability. 228
Take for example, current robotic cleaning technology. 229 These
robots merely vacuum or wash floors, vacuum pool floors, or clean

gutters. 230 These robots are simply the combination of cleaning
devices with wheels, primitive AI, and sensors. 231 Until these robots
existed, most people either cleaned their own homes or hired human
maids. In the case that a human maid caused damage or injury, the
person who incurred the damage would sue the maid or the maid's
employer. If a robotic vacuum caused damage, the person who
incurred the damage would sue the robot's manufacturer and possibly
others involved in its production. Whereas humans and corporations
composed of human workers were liable in the past, manufacturers of
the robotic technology are liable now, hence the shift in liability.
Analogizing this to autonomous cars, when a human crashes her
car into someone because she was texting and not paying attention,
the injured person can sue the human driver because the texting
driver's negligence proximately caused the damage incurred. Yet, if
the human variable was completely removed and the car's
autonomous technology caused the crash, the injured person would
sue the developer or manufacturer of the technology on a products or
strict liability theory. As a result, autonomous car and technology
manufacturers will be responsible for more claims under products and
strict liability.
As with other developing technologies, there will be technical
issues that need to be addressed. 232 The technology will inevitably
cause accidents. Based on how courts currently analyze analogous
autonomous technologies, it is reasonable to anticipate that courts
will apply products and strict liability to the manufacturers of
autonomous cars when the car is the sole cause of damage. 233
Accordingly, manufacturers of autonomous technology and cars will
incur more liability than they are currently accustomed. As a result,
the liability and costs incurred require some form of mitigation.

224. Safer at any speed?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2012, at 77 ("Another
headache will be lawsuits from motorists blaming their car for
crashes.").
225. KALRA ET AL., supra note 217, at 34 ("We anticipate that current
liability laws may lead to inefficient delays in manufacturers introducing
autonomous vehicle technologies. The gradual shift in responsibility for
automobile operation from the driver to the vehicle will lead to a similar
shift in liability for crashes from the driver to the manufacturer.").
226. Markoff, supra note 15 ("As Google has demonstrated, computerized
systems that replace human drivers are now largely workable and could
greatly limit human error, wl;iich causes most of the 33,000 deaths and
1.2 million injuries that now occur each year on the nation's roads.");
see also Jason Koebler, New Traffic Management System May Clear the
Way For Driver-less Cars, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Feb. 17,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/02/17 /new-traffic2012),
management-system-may-clear-the-way-for-driver-less-cars
("Without
sacrificing safety at all, we can get a lot more efficiency and less traffic
delay, he says. Watching other cars whiz by at full speed jtlst feet from
your vehicle might not sound appetizing, but Stone says once people
clear a 'mental hurdle,' it'll become the norm. Can we do better than
human drivers? That's not really a high bar to clear ... I believe they
will be significantly safer than human drivers. They won't drive drunk,
suffer from road rage, or text while driving.") (quoting Peter Stone, a
computer scientist at the Univ. of Texas at Austin).
227. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Product Liability Laws Are New Threat to
Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at C2 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003 /10 /06 /business /product-liabilitylawsuits-are-new-threat-to-microsoft.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(showing that when Microsoft came out with its new operating system,
products liability suits ensued).
228. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A cmt. c (1965).
229. iRobot: Cleaning Robots, !ROBOT.COM (last visited Mar. 8, 2012, 12:25
pm), http://store.irobot.com/shop/index.jsp?categoryld=2804605 ("Our
home robots are revolutionizing the way people clean, inside and out.
More than 6 million home robots have been sold worldwide, with the

116

award-winning iRobot Roomba® Vacuum Cleaning Robot leading the
charge.").
230. Id. (showing for sale the iRobot Roomba vacuum cleaning robots, the
iRobot Scooba floor washing robots, the iRobot pool cleaning robots,
and the iRobot Looj gutter cleaning robot).
231. iRobot: Get to Know Your Robot, !ROBOT.COM (last visited Mar. 8,
2012,
12:30
pm),
http://store.irobot.com/ shop /index.jsp ?categoryld=2804605 (explaining
the technology of iRobot cleaning robots).
232. See, e.g., Toyota Recall Information - 2009-2011 Recall Notices,
TOYOTA
(last
visited
Mar.
17,
2012,
10:17
pm),
http://www.toyota.com/recall/ (providing consumers of Toyota vehicles
with the most updated information regarding vehicle recalls).
233. See supra, Section III.
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autonomous car owners will inevitably blame their cars for crashes. 224
With new autonomous technologies, there will generally be a shift in
liability from the human owner to the manufacturer of the defective
product. 225 Particularly, with autonomous cars, many torts caused by
human error-such as negligence claims between drivers or drunk
driving accidents-will dramatically decrease. 226 Yet, with the new
autonomous technology, many new claims will arise. 227 For instance,
faulty technology or errors in the computer software may cause many
accidents. In this case, the manufacturer or developer of the defective
technology would be held liable based on the policy rationale of
products and strict liability. 228
Take for example, current robotic cleaning technology. 229 These
robots merely vacuum or wash floors, vacuum pool floors, or clean

gutters. 230 These robots are simply the combination of cleaning
devices with wheels, primitive AI, and sensors. 231 Until these robots
existed, most people either cleaned their own homes or hired human
maids. In the case that a human maid caused damage or injury, the
person who incurred the damage would sue the maid or the maid's
employer. If a robotic vacuum caused damage, the person who
incurred the damage would sue the robot's manufacturer and possibly
others involved in its production. Whereas humans and corporations
composed of human workers were liable in the past, manufacturers of
the robotic technology are liable now, hence the shift in liability.
Analogizing this to autonomous cars, when a human crashes her
car into someone because she was texting and not paying attention,
the injured person can sue the human driver because the texting
driver's negligence proximately caused the damage incurred. Yet, if
the human variable was completely removed and the car's
autonomous technology caused the crash, the injured person would
sue the developer or manufacturer of the technology on a products or
strict liability theory. As a result, autonomous car and technology
manufacturers will be responsible for more claims under products and
strict liability.
As with other developing technologies, there will be technical
issues that need to be addressed. 232 The technology will inevitably
cause accidents. Based on how courts currently analyze analogous
autonomous technologies, it is reasonable to anticipate that courts
will apply products and strict liability to the manufacturers of
autonomous cars when the car is the sole cause of damage. 233
Accordingly, manufacturers of autonomous technology and cars will
incur more liability than they are currently accustomed. As a result,
the liability and costs incurred require some form of mitigation.

224. Safer at any speed?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2012, at 77 ("Anothf;:r
headache will be lawsuits from motorists blaming their car for
crashes.").
225. KALRA ET AL., supra note 217, at 34 ("We anticipate that current
liability laws may lead to inefficient delays in manufacturers introducing
autonomous vehicle technologies. The gradual shift in responsibility for
automobile operation from the driver to the vehicle will lead to a similar
shift in liability for crashes from the driver to the manufacturer.").
226. Markoff, supra note 15 ("As Google has demonstrated, computerized
systems that replace human drivers are now largely workable and could
greatly limit human error, wl;iich causes most of the 33,000 deaths and
1.2 million injuries that now occur each year on the nation's roads.");
see also Jason Koehler, New Traffic Management System May Clear the
Way For Driver-less Cars, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Feb. 17,
2012),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/02/17 /new-trafficmanagement-system-may-clear-the-way-for~driver-less-cars
("Without
sacrificing safety at all, we can get a lot more efficiency and less traffic
delay, he says. Watching other cars whiz by at full speed jnst feet from
your vehicle might not sound appetizing, but Stone says once people
clear a 'mental hurdle,' it'll become the norm. Can we do better than
human drivers? That's not really a high bar to clear ... I believe they
will be significantly safer than human drivers. They won't drive drunk,
suffer from road rage, or text while driving.") (quoting Peter Stone, a
computer scientist at the Univ. of Texas at Austin).
227. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Product Liability Laws Are New Threat to
Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at C2 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/06/business/product-liabilitylawsuits-are-new-threat-to-microsoft.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(showing that when Microsoft came out with its new operating system,
products liability suits ensued).
228. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965).
229. iRobot: Cleaning Robots, IROBOT.COM (last visited Mar. 8, 2012, 12:25
pm), http://store.irobot.com/shop/index.jsp?categoryld=2804605 ("Our
home robots are revolutionizing the way people clean, inside and out.
More than 6 million home robots have been sold worldwide, with the
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award-winning iRobot Roomba® Vacuum Cleaning Robot leading the
charge.").
230. Id. (showing for sale the iRobot Roomba vacuum cleaning robots, the
iRobot Scooba floor washing robots, the iRobot pool cleaning robots,
and the iRobot Looj gutter cleaning robot).
231. iRobot: Get to Know Your Robot, IROBOT.COM (last visited Mar. 8,
pm),
2012,
12:30
http://store.irobot.com/shop/index.jsp?categoryld=2804605 (explaining
the technology of iRo bot cleaning robots).
232. See, e.g., Toyota Recall Information - 2009-2011 Recall Notices,
TOYOTA
(last
visited
Mar.
17,
2012,
10:17
pm),
http://www.toyota.com/recall/ (providing consumers of Toyota vehicles
with the most updated information regarding vehicle recalls).
233. See supra, Section III.

117

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET · VOL.

4 · N 0. 1 · 2012

Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability

IV.

PROPOSAL: APPLYING THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT TO
AUTONOMOUS CARS

The Restatement Second of Torts Section § 402A states that
although public policy places the burden on manufacturers and
producers to compensate those harmed by their products, this cost
can be mitigated by liability insurance. 234 Given the potentially high
social utility of autonomous cars, 235 and the theoretical increase in
autonomous car manufacturers' liability, 236 the current liability
framework requires modification in order to establish a two-tiered
insurance program similar to the nuclear energy industry's PriceAnderson Act. The purpose of the two-tiered insurance structure is
to eliminate uncertainties regarding manufacturer liability.
In
addition, the insurance structure is also designed to in~entivize the
autonomous car manufacturers to engage in the production of
The new insurance structure,
autonomous cars and technology.
moreover, is constructed to spur autonomous car manufacturers to
produce safe autonomous vehicles. Nevada has already set forth some
preliminary specifications for "autonomous technology certification
facilit[ies]. "237 The certification facilities' purpose is to determine the
234. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965) ("On whatever
theory, the justification ·for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of
the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the
right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.").
235. Markoff, supra note 15 ("As Google has demonstrated, computerized
systems that replace human drivers are now largely workable and could
greatly limit human error, which causes most of the 33,000 deaths and 1.2
million injuries that now occur each year on the nation's roads. Such
vehicles also hold the potential for greater fuel efficiency and lower
emissions-and, more broadly, for restoring the United States' primacy in
the global automobile industry."); see supra, Section III.
236. Markoff, supra note 15 ("Potential liabilities will be huge for the designers
and manufacturers of autonomous vehicles, said Gary E. Marchant, director
of the Center for Law, Science and Innovation at the Arizona State
University [L]aw [S]chool."); see supra, Section III.E.
237. Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 9, at 6 ("Before an
autonomous vehicle may be registered in this State, the owner of the
autonomous vehicle must submit to the Department, in addition to any
other requirement set forth in chapter 482 of NRS for registering a vehicle,
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autonomous car's compliance with Nevada's autonomous car
regulations. 238
In the proposed framework, the vehicle safety inspection facilities
would not only certify autonomous car owners, but would also
proactively diagnose possible pitfalls in the hardware and software.
To determine which party initially bears full liability, each state
should establish a similar vehicle safety inspection program to ensure
that all autonomous car hardware and software is functioning within
agreed upon parameters set forth by both the industry and the
government.
A.

Vehicle Safety Inspections

In the United States, many state legislatures have promulgated
statutes that require current vehicle owners to have their vehicles
inspected for mechanical soundness. 239 If the vehicle owners do not
obtain a satisfactory result, or fail to have their vehicle inspected,
they cannot lawfully operate their vehicle in that state. 240 In many
cases, these safety inspections are very rigorous. For example, in
Pennsylvania, all passenger cars and light trucks driven on highways
require an annual inspection. 241 Certified mechanics inspect a plethora
of systems, including each car's suspension, steering, and braking

a copy of the certificate of compliance issued by the manufacturer of the
vehicle or by a licensed autonomous technology certification facility
pursuant to section 16 of this regulation.").
238. See id. (setting forth the specifications and requirements of compliance with
the facilities).
239. Motor Vehicle Inspection Div. and the Statistical Analysis Ctr, Nationwide
and Missouri Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Program Fatal Crash
Analysis
2005-2007
11
(2008),
available
at
http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/Publications/OtherPublicat
ions/documents/fata1Crash2005_2007.pdf (showing that as of 2007, these
states have required motor vehicle inspection programs: Delaware, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
240. See e.g., Motor Vehicle Information for New Residents, Pa. Dep't. of
Transp., http://www.dmv.state:pa.us/new_residents/motor_vehicle.shtml
(last visited Mar. 19, 2012, 11:34 AM) ("A vehicle newly registered in
Pennsylvania must be safety inspected within ten (10) days of the
registration date. Inspections are performed at official inspection stations
(usually a repair garage or a service station with a repair shop). Equipment
checks include: lights, brakes, horn, tires, safety belts, exhaust system,
mirrors, tag mounting, suspension, turn signals, steering, glazing, wipers,
and other major parts of your vehicle.").
Pa.
Code
§
175.6
(1998).)
available
241. 67
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/067/chapterl 75/067_0175.pdf.).
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The Restatement Second of Torts Section § 402A states that
although public policy places the burden on manufacturers and
producers to compensate those harmed by their products, this cost
can be mitigated by liability insurance. 234 Given the potentially high
social utility of autonomous cars, 235 and the theoretical increase in
autonomous car manufacturers' liability, 236 the current liability
framework requires modification in order to establish a two-tiered
insurance program similar to the nuclear energy industry's PriceAnderson Act. The purpose of the two-tiered insurance structure is
to eliminate uncertainties regarding manufacturer liability.
In
addition, the insurance structure is also designed to inGentivize the
autonomous car manufacturers to engage in the production of
The new insurance structure,
autonomous cars and technology.
moreover, is constructed to spur autonomous car manufacturers to
produce safe autonomous vehicles. Nevada has already set forth some
preliminary specifications for "autonomous technology certification
facilit[ies]. "237 The certification facilities' purpose is to determine the
234. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965) ("On whatever
theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of
the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the
right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.").
235. Markoff, supra note 15 ("As Google has demonstrated, computerized
systems that replace human drivers a,re now largely workable and could
greatly limit human error, which causes most of the 33,000 deaths and 1.2
million injuries that now occur each year on the nation's roads. Such
vehicles also hold the potential for greater fuel efficiency and lower
emissions-and, more broadly, for restoring the United States' primacy in
the global automobile industry."); see supra, Section III.
236. Markoff, supra note 15 ("Potential liabilities will be huge for the designers
and manufacturers of autonomous vehicles, said Gary E. Marchant, director
of the Center for Law, Science and Innovation at the Arizona State
University [L]aw [S]chool. "); see supra, Section III.E.
237. Reg. Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 9, at 6 ("Before an
autonomous vehicle may be registered in this State, the owner of the
autonomous vehicle must submit to the Department, in addition to any
other requirement set forth in chapter 482 of NRS for registering a vehicle,
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autonomous car's compliance with Nevada's autonomous car
regulations. 238
In the proposed framework, the vehicle safety inspection facilities
would not only certify autonomous car owners, but would also
proactively diagnose possible pitfalls in the hardware and software.
To determine which party initially bears full liability, each state
should establish a similar vehicle safety inspection program to ensure
that all autonomous car hardware and software is functioning within
agreed upon parameters set forth by both the industry and the
government.
A.

Vehicle Safety Inspections

In the United States, many state legislatures have promulgated
statutes that require current vehicle owners to have their vehicles
inspected for mechanical soundness. 239 If the vehicle owners do not
obtain a satisfactory result, or fail to have their vehicle inspected,
they cannot lawfully operate their vehicle in that state. 240 In many
cases, these safety inspections are very rigorous. For example, in
Pennsylvania, all passenger cars and light trucks driven on highways
require an annual inspection. 241 Certified mechanics inspect a plethora
of systems, including each car's suspension, steering, and braking

a copy of the certificate of compliance issued by the manufacturer of the
vehicle or by a licensed autonomous technology certification facility
pursuant to section 16 of this regulation.").
238. See id. (setting forth the specifications and requirements of compliance with
the facilities).
239. Motor Vehicle Inspection Div. and the Statistical Analysis Ctr, Nationwide
and Missouri Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Program Fatal Crash
Analysis
2005-2007
11
(2008),
available
at
http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/Publications/OtherPublicat
ions/documents/fata1Crash2005_2007.pdf (showing that as of 2007, these
states have required motor vehicle inspection programs: Delaware, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
240. See e.g., Motor Vehicle Information for New Residents, Pa. Dep't. of
Transp., http://www.dmv.state:pa.us/new_residents/motor_vehicle.shtml
(last visited Mar. 19, 2012, 11:34 AM) ("A vehicle newly registered in
Pennsylvania must be safety inspected within ten (10) days of the
registration date. Inspections are performed at official inspection stations
(usually a repair garage or a service station with a repair shop). Equipment
checks include: lights, brakes, horn, tires, safety belts, exhaust system,
mirrors, tag mounting, suspension, turn signals, steering, glazing, wipers,
and other major parts of your vehicle.").
241. 67
Pa.
Code
§
175.6
(1998).)
available
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/067/chapterl 75/067_0175.pdf.).
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systems. 242
In addition, the Pennsylvania state legislature has
provided detailed procedures for the mechanics to follow when
executing these inspections. 243 If someone fails the inspection, he or
she does not receive an inspection sticker, which is required for vehicle
registration in Pennsylvania. 244 The Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation contracted a private company to analyze the
effectiveness of its vehicle safety program and concluded that the
"results of the research clearly demonstrate that the Vehicle Safety
Inspection program in Pennsylvania is effective and saves lives. "245
Likewise, Missouri has an established vehicle safety inspection
program, and it conducted a study that analyzed whether the vehicle
inspection programs had an impact on "reducing vehicle defects as a
causation factor in the worst types of traffic crashes. "246 The study
concluded that while Missouri's program is more effective than all of
the states with and without safety inspection programs aggregated,
states with safety inspection programs had more cars with defects
that were involved in fatal crashes than states without programs. 247
Furthermore, many critics disagree with the overall effectiveness of
the vehicle safety inspections and deem the programs as
"expendable. "248 In 2009, the District of Columbia decided to cut its
vehicle safety inspection program to save about $400,000 annually. 249
242. Id. at §§ 175.6-175.78 (The mechanics also inspect the tires and wheels,
lighting and electrical systems, glazing, mirrors, windshield defrosters,
windshield washers, windshield wipers, fuel systems, speedometers,
odometers, exhaust systems, horns and warning devices, body, and chassis.).
243. Id. at § 175.80.
244. Motor Vehicle Information for New Residents, supra note 239.
245. Nicholas J. Vlahos et al., Pennsylvania's Vehicle Safety Inspection Program
Effectiveness
Study
(070609)
ES-1,
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/inspections/Inspection%20Program
%20Effectiveness%20Study. pdf.
246. Motor Vehicle Inspection Div. and the Statistical Analysis Ctr., Nationwide
and Missouri Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Program Fatal Crash
Analysis
2005-2007
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/Publications/OtherPublicat
ions/documents/fata1Crash2005_2007.pdf ("The analysis was limited to an
examination of vehicles involved in traffic crashes resulting in the death of
one or more persons."); (The study defined vehicle defects as including
defects with "tires, brakes, steering system, exhaust system, headlights,
signal lights, horn, mirrors, wipers, and wheels.").
247. Id.
248. Sharon Silke Carty, D.C. junks car safety inspections: Will others, too?,
USAToday.com
(Dec.
10,
2009,
10:35
AM),
http:/ /www.usatoday.com/money / autos/2009-12-10inspectionslO_ CV_N .htm.
249. Id. ("Pennsylvania's safety-inspection program-11 million inspections a
year at 17,000 private garages-costs about $300 million a year. Just $1.5
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Marc Poitras, a professor of economics at the University of Dayton
does not believe that the programs are cost effective, and he stands
behind the "Peltzman Effect. "250 The Peltzman Effect theorizes that
vehicle safety· programs provide drivers with a false sense of security,
resulting in less prudent driving. 251 Nevertheless, the purpose of
vehicle safety inspections is not aimed at the drivers-but rather "to
identify and remove unsafe vehicles from the road". 252 Even if the
Peltzman Effect holds true for the current vehicle safety programs,
the argument is moot regarding autonomous cars since they are
operated by software and hardware, not humans with a false sense of
security.
With respect to autonomous cars and the proposed framework, as
long as the owners of autonomous cars bring their cars in for safety
inspections, the liability will shift to the manufacturer. 253 This shift,
however, is the crux of the autonomous car liability controversy.
Products and strict liability will undoubtedly be the leading theory of
recovery in the case that an autonomous vehicle's technology is the
proximate cause of harm or injury. 254 Other high-risk, high-utility
industries have faced a similar problem. 255 To ensure these industries
enter the marketplace swiftly-or at all-the federal government
sometimes intervenes. 256
million is paid by the state. The rest is borne by vehicle owners, who pay
$16 or $23 for the safety inspections, depending on the type and age of their
vehicles. Emissions testing, where required, is a separate fee.").
250. See Paul G. Specht, The Peltzman Effect: Do Safety Regulations Increase
Unsafe Behavior?, 4 The J. of SH & E Res. 3, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.asse.org/academicsjournal/archive/vol4no3/docs/fa1107feature02.pdf.
251. Carty, supra note 248 (describing the Peltzman Effect as "a theory that
holds that vehicle-safety efforts actually can negate their own impact.").
252. VLAHOS, supra note 245.
253. There will be a time frame in which an owner must bring his or her car
in for a safety inspection. So if the government requires owners of
autonomous cars to have their cars inspected three times a year, there
are three time frames. As long as the owner brings his or her car in as
required, liability is shifted to the manufacturer during that time frame
until that time frame is over, and the liability shifts back to the owner
until they bring it in for another inspection.
Not only does this
incentivize the owners to bring their cars in, but also increases the
likelihood that technical errors are found since this is a proactive
program. Note, that regardless of the shift in liability, the owner of the
autonomous car will remain liable for any damages caused by his or her
own negligence.
254. See supra Section III.
255. See infra, Section IV.B.
256. Id.
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systems. 242
In addition, the Pennsylvania state legislature has
provided detailed procedures for the mechanics to follow when
executing these inspections. 243 If someone fails the inspection, he or
she does not receive an inspection sticker, which is required for vehicle
registration in Pennsylvania. 244 The Pennsylvania Departnient of
Transportation contracted a private company to analyze the
effectiveness of its vehicle safety program and concluded that the
"results of the research clearly demonstrate that the Vehicle Safety
Inspection program in Pennsylvania is effective and saves lives. "245
Likewise, Missouri has an established vehicle safety inspection
program, and it conducted a study that analyzed whether the vehicle
inspection programs had an impact on "reducing vehicle defects as a
causation factor in the worst types of traffic crashes. "246 The study
concluded that while Missouri's program is more effective than all of
the states with and without safety inspection programs aggregated,
states with safety inspection programs had more cars with defects
that were involved in fatal crashes than states without programs. 247
Furthermore, many critics disagree with the overall effectiveness of
the vehicle safety inspections and deem the programs as
"expendable. "248 In 2009, the District of Columbia decided to cut its
vehicle safety inspection program to save about $400,000 annually. 249

Marc Poitras, a professor of economics at the University of Dayton
does not believe that the programs are cost effective, and he stands
behind the "Peltzman Effect. "250 The Peltzman Effect theorizes that
vehicle safety· programs provide drivers with a false sense of security,
resulting in less prudent driving. 251 Nevertheless, the purpose of
vehicle safety inspections is not aimed at the drivers-but rather "to
identify and remove unsafe vehicles from the road". 252 Even if the
Peltzman Effect holds true for the current vehicle safety programs,
the argument is moot regarding autonomous cars since they are
operated by software and hardware, not humans with a false sense of
security.
With respect to autonomous cars and the proposed framework, as
long as the owners of autonomous cars bring their cars in for safety
inspections, the liability will shift to the manufacturer. 253 This shift,
however, is the crux of the autonomous car liability controversy.
Products and strict liability will undoubtedly be the leading theory of
recovery in the case that an autonomous vehicle's technology is the
proximate cause of harm or injury. 254 Other high-risk, high-utility
industries have faced a similar problem. 255 To ensure these industries
enter the marketplace swiftly-or at all-the federal government
sometimes intervenes. 256

242. Id. at §§ 175.6-175. 78 (The mechanics also inspect the tires and wheels,
lighting and electrical systems, glazing, mirrors, windshield defrosters,
windshield washers, windshield wipers, fuel systems, speedometers,
odometers, exhaust systems, horns and warning devices, body, and chassis.).
243. Id. at § 175.80.
244. Motor Vehicle Information for New Residents, supra note 239.
245. Nicholas J. Vlahos et al., Pennsylvania's Vehicle Safety Inspection Program
Effectiveness
Study
(070609)
ES-1,
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/inspections/Inspection320Program
320Effectiveness320Study. pdf.
246. Motor Vehicle Inspection Div. and the Statistical Analysis Ctr., Nationwide
and Missouri Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Program Fatal Crash
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3
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available
at
Analysis
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one or more persons."); (The study defined vehicle defects as including
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year at 17,000 private garages-costs about $300 million a year. Just $1.5
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million is paid by the state. The rest is borne by vehicle owners, who pay
$16 or $23 for the safety inspections, depending on the type and age of their
vehicles. Emissions testing, where required, is a separate fee.").
250. See Paul G. Specht, The Peltzman Effect: Do Safety Regulations Increase
Unsafe Behavior?, 4 The J. of SH & E Res. 3, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.asse.org/academicsjournal/archive/vol4no3/docs/fa1107feature02.pdf.
251. Carty, supra note 248 (describing the Peltzman Effect as "a theory that
holds that vehicle-safety efforts actually can negate their own impact.").
252. VLAHOS, supra note 245.
253. There will be a time frame in which an owner must bring his or her car
in for a safety inspection. So if the government requires owners of
autonomous cars to have their cars inspected three times a year, there
are three time frames. As long as the owner brings his or her car in as
required, liability is shifted to the manufacturer during that time frame
until that time frame is over, and the liability shifts back to the owner
until they bring it in for another inspection.
Not only does this
incentivize the owners to bring their cars in, but also increases the
likelihood that technical errors are found since this is a proactive
program. Note, that regardless of the shift in liability, the owner of the
autonomous car will remain liable for any damages caused by his or her
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256. Id.
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Currently, twenty percent of the United States' total energy is
generated by nuclear power. 257 However, in 1956 the private nuclear
power industry was nonexistent due to concerns about the damage
that would occur in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. 258
Whereas most industries utilize liability insurance, in the 1950s,
insurance companies had neither the experience nor the financial
resources to insure a nuclear power plant. 259 In 1957, Congress passed
the Price-Anderson Act, which "added indemnity provisions to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954."26° Congress's goal was to create a
liability fund with specific procedures in order to adequately
compensate those injured as a result of a nuclear accident. 261

257. What is the status of the U.S. nuclear industry?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
22,
2011),
http://www.eia.gov/ energy_in_brief/nuclear_industry.cfm ("There are
currently 104 operable commercial nuclear reactors at 65 nuclear power
plants. Since 1990, the share of the Nation's total electricity supply
provided by nuclear power generation has averaged about 20%, with
increases in nuclear generation that have roughly tracked the growth in
total electricity output.").
258. Green, supra note 22, at 482 ("Specific figures finally emerged with the
release in 1957 of a study prepared for the AEC by its Brookhaven
National Laboratory. The Brookhaven Report concluded that in the
event of a serious accident (in a nuclear power plant of the general type
then contemplated at a typical location) resulting in release of all
accumulated fission products as many as 3,400 people might be killed; as
many as 43,000 people might be injured; and as much as 7 billion
dollars in property damage might result, largely from long-term land
contamination.").

Substantively, each state's liability laws govern the theories of
recovery. 262
Under the Act, each nuclear reactor is required to obtain a "first
tier" private insurance policy, valued at $375 million. 263 In the event
of a nuclear accident costing in excess of $375 million, the Act's
"second tier" liability fund is used to cover the surfeit of expenses. 264
The private company operating the nuclear reactor is required to pay
its "prorated share of the excess up to $111.9 million," which comes
from the second tier or pool of funds. 265 Currently, there are 104
nuclear reactors in the United Sates with over $11.6 billion in the
secondary pool of funds. 266 Annually, each nuclear reactor must
"contribute up to $95.8 million" to the secondary pool. 267 The Three
Mile Island accident is an example of how the Act operates. 268
262. JACK K. LEVIN ET AL., 27A AM. JUR. 2D ENERGY AND POWER SOURCES§
408 (2d ed. 2012) ("The substantive rules for decision in a public
liability action will be derived from the law of the state in which the
nuclear incident involved occurred, unless such law is inconsistent with
the provisions of the federal statute establishing the cause of action.").
263. FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 25.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The Price-Anderson Act, AM. NUCLEAR Soc'y (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf ("Power reactor licensees
are required to have the maximum level of primary insurance available
from private sources (currently $300 million) [sic] and to contribute up
to $95.8 million per unit to a secondary insurance pool, payable in
annual installments of $15 million or less, and subject to adjustments for
inflation at five-year intervals.") [hereinafter Am. Nuclear Soc'y].

261. Three Mile Island, 87 F.R.D. at 436 ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
was passed to establish a legal framework for the development, use and
control of atomic energy. In 1957 the Price-Anderson Act added
indemnity provisions to the Atomic Energy Act. It was the goal of
Congress to establish a liability fund, with procedures governing claims
against the fund, to facilitate the rapid and adequate financial
compensation of individuals if there ever were a nuclear accident.").

268. FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 25 ("When the accident at
Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Middletown, Pa., occurred in
1979, the Price-Anderson Act provided liability insurance to the public.
Coverage was available to those in need by the time Pennsylvania's
governor recommended the evacuation of pregnant women and families
with young children who lived near the plant. At the time of the
accident, private insurers had $140 million of coverage available in the
first tier pools. Insurance adjusters advanced money to evacuated
families in order to cover their living expenses, only requesting that
unused funds be returned; recipients responded by sending back several
thousand dollars.
The insurance pools also reimbursed over 600
individuals and families for wages lost as a result of the accident. In
addition to the immediate concerns, the insurance pools were later used
to settle a class-action suit for economic loss filed on behalf of residents
who lived near Three Mile Island. Because the Price-Anderson Act
allowed for a certain amount of money to be spent on each accident, it
covered court fees as well. The last of the litigation surrounding the
accident was resolved in 2003. To date, the insurance pools have paid
approximately $71 million in claims and litigation costs associated with
the Three Mile Island accident.").
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259. Id. at 483 ("First, the insurance companies had no experience with the
risks of nuclear reactors. Second, the amount of the potential liability
was many orders of magnitude beyond the capacity of the insurance
industry.").
260. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (2005); see also Green, supra note 22, at 486-87
("This time it was passed by the House by voice vote after debate and
by the Senate without debate."); see also In re Three Mile Island Litig.,
87 F.R.D. 433, 436 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
was passed to establish a legal framework for the development, use and
control of atomic energy. In 1957 the Price-Anderson Act added
indemnity provisions to the Atomic Energy Act.").
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Nuclear Energy & the Price-Anderson Act: High-Risk & HighUtility

Currently, twenty percent of the United States' total energy is
generated by nuclear poweL 257 However, in 1956 the private nuclear
power industry was nonexistent due to concerns about the damage
that would occur in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. 258
Whereas most industries utilize liability insurance, in the 1950s,
insurance companies had neither the experience nor the financial
resources to insure a nuclear power plant. 259 In 1957, Congress passed
the Price-Anderson Act, which "added indemnity provisions to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. "26° Congress's goal was to create a
liability fund with specific procedures in order to adequately
compensate those injured as a result of a nuclear accident. 261

257. What is the status of the U.S. nuclear industry?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
22,
2011),
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/nuclear_industry.cfm ("There are
currently 104 operable commercial nuclear reactors at 65 nuclear power
plants. Since 1990, the share of the Nation's total electricity supJ?lY
provided by nuclear power generation has averaged about 20%, wi~h
increases in nuclear generation that have roughly tracked the growth m
total electricity output.").
258. Green, supra note 22, at 482 ("Specific figures finally emerged with the
release in 1957 of a study prepared for the AEC by its Brookhaven
National Laboratory. The Brookhaven Report concluded that in the
event of a serious accident (in a nuclear power plant of the general type
then contemplated at a typical location) resulting in release of all
accumulated fission products as many as 3,400 people might be killed; as
many as 43,000 people might be injured; and as much as 7 billion
dollars in property damage might result, largely from long-term land
contamination.").
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Substantively, each state's liability laws govern the theories of
recovery. 262
Under the Act, each nuclear reactor is required to obtain a "first
tier" private insurance policy, valued at $375 million. 263 In the event
of a nuclear accident costing in excess of $375 million, the Act's
"second tier" liability fund is used to cover the surfeit of expenses. 264
The private company operating the nuclear reactor is required to pay
its "prorated share of the excess up to $111.9 million," which comes
from the second tier or pool of funds. 265 Currently, there are 104
nuclear reactors in the United Sates with over $11.6 billion in the
secondary pool of funds. 266 Annually, each nuclear reactor must
"contribute up to $95.8 million" to the secondary pool. 267 The Three
Mile Island accident is an example of how the Act operates. 268
262. JACK K. LEVIN ET AL., 27A AM. JUR. 2D ENERGY AND POWER SOURCES§
408 (2d ed. 2012) ("The substantive rules for· decision in a public
liability action will be derived from the law of the state in which the
nuclear incident involved occurred, unless such law is inconsistent with
the provisions of the federal statute establishing the cause of action.").
263. FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 25.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The Price-Anderson Act, AM. NUCLEAR Soc'Y (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf ("Power reactor licensees
are required to have the maximum level of primary insurance available
from private sources (currently $300 million) [sic] and to contribute up
to $95.8 million per unit to a secondary insurance pool, payable in
annual installments of $15 million or less, and subject to adjustments for
inflation at five-year intervals.") [hereinafter Am. Nuclear Soc'y].

261. Three Mile Island, 87 F.R.D. at 436 ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
was passed to establish a legal framework for the development, use and
control of atomic energy. In 1957 the Price-Anderson Act added
indemnity provisions to the Atomic Energy Act. It was the goal of
Congress to establish a liability fund, with procedures governing claims
against the fund, to facilitate the rapid and adequate financial
compensation of individuals if there ever were a nuclear accident.").

268. FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 25 ("When the accident at
Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Middletown, Pa., occurred in
1979, the Price-Anderson Act provided liability insurance to the public.
Coverage was available to those in need by the time Pennsylvania's
governor recommended the evacuation of pregnant women and families
with young children who lived near the plant. At the time of the
accident, private insurers had $140 million of coverage available in the
first tier pools. Insurance adjusters advanced money to evacuated
families in order to cover their living expenses, only requesting that
unused funds be returned; recipients responded by sending back several
thousand dollars.
The insurance pools also reimbursed over 600
individuals and families for wages lost as a result of the accident. In
addition to the immediate concerns, the insurance pools were later used
to settle a class-action suit for economic loss filed on behalf of residents
who lived near Three Mile Island. Because the Price-Anderson Act
allowed for a certain amount of money to be spent on each accident, it
covered court fees as well. The last of the litigation surrounding the
accident was resolved in 2003. To date, the insurance pools have paid
approximately $71 million in claims and litigation costs associated with
the Three Mile Island accident.").
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259. Id. at 483 ("First, the insurance companies had no experien~e w~th. ~he
risks of nuclear reactors. Second, the amount of the potential liability
was many orders of magnitude beyond the capacity of the insurance
industry.").
260. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (2005); see also Green, supra note 22, at 486-87
("This time it was passed by the House by voice vote a.fter debate. ~nd
by the Senate without debate."); see also In re Three Mile Island Lit1g.,
87 F.R.D. 433, 436 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
was passed to establish a legal framework for the development, use and
control of atomic energy. In 1957 the Price-Anderson Act added
indemnity provisions to the Atomic Energy Act.").
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Overall, the Three Mile Island accident cost over $70 million. 269
However, since the first tier policy covered up to $375 million, there
was no need to delve into the second tier. 270
One of the major benefits of the Act was that it created an
incentive for the private insurance industry to establish a financially
sound "means by which nuclear power plant operators could meet
their financial protection responsibilities. "271 The American Nuclear
Insurers draft all nuclear insurance policies, which are drafted with
the intention to spread the risk over many insurance companies
throughout the world through pooling. 272 Since 1962, the insurance
companies have only paid out $151 million in claims. 273

Obtaining liability insurance, furthermore, is not an unforeseeable
cost-it is merely one of the normal costs of engaging in business. 277
The annual payments are justified by the profits reaped and the risk
taken upon engaging in business, especially high-risk endeavors. Even
in the unlikely case that the ceiling is surpassed, Congress is required
to determine a solution. 278 But more importantly, private nuclear
reactors are not the only industry that the government has provided a
special insurance framework: 279
It should be noted that the federal government provides similar
insurance mechanisms for other types of disasters, such as floods;
agricultural disasters; banks and savings and loan company failures;
home mortgages; and maritime accidents. Liability limits also exist
for oil spills; bankruptcy; worker's compensation; and medical
malpractice. 280
Establishing a similar insurance framework for autonomous car
By
manufacturers would presumably produce similar results.
instituting a similar insurance framework, autonomous car and
technology manufacturers will not have to worry about the risk of
liability affecting their profits because there will be two tiers of
insurance and a ceiling on damages. 281 Under the program, each
autonomous car or technology manufacturer will have to annually pay
its pro rata share into the second-tier, just like the nuclear industry
does with the Price-Anderson Act. 282 Each manufacturer's share is
dependent on what the manufacturer produces, its predicted revenue,
and the amount of risk it is predicted to incur in the future. 283 In
order to be eligible, the manufacturer needs to be registered with the

C.

Analogizing the Price-Anderson Act to Autonomous Car Liability

Nuclear energy currently provides society with substantial
benefits, as will autonomous cars in the future. 274 Still, both nuclear
energy and autonomous cars are high-risk-particularly at the
outset-because the technology is new and unpredictable. The PriceAnderson Act was a well-suited solution to the private nuclear energy
conundrum. 275 The Act did not place any financial burden on either
the government or the public, and it removed a barrier to entry by
placing an insurance ceiling on the total amount of damages that the
private sector may need to pay in the event of a nuclear accident. 276
269. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id. ("The American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), which currently writes all
nuclear liability policies, retains about one third of the liability exposure
under each policy and cedes the remaining two thirds to insurers around
the world. This approach allows ANI to marshal the resources of the
worldwide insurance community and spread the uncertainties of the risk
over a large financial base. The Act has enabled insurers to provide
stable, high quality coverage for nuclear risks.").
273. Id. at 3 ("In the 43 years of Price-Anderson protection, the nuclear
insurance pools have paid a total of $151 million for claims. The
Department of Energy has paid about $65 million during this same
period.").
274. See supra, Section III.

to the public or the government. The Act has removed the deterrent to
private sector participation in nuclear activities presented by the threat
of potential liability claims following a large accident.").
277. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 584-88 (explaining liability
insurance and its impact on tort law); see also S.S. Kresge Co. v. Port
of Longview, 18 Wash. App. 805, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) ("he can
make the expense of liability insurance a cost of doing business . . . . ")
(citing Pappas v. Carson, 50 Cal. App. 3d 261, 269 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975)).
278. See FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 26.
279. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3.

275. American Nuclear Society, supra note 267, at 3; see also Insurance:
Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability Insurance at No Cost to
the
Public,
NUCLEAR
ENERGY
INST.
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.nei.org/ resourcesandstats / documentlibrary / safetyandsecurit
y /factsheet/priceandersonact ("The act has proven so successful that
Congress has used it as a model for legislation to protect the public
against potential losses or harm from other hazards.").
276. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3 ("The Price-Anderson Act is a
consumer- [sic] and public-oriented legislation. It provides a substantial
amount of insurance protection paid by the commercial sector at no cost
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280. Id.
281. See LeBeau, supra note 15.
282. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267.
283. Since some of those involved may be large car manufacturers, such as
General Motors, while others may be small hardware or software firms,
multiple variables will determine each manufacturer's pro rata share. If
a company merely creates radars and nothing else, they should pay less
than GM, who will probably manufacturer and profit much more.
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Overall, the Three Mile Island accident cost over $70 million. 269
However, since the first tier policy covered up to $375 million, there
was no need to delve into the second tier. 270
One of the major benefits of the Act was that it created an
incentive for the private insurance industry to establish a financially
sound "means by which nuclear power plant operators could meet
their financial protection responsibilities. "271 The American Nuclear
Insurers draft all nuclear insurance policies, which are drafted with
the intention to spread the risk over many insurance companies
throughout the world through pooling. 272 Since 1962, the insurance
companies have only paid out $151 million in claims. 273

Obtaining liability insurance, furthermore, is not an unforeseeable
cost-it is merely one of the normal costs of engaging in business. 277
The annual payments are justified by the profits reaped and the risk
taken upon engaging in business, especially high-risk endeavors. Even
in the unlikely case that the ceiling is surpassed, Congress is required
to determine a solution. 278 But more importantly, private nuclear
reactors are not the only industry that the government has provided a
special insurance framework: 279
It should be noted that the federal government provides similar
insurance mechanisms for other types of disasters, such as floods;
agricultural disasters; banks and savings and loan company failures;
home mortgages; and maritime accidents. Liability limits also exist
for oil spills; bankruptcy; worker's compensation; and medical
malpractice. 280
Establishing a similar insurance framework for autonomous car
By
manufacturers would presumably produce similar results.
instituting a similar insurance framework, autonomous car and
technology manufacturers will not have to worry about the risk of
liability affecting their profits because there will be two tiers of
insurance and a ceiling on damages. 281 Under the program, each
autonomous car or technology manufacturer will have to annually pay
its pro rata share into the second-tier, just like the nuclear industry
does with the Price-Anderson Act. 282 Each manufacturer's share is
dependent on what the manufacturer produces, its predicted revenue,
and the amount of risk it is predicted to incur in the future. 283 In
order to be eligible, the manufacturer needs to be registered with the

C.

Analogizing the Price-Anderson Act to Autonomous Car Liability

Nuclear energy currently provides society with substantial
benefits, as will autonomous cars in the future. 274 Still, both nuclear
energy and autonomous cars are high-risk-particularly at the
outset-because the technology is new and unpredictable. The PriceAnderson Act was a well-suited solution to the private nuclear energy
conundrum. 275 The Act did not place any financial burden on either
the government or the public, and it removed a barrier to entry by
placing an insurance ceiling on the total amount of damages that the
private sector may need to pay in the event of a nuclear accident. 276
269. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id. ("The American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), which currently writes all
nuclear liability policies, retains about one third of the liability exposure
under each policy and cedes the remaining two thirds to insurers around
the world. This approach allows ANI to marshal the resources of the
worldwide insurance community and spread the uncertainties of the risk
over a large financial base. The Act has enabled insurers to provide
stable, high quality coverage for nuclear risks.").

to the public or the government. The Act has removed the deterrent to
private sector participation in nuclear activities presented by the threat
of potential liability claims following a large accident.").
277. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 584-88 (explaining liability
insurance and its impact on tort law); see also S.S. Kresge Co. v. Port
of Longview, 18 Wash. App. 805, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) ("he can
make the expense of liability insurance a cost of doing business . . . . ")
(citing Pappas v. Carson, 50 Cal. App. 3d 261, 269 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975)).

273. Id. at 3 ("In the 43 years of Price-Anderson protection, the nuclear
insurance pools have paid a total of $151 million for claims. The
Department of Energy has paid about $65 million during this same
period.").

278. See FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INS., supra note 26.

274. See supra, Section III.

279. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3.

275. American Nuclear Society, supra note 267, at 3; see also Insurance:
Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability Insurance at No Cost to
the
Public,
NUCLEAR
ENERGY
INST.
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.nei.org/ resourcesandstats / documentlibrary / safetyandsecurit
y /factsheet/priceandersonact ("The act has proven so successful that
Congress has used it as a model for legislation to protect the public
against potential losses or harm from other hazards.").

280. Id.

276. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267, at 3 ("The Price-Anderson Act is a
consumer- [sic] and public-oriented legislation. It provides a substantial
amount of insurance protection paid by the commercial sector at no cost
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281. See LeBeau, supra note 15.
282. Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267.
283. Since some of those involved may be large car manufacturers, such as
General Motors, while others may be small hardware or software firms,
multiple variables will determine each manufacturer's pro rata share. If
a company merely creates radars and nothing else, they should pay less
than GM, who will probably manufacturer and profit much more.
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government and meet certain qualifications set forth by both industry
and the government. While this framework based on the nuclear
industry will likely have the same positive results for the autonomous
car industry, there is are still concerns: what if the autonomous car
industry depletes the second tier of liability insurance? 284
In the case that the first and second tiers of liability insurance are
depleted, just as the Price-Anderson Act requires for the nuclear
industry, Congress should determine a solution. 285 Asking Congress
to act is merely an ultimate failsafe should the second tier be
depleted, particularly considering the canta~erous nature of the
legislative process and Congress. With "just about every traditional
automaker . . . developing its own self-driving model, "286 the second
tier should have no problem establishing a substantial fund. The idea
is that the mere existence of such an insurance program provides
manufacturers of autonomous cars and technologies with a sense of
security because, under this program, they will not suffer
unsustainable losses. 287 But why do manufacturers of autonomous
cars deserve special treatment?
Autonomous cars' social utility will be significant, and their
creators merit special treatment. 288 These cars will save millions of
lives and billions of dollars once they enter the marketplace. 289
Similarly, nuclear power is also beneficial to society. 29° For instance,
nuclear power is carbon free-it emits no greenhouse gases. 291

"Proponents of nuclear power say it is the only available method of
producing large amounts of energy quickly enough to make a
difference in the fate of the atmosphere. "292 Nuclear power, though,
does have its drawbacks. 293 For instance, a nuclear reactor meltdown
can cause substantial harm. 294 When weighing the social utility of
nuclear power plants against the potential harm it can cause, the
picture is not clear how beneficial nuclear power really is to society.
The recent accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan
in March 2011 caused damage that is predicated to cost upwards of
$14 billion. 295 Nearly 170,000 people were displaced due to a '"major
release of radioactive material ... ' causing 'health and environmental
effects requmng implementation of planned and extended
countermeasures. "' 296 Yet, in the United States, nuclear power is
treated differently than other industries in terms of liability. 297
Conversely, when weighing autonomous cars' social utility against the
harm they may cause, the benefits clearly outweigh the harm.

284. See Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267.
285. Id.
286. Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive, The Autonomous Car of the
WIRED
(Jan
20,
2012),
available
at
Future
Is
Here,
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff_autonomouscars/all/1
("Google isn't the only company with driverless cars on the road.
Indeed, just about every traditional automaker is developing its own
self-driving model, peppering Silicon Valley with new R&D labs to work
on the challenge.").
287. See LeBeau, supra note 15.
288. See supra, Section III.
289. See supra, Section III.
290. See Michael Totty, The Case For and Against Nuclear Power, WALL.
ST.
J.,
Jun.
30,
2008,
at
R3
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121432182593500119.html
(exploring
the pros and cons of nuclear power).

the global community from achieving long-term gains in the control of
carbon dioxide emissions."'). See also MIT Releases Interdisciplinary
Study on the "Future of Nuclear Energy," MIT (July 29, 2003)
(emphasis in original), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
("But the prospects for nuclear energy as an option are limited, the
report finds, by four unresolved problems: high relative costs; perceived
adverse safety, environmental, and health effects; potential security risks
stemming from proliferation; and unresolved challenges in long-term
management of nuclear wastes.").
292. Nuclear
Energy,
N.Y.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/energyenvironment /atomic-energy /index.html?scp=lspot&sq=nuclear320power&st=cse (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).

TIMES,

293. See id. (providing an overview of the 2011 Japanese nuclear reactor
accident and the general drawbacks of using nuclear energy as a power
source).
294. See id. (providing an overview of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
accidents).
295. Jacob Adelman, Fukushima Cleanup Bill $14B Over 30 Years,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1104/fukushima-cleanup-bill-14b-over-30-years-ministry.html
("Contaminated material from Japan's wrecked Fukushima nuclear
plant will be collected over 30 years and stored at a secure site at a cost
of 1.1 trillion yen ($14 billion), according to the country's environment
ministry.").

291. The
Future
of Nuclear
Power,
MIT
(July
23,
2003),
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ ('"Fossil fuel-based electricity is
projected to account for more than 403 of global greenhouse gas
emissions by 2020,' said Deutch. 'In the U.S. 903 of the carbon
emissions from electricity generation come from coal-fired generation,
even though this accounts for only 523 of the electricity produced.
Taking nuclear power off the table as a viable alternative will prevent

296. Catherine Butler et al., Nuclear Power After Japan: The Social
Dimensions,
ENVIRONMENT
MAGAZINE,
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/ Archives /Back320Issues /2011 /N
ovember-December3202011/Nuclear-full.html (Last visited Mar. 10,
2012, 9:40 pm).
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297. See supra, Section IV.A.
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government and meet certain qualifications set forth by both industry
and the government. While this framework based on the nuclear
industry will likely have the same positive results for the autonomous
car industry, there is are still concerns: what if the autonomous car
industry depletes the second tier of liability insurance? 284
In the case that the first and second tiers of liability insurance are
depleted, just as the Price-Anderson Act requires for the nuclear
industry, Congress should determine a solution. 285 Asking Congress
to act is merely an ultimate failsafe should the second tier be
depleted, particularly considering the cantankerous nature of the
legislative process and Congress. With "just about every traditional
automaker . . . developing its own self-driving model, "286 the second
tier should have no problem establishing a substantial fund. The idea
is that the mere existence of such an insurance program provides
manufacturers of autonomous cars and technologies with a sense of
security because, under this program, they will not suffer
unsustainable losses. 287 But why do manufacturers of autonomous
cars deserve special treatment?
Autonomous cars' social utility will be significant, and their
creators merit special treatment. 288 These cars will save millions of
lives and billions of dollars once they enter the marketplace. 289
Similarly, nuclear power is also beneficial to society. 29° For instance,
nuclear power is carbon free-it emits no greenhouse gases. 291

"Proponents of nuclear power say it is the only available method of
producing large amounts of energy quickly enough to make a
difference in the fate of the atmosphere. "292 Nuclear power, though,
does have its drawbacks. 293 For instance, a nuclear reactor meltdown
can cause substantial harm. 294 When weighing the social utility of
nuclear power plants against the potential harm it can cause, the
picture is not clear how beneficial nuclear power really is to society.
The recent accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan
in March 2011 caused damage that is predicated to cost upwards of
$14 billion. 295 Nearly 170,000 people were displaced due to a "'major
release of radioactive material ... ' causing 'health and environmental
effects requmng implementation of planned and extended
countermeasures. "' 296 Yet, in the United States, nuclear power is
treated differently than other industries in terms of liability. 297
Conversely, when weighing autonomous cars' social utility against the
harm they may cause, the benefits clearly outweigh the harm.

284. See Am. Nuclear Soc'y, supra note 267.
285. Id.
286. Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive, The Autonomous Car of the
WIRED
(Jan
20,
2012),
available
at
Future
Is
Here,
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff_autonomouscars/all/1
("Google isn't the only company with driverless cars on the road.
Indeed, just about every traditional automaker is developing its own
self-driving model, peppering Silicon Valley with new R&D labs to work
on the challenge.").
287. See LeBeau, supra note 15.
288. See supra, Section III.
289. See supra, Section III.
290. See Michael Totty, The Case For and Against Nuclear Power, WALL.
ST.
J.,
Jun.
30,
2008,
at
R3
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121432182593500119.html
(exploring
the pros and cons of nuclear power).

Future
of Nuclear
Power,
MIT
(July
23,
2003),
291. The
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ ('"Fossil fuel-based electricity is
projected to account for more than 403 of global greenhouse gas
emissions by 2020,' said Deutch. 'In the U.S. 903 of the carbon
emissions from electricity generation come from coal-fired generation,
even though this accounts for only 523 of the electricity produced.
Taking nuclear power off the table as a viable alternative will prevent
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the global community from achieving long-term gains in the control of
carbon dioxide emissions."'). See also MIT Releases Interdisciplinary
Study on the "Future of Nuclear Energy," MIT (July 29, 2003)
(emphasis in original), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
("But the prospects for nuclear energy as an option are limited, the
report finds, by four unresolved problems: high relative costs; perceived
adverse safety, environmental, and health effects; potential security risks
stemming from proliferation; and unresolved challenges in long-term
management of nuclear wastes.").
292. Nuclear
Energy,
N.Y.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/energyenvironment /atomic-energy/ index.html ?scp=lspot&sq=nuclear320power&st=cse (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).

TIMES,

293. See id. (providing an overview of the 2011 Japanese nuclear reactor
accident and the general drawbacks of using nuclear energy as a power
source).
294. See id. (providing an overview of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
accidents).
295. Jacob Adelman, Fukushima Cleanup Bill $14B Over 30 Years,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1104/fukushima-cleanup-bill-14b-over-30-years-ministry.html
("Contaminated material from Japan's wrecked Fukushima nuclear
plant will be collected over 30 years and stored at a secure site at a cost
of 1.1 trillion yen ($14 billion), according to the country's environment
ministry.").
296. Catherine Butler et al., Nuclear Power After Japan: The Social
ENVIRONMENT
MAGAZINE,
Dimensions,
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/ Archives/Back320Issues/2011/N
ovember-December3202011/Nuclear-full.html (Last visited Mar. 10,
2012, 9:40 pm).
297. See supra, Section IV.A.
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Although autonomous cars can cause damage, the worst-case
scenario is by no means close to the nuclear power industry's worstcase scenario. Even if you aggregate all of the potential harm that
autonomous cars might cause over many years, the autonomous cars
still provide enough benefits to outweigh the aggregate. Nuclear
power plants, though, may not. There is insufficient evidence to show
nuclear reactors provide society with substantial benefits in
comparison to the drawbacks. 298 Thus, if nuclear power plants
provide society with less utility than autonomous cars will, yet still
receive special protections, autonomous cars should be granted at
least the same privileges that the nuclear power industry enjoys. All
the same, regardless of autonomous cars' social utility, why do
manufacturers of autonomous cars .and technology need special
treatment when they can merely pass the costs on to the consumer,
just as other industries?
First, consumers may not be willing or able to absorb the costsespecially after a recession-and an uncertain economic outlook for
the future. 299 Second, passing the costs on to the consumer rests on
the assumption that the costs will not raise the purchase price so
substantially that consumers decide not to buy the cars altogether. 300
Even if passing along the costs does not significantly raise the price of
autonomous cars for consumers initially, the possibility that future

costs may result still looms because the market and extraneous factors
are not predicable. 301 Additionally, since the risk that autonomous
cars pose is arguably high, 302 the automobile manufacturers are likely
to be hesitant to take such high risks without mitigation. For
example; General Motors' recent filing of Chapter Eleven in 2009
exemplifies that some of the largest and oldest corporations in the
world are not infallible. 303
With the help of a two-tier insurance framework and federal
regulation, the investment of placing an autonomous car on the road
will be worthwhile for manufacturers. The insurance framework will
alleviate manufacturer's worries of uncertain, and possibly, substantial
liability. Moreover, the framework will place no cost on consumers or
the government. This proposal also upholds public policy concernsthat manufacturers should be responsible for the harms their products
cause. 304 Furthermore, the program is proactive because it operates ex
ante by establishing vehicle inspections in order to find problems with
autonomous cars before they transpire. Additionally, the vehicle
programs provide courts, consumers, and manufacturers with
certainty as to who bears the liability after certain events occur.
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Although autonomous cars can cause damage, the worst-case
scenario is by no means close to the nuclear power industry's worstcase scenario. Even if you aggregate all of the potential harm that
autonomous cars might cause over many years, the autonomous cars
still provide enough benefits to outweigh the aggregate. Nuclear
power plants, though, may not. There is insufficient evidence to show
nuclear reactors provide society with substantial benefits in
comparison to the drawbacks. 298 Thus, if nuclear power plants
provide society with less utility than autonomous cars will, yet still
receive special protections, autonomous cars should be granted at
least the same privileges that the nuclear power industry enjoys. All
the same, regardless of autonomous cars' social utility, why do
manufacturers of autonomous cars _and technology need special
treatment when they can merely pass the costs on to the consumer,
just as other industries?
First, consumers may not be willing or able to absorb the costsespecially after a recession-and an uncertain economic outlook for
the future. 299 Second, passing the costs on to the consumer rests on
the assumption that the costs will not raise the purchase price. so
substantially that consumers decide not to buy the cars altogether. 300
Even if passing along the costs does not significantly raise the price of
autonomous cars for consumers initially, the possibility that future

costs may result still looms because the market and extraneous factors
are not predicable. 301 Additionally, since the risk that autonomous
cars pose is arguably high, 302 the automobile manufacturers are likely
to be hesitant to take such high risks without mitigation. For
example, General Motors' recent filing of Chapter Eleven in 2009
exemplifies that some of the largest and oldest corporations in the
world are not infallible. 303
With the help of a two-tier insurance framework and federal
regulation, the investment of placing an autonomous car on the road
will be worthwhile for manufacturers. The insurance framework will
alleviate manufacturer's worries of uncertain, and possibly, substantial
liability. Moreover, the framework will place no cost on consumers or
the government. This proposal also upholds public policy concernsthat manufacturers should be responsible for the harms their products
cause. 304 Furthermore, the program is proactive because it operates ex
ante by establishing vehicle inspections in order to find problems with
autonomous cars before they transpire. Additionally, the vehicle
programs provide courts, consumers, and manufacturers with
certainty as to who bears the liability after certain events occur.
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DRONE STRIKES ON CITIZENS:

Lastly, the insurance framework furthers car manufacturers' chief
concern-increasing profit margins-by placing a ceiling on damages
and providing car manufacturers with insurance that will arguably
provide the manufacturers with full coverage. Thus, like many other
industries, products and strict liability still apply to autonomous cars,
as the manufacturers should compensate those their products harm.
Yet, due to the social utility of autonomous cars, manufacturers also
deserve a special insurance framework to reduce risk.

V.

ENSURING DUE PROCESS FOR U.S.
CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM
ABROAD
By: Casey Fitzpatrick*
It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that
our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested;
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment
at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.

CONCLUSION

With the passing of time, cars are becoming more autonomous
and independent of humans. 305
Cars can park themselves with
minimal human intervention, 306 prevent accidents, and drive
themselves on marked roads with almost no human involvement. 307
Still, with this shift in control from humans to technology, there also
comes a shift in liability. 308 While autonomous cars will eliminate
many accidents currently caused by human error, many other
accidents will undoubtedly arise due to technological malfunctions. 309
Consequently, in order to ensure that autonomous car technology
enters the marketplace in a timely fashion, the liability of autonomous
car and technology manufacturers requires mitigation.
The autonomous car industry should adopt a two-tiered insurance
framework, similar to that of the nuclear power industry that would
also establish a ceiling on damages. 310 A similar two-tiered insurance
framework is necessary to provide certainty to manufacturers of
autonomous cars and technology regarding their liability so they have
an incentive to develop and produce autonomous cars. Hence, if the
current liability framework is not altered in some way, autonomous
cars will take much longer to enter the market and society will be
unable to fully reap the benefits of autonomous cars until a much
later time. With the current state of transportation and the burden it
has on society, 311 it is desirable that autonomous cars enter the
marketplace as soon as possible.

Justice O'Connor, llamdi v. llumsfeldt
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INTRODUCTION

The horrific events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on
Terror have ushered in an era rife with legal dilemmas, but few
definitive answers. One of the areas the United States has struggled
with is how to treat U.S. citizens who engage in terrorism. In an
attempt to limit risk to military personnel, the United States h_as
employed an unprecedented tool on the battlefield: unmanned aerial
vehicles, commonly known as drones. 2 The Obama Administration has
significantly increased the use of drone strikes from the G:eorge W.
Bush Administration; 3 in 2010, a total of 117 drone strikes were
conducted in Pakistan, which is double the number of strikes
conducted in Pakistan during the entirety of G.W. Bush's presidency. 4
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